The place of public statutory tribunals in the English legal system by Evans, Ann
Durham E-Theses
The place of public statutory tribunals in the English
legal system
Evans, Ann
How to cite:
Evans, Ann (1979) The place of public statutory tribunals in the English legal system, Durham theses,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9606/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
The Place of Public Statutory Tribunals in the 
English Legal System. 
Submitted by 
.~NN EVJ\NS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF B.C.L. 
UNIVERSITY OF DURH.l\M 
DEPARTMENT OF L.l\W 
1979 
The Copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No 
quotation from it should be published without her prior 
written consent and information derived from it should · 
be· acJcnm-11edgedo 
ABSTRACT 
A survey of tribunals in terms of history emphasises 
their unsystematic development. Two individual tribunals, the 
Traffic Commissioners and the Industrial Tribunals are taken as 
examples of this. The relationship between tribunals and the Executive, 
which is normally responsible for setting them up, continues to be 
uncertain and aubiguous. Despite the conclusion in the Franks 
Report that tribunals have an adjudicatory function, there is a 
lack of any recognised link between tribunals and the courts. This 
has led to increasing use of remedies ill-adapted to the purpose 
in order to challenge tribunal decisions in the courts. The 
emergence of a body of judicial opinion favouring appeal, at least 
on apointof law, has resulted in the blurring of legal principles. 
The rules of procedure for tribunals are unnecessarily varied and 
contain unjustifiable variations. The present selection of members 
is unsatisfactory and improvements are necessary in the provision of 
accommodation and administrative staff. The Council on Tribunals 
has not the resources for adequate supervision and has no power to 
remodel the system. The conclusion is that Parliament should find 
time for a comprehensive review. The advantages of tribunals are 
obscureo by the difficulties outlined above. Legislation should be 
enacted to provide for systematic development in the future. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
In the ~resent century a number of factors, 
some simple, some complex, often interrelated have 
led to the emergence, development and proliferation 
of tribunals, statutory decision-making bodies which 
are independent of ministers and their departments 
but ,.,rhich are not in the strict sense courts of law. 
The term "tribunal" itself is used \vith other conno-
tations and can indeed also be used of a court of law; 
since the tribunals '"hich are the subject of this uork 
are created by statute, either directly or increasingly 
through delegated legislation, it is convenient to 
call them statutory tribunals. 
Statutory tribunals have been set up as decision-
making bodies in a number of diverse areas of law, 
many of Hhich ure more lil<:ely to be the concern of 
the mon on u-,c Clapham omnibus than are many of the 
questions brought before the ordinary courts of la'"· 
Thus a number of writers have remarl<:ed that the 
proceedings of statutory tribunals are more likely to 
affect the life of the ordinary citizen than are those 
of the courts of law1 • The term "administrative" is 
commonly applied to these tribunals and during the 
first half of the present century they '"ere thought 
of as a part of the executive function of government. 
') 
The Franks Report~ declared in opposition to this view 
that "tribunals should properly be regarded as machiner}' 
provided by Parliament for adjudication" 3 and this 
conclusion has since met with general acceptance. 
1. cf. Harry Street - Justice in the Helfare State; 
Archer et al - Poor People's Courts. 
2. 1957 Cmnd 218. 
3. Ibid para. 40. 
.. 
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However, despite this act of legitimation, 
tribunals were still not considered to be full members 
of the judicial family. "Tribunals are not ordinary 
courts but neither are they appendages of Government 
Departments"1 ; this statement left tribunals inhabiting 
a no-man's land between the executive and the judiciary, 
belonging neither to the one nor to the other. It is 
arguable that the complexities of modern government 
require this land to be inhabited and that indeed 
statutory tribunals perform a valuable bridging function 
between the two. It is,however,unfortunate for the status 
of tribunals that they should be thus viewed as "nobody's 
children". In particular it has contributed to 
definitions of tribunals that abound in negatives, as 
exemplified in the Franks Report and in judicial 
? pronouncements- • 
. As a positive contribution, I would therefore 
define a tribunal as a statutory body with a clearly 
defined jurisdiction whose pronouncements have legally 
binding effect. Thus we can identify three essential 
features a 
1. Statutory origin. 
2. Limited jurisdiction. 
3. Enforceable decisions. 
As will be noted later,_ this power to make decisions 
as distinct from power to give advice (which distin-
guishes tribunals from inquiries) may still be in 
doubt • However, I would suggest that it is now 
essential, not least for maintaining public confidence 
in tribunals that their decisions should be binding 
in law. 
1. Franks Report,para. 40. 
2. Shell Co., .Australia v. Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation J!93~ .AC. 275. 
... 
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The tendency of governments to create specialised 
tribunals for particular problems has led to great 
diversity in and proliferation of tribunals (there 
are now over fifty different statutory tribunals in 
England and Wales). Tribunals have been described 
as occupying "a large part of a spectrum at one end 
of which is the every-day administrative decision 
taken in an office and at the other a judicial decision 
1 h' . . h taken by a court" • T 1s descr1pt1on suggests t at 
any· attempt to classify tribunals can do no more than 
assign to each tribunal its place along the line of 
the spectrum and there is a certain validity in this 
view. However, rather than being evenly distributed 
between the end points, statutory tribunals can be 
seen to cluster. There are a number of busy tribunals 
which operate as courts adjudicating between parties 
and a number of others which make decisions largely 
on grounds of policy that might equally well be made 
by an administrator. In terms of case load, statu-
tory tribunals are clustered at either end of the 
spectrum and I propose to select one example of a 
tribunal from each cluster •. ' Two tribunals, the 
Industrial Tribunals as court-like tribunals and the 
Traffic Commissioners as policy-centred tribunals will 
be examined in some detail. 
Before proceeding to this examination, I shall 
outline briefly the origins and development of 
statutory tribunals up to the appointment of the 
franks Committee in 1955. Tribunals had been within 
the terms of reference of the committee on Ministers' 
Powers (the Donoughmore Committee) 2 which reported 
in 1932 but this report had concluded that tribunals 
1. Wraith and Hutcheson, .!\dministrative Tribunals, 
P• 22. 
2. 1932 cmd 4060. 
.. 
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were exceptional and that those few that existed, 
provided that they observed the principles of natural 
justice, were working well. By 1957 the situation 
had changed in respect of this first conclusion. There 
were many more tribunals, too many indeed to support 
the view that they were exceptional. Meanwhile, 
criticisms of tribunals were widespread and could 
clearly not be met by an appeal to wide principles 
of natural justice; specific proposals were needed. 
Many of the problems examined by the Franks committee 
must have existed in 1932 but because tribunals were 
few in number they were not subject to close scrutiny 
by the Donoughmore Committee which concentrated its 
efforts on delegated legislation. Scrutiny was thus 
postponed, some would argue with unfortunate results 
in the intervening years. 
Statutory tribunals can be seen to adjudicate; 
that is they make decisions based on evidence placed 
before them. In this they operate more as courts 
than as administrators. However,the areas in which 
they operate, such as taxation, welfare, immigration, 
are areas where public considerations intrude on 
private actions. In this respect tribunals are part 
of public administration in which area they can be 
seen to administer by adjudication. 
This study of tribunals and the peculiar posi-
tion they hold in relation to the English legal 
system is based on the following preliminary 
consideration: 
1. While it is not difficult to see 
historical continuity and social 
inevitability in the continuing 
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and expanding use of tribunals to settle 
disputes in particular areas of law and 
administration, the past is not by itself 
sufficient justification for continuing 
a practice without questions. Serious 
questions have been raised concerning 
tribunals and they deserve consideration 
and answers. 
2. The absence of any clear objectives, apart 
from expediency, behind the establishment 
of most tribunals has resulted in a mixture 
of statutory bodies some of which are 
conspicuously more successful than others. 
It is so easy to legislate for a new tribunal 
that legislators are tempted to use the 
easy solution of a legislative formula already 
used on previous occasions. It seems desirable 
to clarify the objectives behind the operation 
of tribunals with a view to weed~ng out those 
tribunals that do not fulfill these objectives 
and to encouraging legislators to consider 
the implications before creating yet another 
tribunal. 
3. Tribunals cannot by any stretch of the imagina-
tion be seen to-day as forming a system, yet 
a system is what is neededa a system that 
distinguishes between the jobs tribunals are 
asked to do and which provides a pattern that 
the average claimant can understand. 
4. The lack of system is particularly apparent 
in the matter of appeals. There are a small 
number of higher level tribunals which hear 
appeals from lower tribunals. .~s all these 
- 6 -
are staffed by lawyers, there seems no reason 
'\vhy they should not be amalgamated into a 
single Appeal Tribunal. 
5. The Council on Tribunals has never been 
accorded the legal powers envisaged for it 
by the Franks Report nor has it in practice 
exerted much influence on the law. Its most 
careful pronouncements and sensible reconunen-
dations go by default because of its shadowy 
role and lack of "teeth". There is a strong 
case for re-defining the role of the Council 
on Tribunals and for reinforcing this role 
with appropriate powers. 
The next two chapters will try to clarify the 
present position of tribunals, firstly by looking at 
their origin and secondly by describing two tribunals 
of disparate character. This leads to a discussion of the 
relationship between the executive and tribunals in general. 
Revie\v of tribunals by the courts is examined next and their 
supervision by the council on Tribunals is surveyed. 'fhere 
is a selective appraisal of the procedures and staffing of 
tribunals. The concluding chapter discusses the changes that 
might be desirable and tl1e possibility of systematisation • 
.. 
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CH.!\PTER II 
.!\ Starting Point - Tribunals before Franks 
This chapter contains a brief survey of the 
development of statutory tribunals up to the appointment 
of the Franks committee in 1955. This survey has led 
me to the conclusion that there are three events of 
particular significance in the history of tribunalsa 
the first of these is the provision in the National 
Insurance .net 1911 for 'tribunals (Courts of Referees) 
to form part of the administrative machinery of the 
unemployment insurance scheme; the second is the wide-
spread use of tribunals in legislation enacted between 
1945 and 1950, legislation which regulated areas of social 
activity such as education, medicine and the provision 
of rented accommodation previously left more or less to 
private arrangement; the final factor is the acceptance 
in the Franks Report of the function of tribunals as 
adjudicatory, a finding which identifies them as part 
of the court structure. 
It is in the nature of things for a system of 
regulation to give rise to disputes among those who are 
subject to it. Therefore it is usually a part of any 
system of law to contain within it the machinery for 
settling such disputes. In· England the Common Law 
Courts 1vere initially concerned with property disputes, 
but they developed over the centuries to take account 
of other matters until they were systematised by the 
Judicature .~ct 1875. Decisions of these courts came 
to be an integral part of the law itself. A judicial 
decision clearly may be made in a court of law but 
currently many decisions that might be thought to be 
matters for judicial decision are made by tribunals • 
.. 
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The fact that these are differentiated from courts of 
law in name indicates that there should be some more 
substantial difference between them. .~n inquiry into 
these difference begins by observing how these tribunals 
came to be established at a time when a well-developed 
system of courts already existed. 
The word tribunal seems to be derived from two 
Latin words: Tribunus, a representative of the people, 
usually considered a protector of their liberties and 
tribuna, a raised floor for a magistrates• chair. In 
its modern English usage, the word tribunal refers to 
a panel or group of persons, usually with the function 
of making decisions at a public sitting. In its widest 
sense, "tribunal" can be used to refer to a court of 
law. More frequently, however, the word is used to 
distinguish a rather more informal body from a court 
of law. This body is usually a small group of people 
(typically three, less frequently two or one) selected 
from among the general population. The.tribunal 
usually holds public sessions but also acts informally 
in comparison to a court. It has power to_pronounce 
or adjudicate on matters brought before it. Such 
tribunals have been variously described as "administrative", 
"ministerial", "special" and ··statutory·•. I propose 
to use the term "statutory•· as being the least misleading. 
The tas]{ of describing a tribunal presents problems 
similar to those of describing an elephant. It is 
fairly simple to recognize a tribunal at work; it is 
difficult in general terms to describe the purpose and 
structure of a tribunal. It can be argued indeed that 
each tribunal is sui generis and that any definition 
that overrides the individual variation among tribunals 
is so '\vide as to be worthless. 
.. 
- 9 -
Yet there are certain features common to most if 
not to all tribunals. The origin. of the modern tribunal 
is in statute and because of a tendency for draftsmen 
to use standard clauses in .~cts of Parliament, there 
is a basic similarity in the structure decreed by 
statute for different tribunals. Thus the members of 
a tribunal will be lay persons, but the method of selec-
tion will be designed to lead to the appointment of 
persons with a certain expertise or experience. The 
balance ,.,ill usually be held by someone with legal 
training. Hearings are usually open to the public (who 
rarely attend them). .A tribunal hearing is devoid of 
some of the formality that prolongs court proceedings 
but it follows a general pattern of procedure dictated 
by considerations of "natural justice". The decision 
reached by the tribunal at the end of its proceedings 
is binding in law but enforcement usually depends 
on further proceedings in the courts. 
It is a feature of the modern tribunal as described 
above that it originates in statute and is given juris-
diction to deal with matters relating to the law enacted 
by that statute. Thus the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
was set up under the Mental Health .Act 1959 for matters 
concerned w·ith the operation of that act. Sometimes 
a tribunal may take over matters arising under a previous 
statute as the National Insurance Local .Appeal Tribunals 
were empowered in 1959 to deal with disputed claims under 
The Family .Allowances .Act 1944, which had previously 
been settled by a referee. Sometimes a tribunal may be 
utilised by a subsequent statute as the Industrial Tribunals 
set up under the Industrial Training .Act 1964 were used 
to deal with claims arising under the Redundancy Payments 
.Act 1965, and the jurisdiction of these tribunals has 
.. 
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sin(·o >r----n further extended. i'!C?vcrtheless, a temptation 
to whi rh most legislators sur·r·wnb is to rreate a ne1o.• 
td.hunL!l to r.l•:?ct euch new need that nrises and the result 
is tho (~~dstcnrc of m<:wy more:~ tribunals than could be 
justified l~· ~ systcmati~ ~ppro~rh. Jt is possible then 
to define tb0se td_l-JLmals ()S stututory decision-mnJdng 
hodio.s (-om~Jo~cd of la::,:rnc-n hut 1vi th u specialized membC?r-
ship op0rat ing inforJnally ;1nc1 aiming at a spee-dy con-
rlusion so as to minimise costs. 
'rho mu1d ng of d(:""'r:i sions is un ess<?ntial funl'tion 
of !]Ovcrnmr.::nt. Some of these decisions arC? thought to 
he appropr i ;.-:to for thr~ r·ourt s of laiv and cun ronveniently 
he ter~~d judiriul derisions. Many decisions, however, 
dr~fy rL12sificution and in prartirc: the tasJc of maJdng 
these i2 o~tcn given to persons or bodies especially 
dcsignat~d for the t2sk. From the fourt_ eenth century 
the Ju~tir0s of the Feur~ wC?re used for various tasks, 
involvin~ the makinJ of dorisions for the regulation 
of lat~ur anrl wa£eS, ~or the: muintonance of bridgC?s and 
hig-h1:a::;'::: ;Jr:c1 f:or the ~cl ief of the 1Joor. .As one tasJ~ 
fcJ_l out o~ us2 there was always another to take its 
._Jl an' and tho; ,Ju~;tict:'s of the Pea co. have a more or less 
r·ontinuou:::; history of :::-xistence, but i·Ji th a varying 
jurisdirtion '~hi~h later rame to be th~t of a rourt for 
minor rrinin~l offenrRs ~s well as including a licensing 
runetion in ronncction. '"ith the sulc of alr.ohol 1vhich 
J.~ a fa:nilinr. :-'eC'lture of the Justices' work to-du_r • 
. :\:'::- tho ,_~opul2tj on o: Ent;:rlnnd incre<'lsP.d and sor:i ety 
h:c<lmc t~lo_r" rompl ex, tllf:? joh of maJdng derisions had 
to he ~~re~~ DOrP widGly nnd the n:ineteenth century, 
<1 r0ntt1r.:~ oF ,:Jcp0riment;,tion, s;:n·l tht~ setting up of 
o num~')c_r or 1~odj_e:'"' to do thi~. Comr:-dssionr=-rs of 
.. 
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Income Tax were provided for by Statute in 1799 although 
at first the commissioners were often also Justices of 
the Peace. Two separate bodies, the General commissioners 
of Income Tax set up in 1803 and the Special Commissioners 
of Income Tax in 1805, are recognisably within the definition 
given for tribunals and still operate to-day. 
Despite their nineteenth century origins, however, 
tribunals are a twentieth century phenomenon. The 
prototype of the modern tribunals is the court of Referees 
set up under the National Insurance .Act 1911. This act 
was a legislative milestone for a number of reasonsa 
firstly, it marked the acceptance by government of a role 
previously reserved for business,self-help and charitable 
organizations, that of insurers against certain risks 
of human existence; secondly, it was the first durable 
enactment, after a number of false starts, in that body 
of social legislation which set up what has come to be 
known as the Welfare State; thirdly, it was one of many 
solutions suggested, discussed and tried to the intractable 
problem of unemployment in an industrial society, a 
problem which had troubled the British people for over 
a century and her politicians·for over a decade; of 
these solutions, it was the one that emerged as the long-
term answer. The National Insurance .Act 1911 founded 
the system of social security that operates to-day, albeit 
that the underlying insurance principle has become strained 
in the process. 
Since 1911, there have been many National Insurance 
.~cts but three basic features have remained the samea 
rontributions shared between citizen and state, state 
regulated right to benefits and a statutory machinery 
for the administration of the scheme. Part of this 
.. 
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machinery as established in 1911 was the Court of Referees 
which was to set the pattern for those bodies now generally 
known as tribunals, and of which there are now over fifty 
di fferent examples. 
The National Insurance .~ct 1911 was in two distinct 
parts and should logically have been two separate 
enactments. .~s noted by William Beveridge "compulsory 
1nsurance against sickness and invalidity and compulsory 
insurance against unemployment were conceived in the 
same year, 1908, and they came to birth together three 
years later in the National Insurance Act 1911. But 
the parentage was different"1 • Part I which concerned 
health was diffuse and hastily prepared with the champion-
ship of David Lloyd-George; Part II, which introduced 
unemployment insurance had been carefully drafted and 
well-prepared by Winston Churchill and Hubert Llewellyn-
Smith. During the passage of the National Insurance 
Bill through Parliament, most of the debate and contro-
versy arose from the Part I proposals anq those on Part 
II concerned finance, the actuarial basis of the Bill 
and the opportunities for exploitation of the scheme 
by idlers and scroungers. Tribunals, then called Courts 
of Referees, figured only in Part II and called forth 
no more than passing comment. 
The administration of Part II of the National 
Insurance .~ct 1911 was a compromise between the local 
structure used since the reign of Elizabeth. I for the 
administration of the Poor Law, and the central struc-
ture now seen as desirable both because of the size of the 
problem and because of the failure of remedies already 
tried organised at local level (as under the Unemployed 
Workmen's .Act 1905). The new scheme was designed 
1. Wo Beveridge, Power and Influence • 
.. 
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with the intention of avoiding the petty 
mindedness and local variation that had always accom~ 
panied decentralized schemes. The .~ct provided for a 
Central (Unemployed) Board and Local Committees for desi-
gnated areas and specific trades; the chairman of each 
local committee was to be legally qualified; members 
of the committee were drawn from owners of capital 
(employers) and workers (employees). .A panel chosen 
from each committee was to act as "referees" should there 
be a dispute between a claimant of unemployment benefit 
and an "insurance officer·;, who was given the main 
decision-making function under the .Act. -~ further appeal 
from the court of Referees lay to ··u.mpires" appointed 
by the Crown from highly-qualified and senior lawyers. 
The Court of Referees later became the National Insurance 
Local Appeal Tribunal and the Umpires became known as 
the National Insurance Commissioners. A Commissioner, 
whether sitting alone or with others is defined as a 
tribunal under the Tribunals and Inquiries .Act 1958, 
as are a '\vhole variety of persons or bodies instituted 
since 1911, at which time it can hardly have been fore-
seen that a definition would. be neededo 
i-lilliam Beveridge credits the whole idea of the 
referees to Hubert Llewellyn-Smith. These two under-
took the detailed drafting of the National Insurance 
Bill, Winston Churchill having left the Board of Trade 
at an early stage in its development. 
".~s one experienced in dealing with Parliamentary 
questions, he(Llewellyn-Smith)said to me that some means 
must be found of relieving the President of the Board 
of trade of the constitutional responsibility for 
decisions on individual claims to benefit; otherwise 
.. 
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the President would have to spend most of his life 
in explaining why benefit had been refused to John Smith 
or withdrawn from him. There followed the invention of 
Insurance Officers, courts of Referees and Umpires"1 • 
Although Beveridge refers to this part of the scheme 
as a "novel feature", it seems likely that Beveridge 
too had influenced the scheme. Beveridge had prepared 
for the unemployment insurance scheme by visiting 
Germany where pensions and compensation for accidents 
at work were provided by a similar state-sponsored 
scheme. In September 1907 he had attended a hearing 
of a"Schiedsgerecht", which he describes as a court 
of arbitration dealing with disputes over pension rights. 
He had published an article in the Morning Post of 17th 
September 1907 on the German system of compensation for 
accidents at work, in which he wrote "Litigation between 
individual workmen and employers has been absolutely 
abolished and with it has gone a fruitful source of 
embittered relations between the two parties". Clearly 
Beveridge had observed the settlement of disputes by 
specialist tribunals and was predisposed to favour keeping 
certain disputes out of the ordinary courts of law. 
The courts of Referees can also be seen as a 
development of the systems used to regulate the railways 
in the previous century. The development of railways 
had posed new problems for society which were gradually 
seen to require state intervention. Throughout the middle 
years of the century various systems were trieda In 
1840, the Railway Department of the Board of Trade was 
established, thus giving a government department the 
function of protecting the public interest; in 1844, 
the department's function was taken over by a separate 
1. w. Beveridge, Power and Influence • 
.. 
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Railways Board; this Board was superseded by the 
Commissioners of Railways in 1846; in 1851 these inde-
pendent bodies were abandoned in favour of a return to 
the Railways Department of the Board of Trade. All of 
these variously designated bodies were invested with 
different powers at different periods of time but in 
general they had to receive notice of the intended 
opening. of a ~ew line which they then had power to 
inspect; they had power to grant or withold approval 
for the operation of the new line. In this they fore-
shadowed the Traffic Commissioners established in 1930 
to regulate road transport. The regulatory bodies for 
the railways also scrutinised by-laws and investigated 
accidents. These responsibilities might involve settling 
disputes for which an "adjudicatory panel" was used. 
The regulation of railways in the nineteenth 
century provided a testing ground in the search for 
an effective system of government intervention. This 
was carried out by "developing a system, J'!lany of whose 
features - delegated legislation, administrative 
tribunals, appeal to the Minister and quasi-legislation -
have proved highly controversial"1 • 
The Regulation of Railways .~ct 1873 consolidated 
the experimentation and set up the Railway and canal 
Commission which was strengthened and given wider 
powers under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888. The 
Commission had power to influence the rates charged by 
railway and canal operators for their services, a power 
inherited by the Transport Tribunal and similar to that 
now exercised by the Traffic Commissioner. The Railway 
and Canal Commissioners exercised some of their powers 
sitting as a "tribunal" whose structure was similar to 
1. H. Parriss, "Government and Railways in Nineteenth 
Century Britain "• 
.. 
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that of the Courts of Referees set up under the National 
Insurance .~ct 1911. Even if not acknowledged, the 
nineteenth century experience of railway regulation must 
have influenced the development of statutory tribunals 
in the twentieth century; "Hence, even to-day the nine-
teenth century origins of modern administrative law are 
not generally recognised••1 • 
In 1911, hmvever, the new courts of Referees were 
seen as a part of an advisory service and their judicial 
function was hardly appreciated. However, their useful-
ness "\vas clear and other new tribunal~ were set up 
particularly during the war-time period, 1914-1918. 
Some of these fulfilled a passing need, others had a 
more permanent existence. .~ong the temporary tri-
bunals 1vere the Munitions .Appeal Tribunals set up under 
the Munitions of War .Act 1915 which operated a juris-
diction over certain industrial disputes and which 
h . . . 2 ave been seen as pressag1ng the Industrlal Trlbunals • 
The Pensions .~ppeal Tribunals set up under the War Pensions 
(.Administrative Provisions) .Act 1919 took the now near-
standard pattern of three members, in this case a legally-
qualified chairman, a medical-'practitioner and a disabled 
soldier (commissioned or non-commissioned depending on 
the rank of the claimant). These particular tribunals 
were temporary in respect of the particular matter of 
war pensions but referees were established under s.29 of 
the Wid01vs, Orphans and Old .~ge Contributory Pensions 
.Act 1925 and similar tribunals were used to determine 
pension disputes during and following the second World 
War. 
1. H. Parris, Op. Cit. 
2. G. R. Rubin. The Origins of the Industrial Tribunals 
Indust. L. J., Sept. 1977, 6, 149 • 
.. 
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In 1920, The 1911 .~ct and its amending legislation 
were repealed and replaced by the Unemployment Insurance 
.1\ct of that year, which effected the separation of 
unemployment insurance, now expanded and to a large 
extent established as a proper function of the State, 
from health insurance which was operated through the 
Friendly Societies. The two sorts of provision were 
not again to be united in the same act, nor were they 
seen as parts of one comprehensive problem until the 
Beveridge Report was implemented by legislation after 
1945. 
The problems which the 1911 .1\ct was designed to 
solve were already receding in 1911 and during the war 
years unemployment all but disappeared; the heavy 
casualties of the war might have suggested that shortage 
of labour might become the new problem. Instead in 
the 1920's, unemployment reached unprecedented levels 
and much of it was sufficiently long term to take 
those unemployed beyond any legal right to benefit. 
The unemployment benefit fund staggered from one 
cash crisis to another and amending acts were passed 
at the rate o~ more than one·a year. The two basic 
assumptions underlying the scheme, that levels of 
unemployment over time were predictable in that they 
followed a regular trade cycle, and that most unemploy- . 
ment represente.d a temporary phase in a person • s life, 
were shown to be unjustified in the inter-war years. 
The Unemployment Insurance .~ct 1920 re-enacted 
the provisions of the 1911 in respect of the adminis-
trative machinery. It provided that, a claim for 
benefit having been made in the first place to an 
Insurance Officer, a dissatisfied claimant might refer 
a dispute to a Court of Refereesa "The court of Referees, 
after considering the circumstances shall make to the 
.. 
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Insurance Officer such recommendations on the case 
as they may think proper and the·Insurance Officer shall, 
1 h d . . . 1 un ess e l.sagrees, g1.ve effect to these recommendatl.ons" • 
Presumably in practice, Insurance Officers did give 
effect to those recommendations, but clearly in the early 
years findings by the Courts of Referees were not deci-
sions, they were advice. During the 1920's, Parliament 
was mainly concerned with the government's failure to 
cope with unemployment- In 1929, during a House of 
Commons adjournment debate on unemployment, criticism 
of the disputes procedure forced the Government to reply. 
The Minister of Labour, whose department had evolved 
from the Board of Trade and since 1917 had taken respon-
sibility for the scheme, said "The courts of Referees 
were set up in 1911. We have a subsequent Act of 
Parliament (i.e. the 1920 Act) which is broad in its 
application, but these Courts have had to go on under 
regulations that have been supernnposed upon other 
regulations and it is time there was an inquiry into 
2 the whole procedure" • 
The promised Committee o~ Inquiry (The Morris 
Committee) was set up immediately and its report, ~he 
Report of the Committee on Procedure and Evidence for 
the Determination of Claims for Unemployment Benefit3 , 
was published in 1929. The committee commented on the 
difficulties the Courts of Referees had faced in 
administering the scheme ~n changed circumstances and 
dogged by frequent amendments. In particular;they noted 
the extra burden placed on the Referees by the 78-day 
Review Procedure introduced on an interim recommendation 
of the Blanesburgh committee4 • The Committee also 
1. s. 11 Emphasis added. .!Ul Insurance Officer could 
also refer a question to the Court of Referees for 
their advice before he reached a decision. 
2. HC. Deb. 24th July 1929. 
3. Cmnd 3415, 1929/30. 
4. Cf. The Report of the Royal commission on Unemployment 
Insurance, 1931/32, Cmd 4185. 
.. 
- 19 -
noted that "the conclusion of a Court of Referees is 
not a decision but a recommendation to the Insurance 
Officer"1 • If the Insurance Officer declined to give 
effect to the recommendation, the claimant could appeal 
to an Umpire whose decision was binding. The Morris 
Committee thought that to involve the Umpires in this 
way was unnecessary and recommended that a decision of 
a court of Referees should be binding, a recommendation 
that was implemented by the Unemployment Insurance Act 
1930,s8 (3) of which provides that in the event of a 
dispute over a claim between claimant and Insurance 
Officer, the matter should be referred "to the court 
of Referees for their decision". Thus were the Courts 
of Referees transformed from a panel convened to give 
advice to a tribunal empowered to adjudicate. 
By 1940 there were a number of disparate tribunals 
exercising statutory powers of decision-making. Their 
existence was noted in "Justice and .1\dministr.ati ve Law" 
first published in 1929 by w. A. Robson (Chapter VI 
of that book which deals with tribunals was significantly 
entitled "Trial by Whitehall"). ·Tribunals were at least 
marginally within the field of fire of Lord Hewart when 
he attacked what he saw as excessive administrative 
power in "The New Despotism". He saw the "ministerial 
tribunal'" as a device whereby ministers could have 
a decision made by an alter ego so that effectively 
departments were the real judges and thus clearly 
tempted to rule in their own interests. 
Tribunals came within the terms of Reference of 
the Committee on Ministers Powers appointed in 1929 
"to consider the powers exercised by or under the 
direction of Ministers of the Crown whether by way 
1. 1929/30 cmnd 3415, para. 7. 
.. 
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of delegated legislation or by judicial or quasi-judicial 
decision". This Committee, known as the Donoughmore 
Committee, concerned itself more with delegated legis-
lation than with tribunals and its report1 found little 
to criticise of tribunals as they operated then. The 
Report rejected W. A. Robson • s scheme for .~dministrative 
courts, finding that ministerial tribunals were adequate 
and satisfactory so long as they adhered to the princi-
ples of natural justice which the Donoughmore Committee 
believed that they did. The Report spoke of the 
"necessary safeguards" to the practice of using tribunals 
as being a general right of appeal to the High court on 
a point of law and the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
' High court. The fact that no such general right of 
appeal existed then or exists to-day seems to have been 
overlooked. .~s to the supervisory jurisdiction, the 
Report recommended a simplification of the procedure 
by which this was operated, and this was in fact carried 
out. 
The soothing noises made in the Donoughmore Report 
represented a wasted opportunity. The disturbed 
international politicsof the 1930's soon became war, 
and after that war tribunals were seen as a useful 
administrative device and were much used in the new social 
legislation which between 1945 and 1950 set up the Welfare 
State. 
In retrospect, 1946 should be designated the year 
of the Statutory Tribunal. In that year, four major 
.~cts of Parliament, The Furnished Houses (Rent control) 
.~ct, The National Insurance (Industrial Unjuries) .Act, 
The National Insurance Act and The National Health 
Service Act, established and conferred jurisdiction on 
1. 1932 Cmnd 4060. 
.. 
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a number of important tribunals. This legislation stabi-
lised the pattern, initiated in the National Insurance 
.!'\ct 1911 of a triumvirate made up of a chairman and two 
wingmen; it fixed the name as "tribunal" in place of the 
sporting references to referees and umpires in the 1911 
.~ct; to these tribunals was given the power to settle 
numerous disputes, varying as to their legal basis, often 
involving major points of law and complex legal principles 
and appertaining to rights of high financial value. 
1946 was the year that the statutory tribunal was 
accepted (seemingly with little thought or discussion) 
as the appropriate body to settle disputes arising from 
the social legislation of which these Acts were.a part. 
The .~cts themselves set up the tribunals in the most 
general of terms and the regulations made under the Act 
were not much more specific; examples are given below 
in connection with specific tribunals. Certain illusions 
existed in the minds of the framers of this legislations 
that the number of disputes requiring settlement by the 
tribunals would be small·, that the need for them would 
be a decreasing one, and that the decisions tribunals 
would be required to make wo~ld be simple in nature and 
require the application of common sense rather than 
legal knowledge. Thus Mr. Aneurin Bevan said in reference 
to Rent Tribunals, "these Tribunals in my view and in 
our expectation will be established in a limited number 
of areas"1 • Later in the same debate he said "I feel 
that these Tribunals ought to work with the utmost 
freedom and should have regard always empirically to 
the circumstances of the case rather than that they should 
seek to apply judicial principles" 2 • 
1. H. c. Deb. 415. 1940. 
2. H. C. Deb. 415. 1941. 
.. 
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FURNISHED HOUSES (RENI' CONTROL) .1\CT 1946 
This Act provided that the Minister (of Health) 
could decide that a particular district in England and 
Wales should be subject to the .Act S .1. ( 2) provided 
that "for each district in which this Act is in force 
there shall be a tribunal constituted in accordance with 
the schedule to this Act"; (the Minister was empowered 
to direct that one tribunal could act for more than one 
district). The schedule provided that a tribunal should 
have three members, all appointed by the Minister and 
holding office at his pleasure. Further regulations 
made by the Minister (Furnished Houses (Rent Control) 
Regulation 1946 No. 781) stated that procedure before 
the tribunals was-to be "such as the Tribunal may determine". 
The same regulation (No. 8) provided that the Tribunal 
"may,if they think fit and at the request of either party 
shall, unless for some special reason they consider it 
undesirable, allow the hearing to be held in public". 
Representation before Rent Tribunals was allowed and 
decisions were to be 9iven in writing, although there 
was no requirement that reasons shoUld be given for such 
decisions. 
The Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act 1946 was 
almost word for word the same as the Rent of Furnished 
Houses control (Scotland) Act 1943, a statute whose 
working had been commented on with approval by the 
Ridley Committee which recommended a similar measure 
to apply to England and Wales. In Scotland, however, 
The Act represented change of a procedural nature in 
that the issue of the level of rents had since 1920 
been capable of submission to the Courts; this was not 
so in England and Wales. 
.. 
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The function of the tribunals under both .~cts was 
to consider the amount of rent payable by a tenant of 
furnished living premises and to either confirm it or 
reduce it; or the tribunal could dismiss the reference • 
. ~pplication to a tribunal could be made by either party 
to the contract or by the local .~uthority. The tribunal 
could also make an order preventing the landlord from term-
inating the tenancy for a specified time. 
Both .~cts were thought of as temporary expedientsz 
the 1946 .~ct was designed to end on the last day of 1947 
and the 1943 .Act was to expire six months after the ending 
of the Defence (Emergency Powers) .Act. Both continued 
in operation ·and were amended and put on a permanent 
footing as from Harch 31st 1950 by the Landlord and 
Tenant (Rent Control) .Act 1949 which applied to Scotland, 
England and Wales. The Rent Tribuna~ still operate as part 
of a larger scheme for control of rented property. 
N.~TION.AL INSUR.~NCE {INDUSTRI.AL INJURIES) .ACT 1946 
This .~ct was the third in a series of four designed 
to implement the White Paper on Social Insurance, and it 
replaced the \'lorkmen • s Compensation .Acts (1925-1945) 
with some savings as to "old" injuries and diseases. 
Under the .~ct, questions as to compensation, on the 
insurance principle, were removed from the jurisdiction 
of the courts. The courts had been seen by the working 
population as using legal niceties to prevent payment 
of compensation in deserving cases. The new .~ct set 
up two forms of tribunal machinery: firstly,Medical 
Boards and Nedical .~ppeal Tribunals who were to be 
expert judges as to the causation, nature and extent 
of the injury or disease for which compensation was being 
cl<'l imed; secondly, Local .Appeal Tribunals who were to hear 
appeals from claimants from decisions of Insurance Officers 
as to entitlement to benefit. The procedure here was 
.. 
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an exact parallel to that under the National Insurance 
.Acts, originating in the 1911 .Act and is dealt with more 
fully below. 
Medical .Appeal Boards set up under the National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) .Act 194 6 were to consist 
of "two or more medical practitioners". A claimant 
dissatisfied with a Board's decision could appeal to 
a Medical Appeal Tribunal made up of a Chairman and 
two others, both required to be medical practitioners. 
The appointment of personnel and the provision of 
procedure for both bodies was a matter for the Minister 
of National Insurance. 
The Local .Appeal Tribunals were also organised 
by the Minister of National Insurance. .Appeal from a 
tribunal decision was to one or more Ind~trial 
Insurance Commissioners. The Tribunals were required 
to give decisions, with reasons, in writing. 
THE Nl\TION.AL INSURJ\NCE .ACT 194 6 
This Act preserved the tribunal system originating 
in the National Insurance .Act 1911 giving new names to 
what had been the Courts of ·Referees, which became the 
Local .Appeal Tribunal, and the Umpires which became 
National Insurance commissioners. The sporting association 
was preserved in the Family Allowance Act 1944 and 
disputes under this .Act were decided by referees until 
1959. Moreover any question in a disputed claim under 
the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act and 
the National Insurance .Act, which related to matters 
governed by the Family .Allowances .Act was to be sub-
mitted to referees whose decision was to be accepted 
by the Local .Appeals Tribunals. 
.. 
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The National Insurance .~ppeal Tribunals took over 
directly from the Courts of Referees and these were re-
latively mature. Their procedure was well-established, 
they gave decisions in writing supported by reasons and 
they had acquired a consistency of approach. They had 
been overworked in the late •twenties and early 'thirties 
but this was not seen as a problem for the future. 
N.~TION.AL HE.ALTH .ACT 194 6 
This .~ct introduced a tribunal to consider the 
professional acceptability of practitioners in the various 
branches of the National Health Service set up by the 
Act.Schedule 7 provided for the now typical tribunal 
of chairman and two members; the chairman was to be 
a lawyer of at least ten years standing and appointed 
by the Lord Chancellor. The .two members were to 
represent two interests, that of the Executive Councils 
set up to run the Health Service and that of the 
practitioners. The function of the Tribunal was to decide 
if the continued inclusion of any person-within specified 
categories (covering most practitioners working in 
' health or similar services) _;would be predjudicial to 
the Health Service. In effect the State was providing 
its own disciplinary tribunal to supplement that organised 
within the profession. 
Thus by the end of 1946, these five new tribunals 
were created and one was re-named, and all were in legal 
existence if not in actual operation. These tribunals 
set up a pattern for other tribunals set up in the 
ensuing years. There were a number of features of the 
use of tribunals existing in 1946 which by default 
continued for the next twenty years until the Tribunal 
.. 
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system was reviewed by the Franks Committee. 
The first of these features was that a diversity 
of functions was given to bodies called tribunals, and 
the standardisation of name served to disguise the 
diversity;thus a tribunal might hear and determine 
claims by citizens as to their statutory rights against 
the State (a National Insurance Local Appeal Tribunal); 
a tribunal might act as assessors of the degree of disease 
or injury sustained by an employee (a medical board); 
a tribunal might decide the desirable content of a 
term in a contract between two citizens (a Rent Tribunal); 
a tribunal might consider the professional conduct of 
a medical practitioner (a National Health Tribunal). 
The"rag-bag" process by which all these different 
questions came to be decided by tribunals was not 
recognised as a problem at the time • 
. A second feature was a widespread misconception 
as to the extent of use of these new tribunals. As 
early as 1929, the Morris Committee had commented on 
the delays before hearing by the court of Referees; this, 
they said, was because more cases than expected had come 
before them. No lesson seems to have been learned from 
this experience. 
Thirdly, it is obvious that at least on the Government 
side of the House of Commons, there was, in 1946, a 
widespread desire for informal procedure and a retreat 
from legalism. This blinded the legislators to the 
extremely complex nature of some of the issues assigned 
to tribunals. 
Finally, it is clear from the reports of debates 
1n both houses that tribunals were a decidedly minor 
.. 
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issue in the passage of the various bills through 
Parliament. Major social changes, especially 
nationalisation and the universal provision of medical 
care and education, were the main preoccupation of 
Parliament and people. Tribunals were seen as convenient 
and economical, machinery for settling disputes which 
were constantly underestimated both in number and in 
complexity. Some comments and suggestions were made 
at the time during Parliamentary proceedingss the 
need for a system of tribunals rather than ad hoc 
bodies, and the necessity for complete independence from 
a Ministry1 • But a serious consideration of tribunals 
was delayed until the Franks Commission inquired into 
them • 
. At first the courts seemed to dissociate themselves 
from the new tribunals but during the next ten years, 
statutory tribunals were increasingly the subject of 
controversy and complaint and increasingly these 
complaints reached the courts, usually through the 
use of the prerogative orders which were used to fill 
the gap left by the absence of provision for appeal. 
There were various reasons for this discontents 
The area where tribunals were most active was that of 
welfare legislation, legislation that can now be seen 
as a logical development from earlier measures but at 
the time seemed a massive and sudden move. Ro M. 
Titmus summed up the situation at the end of the war: 
"The State "\-ras assuming new and in many respects wide 
responsibilities for the well-being of individual mem-
bers of society. From its initial pre-occupation with 
the crude manifestations of total war, expressed in such 
defensive policies as moving the injured to hospital, 
1. Cf.HC Deb,Oct. lOth 1948. Col. 302 and C9ls. 
345-346. 
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thefrightened to safety and the dead to the mortuaries, 
the Government was to turn under the pressure of circum-
stances and the stimulus of a broad conception of social 
justice to new fields of constructive welfare policies"1 • 
The ideas and ideals behind the policies pre-dated the 
war. Their implementation was both delayed by the 
occurrence of the war and hastened by its end. It was 
both the newness of the fields and the suddenness with 
which they were entered that provided problems for 
tribunals. 
In 1945, the Labour Party had behind it a long 
history of committment to its welfare programme but 
there seems to have been little preparation at a 
detailed level. What matters were suitable for reference 
to tribunals and what the terms of that reference 
should be were among the details that had received little 
or no consideration. Moreover the unexpected size of 
of the Labour Majority was both a boon and a curses 
On the one.hand it made the dreams of pr~-war days into 
reality but at the same time it removed the option of 
proceeding at a pace which allowed time for consideration 
of detail; indeed it argued for haste. 
The result was that the tribunal figured largely 
• in the 1946 legislation on grounds of expediency and 
economy. Criticism of their operation was thus inevi-
table. However, other factors contributed to the harsh 
opinions that now came to be held of them. The "war-
time spirit" was bound to evaporate in time of peace 
and people soon became both less cooperative and more 
demanding. Tpe requirement of security in sickness, 
difficulty and old age (provided at minimum by the State), 
was met by the 1946 legislation in terms that gave rise 
to the expectation that this should be met as of right • 
. An awareness of rights led to a closer scrutiny of the 
1. Titmus. R., Proble~s of Social Policy • 
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bodies making decisions affecting these rights. Then 
it must be remembered that the Welfare State was 
designed to be comprehensive. In terms of numbers alone, 
because the new legislation affected more people, it was 
inevitable that from these there should come more com-
plaints. Further,many of those newly included in State 
Welfare provision were the better-educated and better-
informed who were able to use their knowledge and express 
their discontent. Those affected now included the arti-
culate and the litigious as well as the poor and meek. 
Also the jurisdiction of at least one class of tribunal, 
the Rent Tribunals, extended to property rights of 
individuals, which people were more concerned to defend 
than they had been to quibble over what appeared as 
state charity. The decisions of the Rent Tribunals direc-
tly regulated payment out of and into the pockets of 
the private citizen, and being without appeal, were among 
the first to be challenged by use of the prerogative 
orders • 
. Among the bogey-men feared by the Labour Government 
in 1945 was the Royal Judge intent on denying the 
benefits of social legislation to the needy and doing 
so by ingenious interpretations of statutory language 
and fine distinctions "on the facts", very much as had 
occurred with the Workmen • s compensation .~cts. Indeed, 
.Aneurin Bevan publicly referred to judges as potential 
"Saboteurs" of socialist legislation. There were other 
reasons too, such as a desire for speed and finality, 
for entrusting decisions solely to tribunals, and for 
making no provision for appeal. 
Therefore, the courts were passed over in the social 
legislation of 1945-50 and judicial pronoucements of 
that time indicate a rather distant attitude towards 
.. 
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tribunals. Thus Goddard L.J. observed in R. v. Brighton 
"b . t 1 Area Rent Tr1 unal, ex parte Mar1ne Parade Esta e • 
"Obviously, therefore, Parliament intended the procedure 
of these tribunals to be of the most informal nature". 
However, by 1950, a subtle change had taken place both 
in judicial attitude and public expectation. New 
judicial appointments were made of people more in touch 
(and in sympathy) with the new legislation which was 
now generally seen as "here to stay". At the same time 
there was increasing dissatisfaction with tribunals in 
operation. Inconsistency of decision among individual 
tribunals, unexpected interpretations of the rules or 
plain misapplication of the law were serious matters 
when no method of appeal existed. The prerogative 
orders especially that of certiorari were used as a 
way of bringing this dissatisfaction before the courts. 
If used in conjunction with the order of Mandamus, 
certiorari could lead to the setting aside of a tribunal 
hearing and to a new hearing of the case before a 
differently constituted tribunal. An action for a 
Declaration could also be used to enable the courts to 
pronounce upon the legalities of a tribunal decision 
but it was appropriate only in these cases where a 
declaration of the rights of the matter was all that 
was desiredo 
The Prerogative Order (once the writ) of certiorari 
was once chiefly used in relation to proceedings before 
Magistrates' Courts but it could be used to bring the 
record of any "inferior tribunal"before the Divisional 
Court of Queen's (or King's) Bench. From this record 
the court could see if that tribunal had acted without 
jurisdiction or exceeded its proper jurisdiction. 
1. g950] , 1 .ALLER 946. 
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Judicial opinion was opposed to any Statutory restriction 
on the issue of the Prerogative Writs (or Orders). 
General words giving finality to a decision were not 
sufficient to exclude review by certiorari and even a 
specific exclusion of such review was inoperative if 
the application for Certiorari alleged improper consti-
tution of the inferior tribunal, or procedural or other 
major irregularity. 
"It is not in the public interests that inferior 
tribunals of any kind should be ultimate arbiters on 
questions of law. Parliament.can of course make them 
so; but it is clear ••• that a legislative intention 
to do so is not sufficiently expressed by the mere 
provision that the decision of such and such tribunal 
shall be final"1 • 
. ~1 so, in the case of R. v. Northumberland, 
Compensation .~ppeal Tribunal ex parte Shaw2 it was established 
that the Courts could review a decision by certiorari and 
could quash such a decision for patent error of law on the 
face of the record. 
To some extent, dissatisfaction with statutory 
tribunals, was being heard in the courts in the 1950's. 
The procedural route to such a hearing had technical 
difficulties and the hearing did not always yield a 
satisfactory remedy. There was confusion over the 
grounds for such approaches to the courts. The 
principle that "Where Parliament has created new rights 
and duties and has appointed a specific tribunal for their 
enforcement,recourse must be had to that tribunal alone"3 
continued to prevent more direct recourse being had to the 
courts and to preclude appeal unless it was provided for 
1. 
2. 
3. 
per Romer L. J. in R. v. Medical .A.ppeal Tribunal 
ex parte Gilmore {j.957] 2 W L R 498. 
1952 lKB 338. 
De Smith,Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 224 • 
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in the legislation. The ruling in Barraclough v. Brown1 , 
that where a right is given by a statute and the statute 
also provides for enforcement by a specific court, then no 
other court can entertain claims in relation to that right, 
was applicable to tribunals and, although distinguished on 
a number of points, effectively separate~ tribunal matters 
from the courts. General dissatisfaction with this posi-
tion provoked a standard Government response. 
On November 1st 1955, the Franks Committee was 
appointed. Its terms of reference werea 
"To consider and make recommendations on -
(a) The constitution and working of tribunals 
other than the ordinary courts of law, 
constituted under any .~ct of Parliament, 
by a Minister of the Crown or for the 
purposes of a Ministers' function; 
(b) The working of such administrative 
procedures as include the holding 
of an enquiry of hearing by or on 
behalf of a Minister on an appeal or 
as a result of objections or repre-
sentations and in particular· the 
procedure for the compulsory purchase 
of land". 
In the Report of the Fr~ks committee, tribunals 
were recognised as a permanent element of the legal 
systemo This marked the end of a period of growth and 
initiated a new period of consolidation. 
1. 1897 AC 615o 
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CH.l\PTER III 
-~ Tale of Two Tribunals 
This chapter takes a closer look at two particular 
tribunals, the Traffic Commissioners and the Industrial 
Tribunals and examines how they were developed in res-
ponse to particular needs. The variety of tribunals 
in existence to-day is bewildering to the layman and 
although in one sense they follow earlier models, 
especially that set up in the National Insurance .~ct 
1911, each tribunal has its own identity and is the 
product of the particular circumstance which led to 
its establishment. 
The two tribunals chosen illustrate two general 
situations .which are likely to lead to the setting up 
of a tribunals either a new area of policy decided on 
by government generates the need for impartial decisions 
to be made in particular cases or a new area of legis-
li:.tion requires an impartial body t.o adjudicate on 
disputes arising over the new leg~l rights and duties 
created by legislation. In the former case, in order 
that decisions should not ~e made by those 'rith a 
political interest in the outcome, a policy-oriented 
tribunal may be set upa In the latter case where 
adjudication is thought to be inappropriate for a 
court of law, a court-style tribunal may be created. 
The first of these is exemplified by the Traffic 
Commissioners 1-1ho operate a licensing system for the 
operation of services of passenger and goods transport 
by road• The second is exemplified by the Industrial 
------·- -·-
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Tribunals, recently referred to as "Courts in mufti"1 , 
and who among other things determine claims by employees 
for compensation for unfair dismissal. Both of these 
tribunals operate through regional organisation, an area 
of the country being served by tribunals organised from 
a central office in the area. 
Each of these two tribunals has its own individual 
history in terms of need, legislation, jurisdiction and 
resulting procedural approach. Both are very busy 
tribunals holding regular public sittings. The tale 
of the two tribunals which follows illustrates many features 
of twentieth century statutory tribunals. 
1. Article in the Guardian, 2?.8.78. 
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Tribunals and Transport 
The role of regulator in the public interest 
of the railways had been accepted with reluctance by 
governments in the ninetheenth century and ran counter 
both to political philosophy and to public expectation 
at that time. Some of the regulations to which the 
railway companies were subject can be seen as the price 
for the privileges and powers conferred on them under 
the private."cts of Parliament that were used to set the 
companies up. The administrative machinery was largely 
a response to the fears in Parliament of the monopolistic 
position of the railways. However when road transport 
expanded and diversified in the present century, there 
was an equal lack of eagerness on the part of governments 
to interfere. Now seen as inevitable, public controls 
over enterprises which transported passengers and goods 
by road was undertaken through legislation some time 
after the problems of the inevitable free-for-all 
situation had become clear. No one could accuse 
governments of meeting their problems half-way. 
The public control of railways and canals had 
been the subject of experiment and a number of different 
regulatory systems were tried. The Railway and Canal 
Commission was the durable result of a period of trial 
and error. The Commission's jurisdiction over fares 
and charges was given in 1921 to the Railway Rates 
Tribunal 1vhich ,.,as .renamed the Transport Tribunal in 
1947. This body was seen as a specialist court whose 
main function was the fixing of rates charged by the 
railway. The tribunal was intended to counterbalance 
.. 
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the power of the railways as the many small companies 
of the nineteenth century ~merged to form a few large 
companies each 1-Tith a virtual regional monopoly. The 
nationalisation of the railways in 1947 removed much 
" of the raison d'etre of the Railway Rates Tribunal 
although it '\vas renamed the Transport Tribunal and 
as such continues to operate to-day with a much reduced 
jurisdiction and an additional function to hear appeals 
against refusal by the Traffic commissioners of Operaters' 
Licences in respect of goods vehicles. 
The use of road transport increased sharply in 
the 1920's in three formss private transport, public 
passenger transport and carriage of goods. The first 
bm were regulated by the Road Traffic .1\ct 1930 and 
the last '"as covered by the Hoad and Rail Traffic .1\ct 
1933. These .flcts put into effect with some alterations 
the recommendations of the Royal commission on Transport 
which sat from 1928-1931. 
The P.oad Traffic .1\ct 1930 divided England and Hales 
into 11 traffic .Areas (there 'vere t'vo more for Scotland}. 
The Netropol i tan .!\rea of London '\vas removed when London 
was given a separate system of regulation under the 
Transport (London) .1\ct 1968, so that currently there 
are 10 areas. The .1\ct required that for each area there 
should be three Traffic Commissioners, one full-time 
Commissioner and bm part-time assistants '\vho '"ere to 
be draun from a panel nominated by the Local .Authorities. 
The pm;rers of regulating road transport,which had 
belonged to Local Government .1\uthorities and had been 
all. but ignored by them, were taken from them and a 
ne,.,r system of control instituted under the Traffic 
Commissioners. TO constitute a tribunal, one or two 
.. 
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r·ornnissioncrs held a publir hearing; in the case of 
clisagre0.mcn.t, trH:? applir:ation coul::l be rc-her~rd by 
three ~om~issioners. 
lJncl2r thr., FO.=!d Traffic lK·t 1930, the main function 
of the Tra.f f ic r'ommissioncrs \vho Here required to repor-t 
annually to Parliament was the grant of licences for 
passenger transport servires by road. Later, under 
the 19 3 3 .l\c·t, they \vere a 1 so to issue 1 icenres for 
the rarriagc of goods by roc1d. The licensing function 
involved the exercise of discretion with very wide 
limits ~nd gave considerable power to the ro~nissioners. 
The Traffic Commissioners continue ·to operate 
to-day as lic--ensing triJ:·unals. The distinction persists 
between the licensing of passenger transport and that 
of goods Lransport. The personnel are the same for 
both, but the statu-tory ~uthority, the constitution and 
the procedure of the tribunal and the conditions for 
the grant of a licenre are all different. 
In respect of lirences for passenger transport 
~:;ervices, the prinrip<Jl .l\rt is nm·.r the Poad Traffic 
.l\r-t 19 60. The operator of a passenger transport 
serv1re 1s re~uired to hold two licences, one in 
respect of the vehirle (a public service vehicle licence) 
<Jnd one in respec·t of the service ( a road service 
In additio~ the operator's staff, that is 
drivers ~nd ronductors al.so require appropriate 
licenrPs, uhirh ar0 also issued by the Commissioners. 
ThP Pllhlic Service Vehicle Licence is issued as 
of r.i.~ht to a person vho satisfies bvo requirements: 
.. 
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1 o That there is =. v:1lid current. certificate 
of fitness in respect of that vehicle 
(these certificates are issued by certi-
fying officers appointed by the Secretary 
of State and are subject to conditions 
prescribed by regulation); 
2. tliat the applicant, as to conduct and 
character, is a fit and proper person to 
hold a licence. 
'The Road Service Licence however is issu0d only 
to persons who can convince the tribunal there is a 
need for that particular service. The -Commissioners 
have an absolute di~'7cretion to refuse a licence, to 
grant it or to grant it subject to conditions. The 
Road Traffic Act 1930 provided that the Traffic 
commissioners in exercising their discretion to refuse 
grant or attach conditions to a Road Service Licence, 
should have regard to the following mattersc 
1. The suitability of the proposed routes 
for the servi-ce; 
2o the extent to whi.ch public need for 
such a service was already served; 
3. the extent to which the service 
was necessary or desirable; and 
4 o the needs of the ,.,hole area in rela-
tion to all forms of transport (S. 72). 
These provisions were re-enacted by the Road Traffic 
Act 1960 without alteration (S. 135 (2)). 
In addition to the power to grant or refuse the 
essential licence, the Commission has power to attach 
conditions to a .licence. These condi'tions may be in 
relation tos 
1. .Any matter affecting the exercise of 
the Commissioners' discretion (see above); 
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2. the fixing of fares at a reasonable level; 
3. the display of fare-tables and time-tables 
to the public; 
4. the positioning of bus stops and fare stages; 
5. the safety or convenience of the public, 
{Foad Traffic .~ct 1960, s. 135 (4)). 
There is an appeal from the tribunal's decision to the 
Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment. 
He ran hear appeals from the refusal of a licence, from 
the imposition of unncceptable conditions and from the 
exercise of other powers of the 1·ommissioners to revoke 
or suspend licences or to vary the conditions attached 
to them. In practice, the appeal may be heard by an 
inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, but the 
decision is taken by the Secretary of State who may 
or may not implement the recommendations in the Inspector's 
Peport as he rhooses. There is a further appeal, on a 
point of lau only,to the Divisional court of Queen's 
Benrh. 
The Traffic Commissioners are also responsible for 
the granting (and revoking) of licences for drivers and 
conductors or Public Service vehicles. Drivers are 
required to take a special test; conductors are required 
to sntisfy the rommissioners that they are "fit and proper" 
persons. Appeals in relation to these licences are heard 
in the Magistrates' Courts. 
The granting of licences to operate goods vehicles 
on the roads was originally provided for by the Road 
and Pail Traffir .1\rt 1933. The principle .~ct is now 
the Transport .~ct 1968. The 1933 .~ct provided that the 
licensing authority for goods vehicles should be a single 
.. 
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TrafficcommissionerJone of those already designated to 
issue licences in respert of passenger transport services. 
Instead of appeal to the Minister from a derision of 
the rommissioner, the Traffic Appeals Tribunal was set 
up to hear appeals. This tribunal \vas abolished in 
19LJ7 w·hen its jurisdiction was transferred to the Tr<msport 
Tribunal. 
The licensing of goods transport \vas delayed until 
1933 hecause the recommendations of the Royal Corrunission 
in this respec·t 'vere more controversial than those con-
cerned with passenger transport. 
The 1933 .~ct provided for three types of licence: 
The ·-~· licence or ;?Ublir carriers' lir·ence; the 'B' 
licence or limited cr=trriers' lirenre; and the •c• lirence 
or priv<'!te carriers' licence (that is for someone carrying 
his mm goods in his own vehic·le). The •c • licence \vas 
granted as of right to a fit and proper person. The 
'.\' and 'D' licences r·ould he granted, refused or granted 
subjP.rt to renditions. In exerrising their discretion 
as to ·-~· and 'D' licences, the licensing authority was 
directed to have regard: 
(a) w·here the applicant is the holder of an 
existing licence of the same class, to 
the extent to which he is authorised to 
use goods vehicles for hire and reward;· 
(b) to the previous conduct of the applicant 
1n the capacity of a carrier of goods; 
(c) to the number and the type of vehicles 
proposed to be used under the licence; 
(d) in determining the number of vehicles to 
be authorised, to the need for providing 
for occasions \vhen vehicles are withdra'vn 
from service for overhaul or repair; 
.. 
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( ':·) tc1 the c_':-~ter· t l:o 1-.rhich the vehicles to be 
<:JLll:hori.::·cc1 ~-::i.J 1 be in suhstitution for hors(o--
c1:::-~;,:;~ V~'hi rl es ~)rr.::-viously used by the l!pplirant 
~or th0 purpos~s of hjs business as a rarri~r 
(S. G(?)). 
'rJljJ.c- cli:cr•rtjnc~ themsP.lve~: arTording to the ronsioo-
rc.tjonc.· s:::Jcr·:i·~'-"h~(l (thf' l<1::-:t of l;•hirh is a n~mindcr o:f 
the rh:.:nc~ns th;rt 1nvP t::~~:en place:> in the transport sc0nc 
~d.nr·p 1933), U1c' TrzJff:i.r·conunissioners exercise a HidE:' 
disc.rrtion. In jssuing .Jll licences, the commissionor~ 
\·TPrr c1.i r•:?,~t r:v'! "to h<JVI? re•Jard to the interests of thP 
~·uh1 ir ''Pili;>r.?ll.r vs 11'P.ll as to these of persons provi-
Soon lifter the system c~me into operation, it 
·p::Js su~~ jrrt to inevi t;-tl~·l.<? critirism. The Traffir 
('ommi:c.:-inncJ~~ 11F'rc~ s<d.cJ to filvour existing operntors 
~s iJC13 in st. !Jr~i·! 2ppl :i r·;~mts and to prot ex-t 1 icenre holders 
as::dn:-_:t ·:.:.hP:i.:: riv<.-:lP. They ucrc said to be stifling 
r~ompetiti.on ~ltHJ to be denying to the publir. the !-Jenefits 
or=- suc·l1 rorqr~titior.. rrhc: Vc!l idity of thGse rriticisms 
1~ as~r~c~~ ir. an article "The P~striction of road 
. . J 
- a cr1t1que" • The 
eontrol. JndPPd, it might he ar0ued that after thP 
rhuot i r •·ol,c1i. t: ions of thr::~ 19:20 • s uny form of control 
..., 
v!Oll] o ·h.~ v,. h-='P11 ~n irnprovmnPnt ........ 
r.~n:t i.:·c: p;:.;s:.~rmgP.r rol!c'l transport lirensing 1vhirh 
h.Js brr"'n J l!r~roJ y unchc.-.nc::red s inc0 1930, carriers • 
ufter 1Jhi.d1 .... ne''' syst0.m 1·!.JS introduced by the Transport 
.~rt 1 <:~Gr.. 
J • Sturlin.r-: :in ~lri t i.;::;}) Trwnsport l!i story 1870-1970. 
I :: : !) , L:::' • ') 0 'I • 
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The granting of licences for goods vehicles 1s 
still th1-~ flmction of the Traffic Commissioners; what 
has changed is the type of licence that they grant and 
the terms on ~1ich they grant it. In place of the old 
A, B and C licences there is now a single operater's 
licence. Two procedures for applications for licences 
\vere established by the Transport .1\ct 1968. .1\ full 
procedure for new· applicants and a simplified procedure 
for applicants "\vho held an .1\, B or C licence on Narch 
1970, uhc::-n the relevant provisions became operative. 
Under the old system, C licences were issued as 
of right to fit and proper persons. A and B licences 
were issued at the discretion of the Licensing Authority 
,.,rho had '"ide powers to grant, refuse or issue the 
licence subject to conditions. The new operator's licence 
is issued as of right unless objections are made to the 
applic;:a·tion.. Such objections may be made only by any 
of three ·types of bodies: by a specified Trade Union 
or Employers• .1\ssociation; by a Chief Officer of Police 
or by a Local .?\uthori ty. The only admissable ground 
of objection is that the applicant is not a fit and 
proper person to hold a licence. If objections are 
made, the: Licensing .f\uthority holds a formal hearing 
as a result of which it may refuse or grant a licence 
or grant one on conditionso A person aggrieved by the 
decision of the Licensing Authority has the right to 
appeal to the Transport Tribunal. 
The only circwnstances \vhich the Licensing .1\uthor-ity 
can nOi·! consider when deciding \vhether to grant or refuse 
a 1 icenr::e or to issue it subject to condition are those 
pertaining to the character and conduct of the applicant. 
Having once issued a licence (usually for 5 years),the 
.. 
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Lic-ensing .r~uthor i ty has pm.,rer to revmke or suspend 
the licence on evidence that he is not a fit and 
proper person to hold it. .~s with the other licences 
the Commissioners issue, reports may be received from 
Inspectors 1vh0 have pm.,rer to visit and examine premises 
and vehicles operated by licence holders. .1\n inspector 
may also be called to give evidence in proceedings before 
the r·orrunissioners.Proceedings are informal, evidence 
is not given on oath, principles of natural justice 
guide the order of proceedings so that evidence from 
an Inspector can only be received if the applicant has 
the opportunity to hear and contradict it. 
In one sense it may be said that there is no dispute 
inter partes in an applicatiori before the Traffic 
Corrunissioners. .1\s no one has an absolute right to a 
licence, refusal of an application does not put the 
applicant in a 1vorse position than anyone else. In 
practice, of course, the expectatiori of a licence may 
be the basis of the applicants' livelihood and he 1s 
likely to see his application as a dispute between 
authority and himself. 
The exercise of discretion by the Traffic Commissi.oners 
is '"ide hut the guidelines for its exerc1se are clearly 
indicatcc:J' by the legislation. The .~uthori ty is acting 
judicially and is subject to review by way of certiorari. 
In no case is a decision by the Authority final; 
the appeal available however varies depending on the 
type of application. 
The Traffic Commissioners have had essentially 
the same function since they were set up by the 1930 .l\ct • 
. ~ny increase in their jurisdiction is a consequence of 
.. 
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Clt\ increasing use of road transport and not an extension 
of their functions. The Industrial Tribunals, an 
account of '\-Thich now follows have experienced rapid 
changes in function during the relatively brief period 
of their history. 
The Industrial Tribunals 
"Hhen in doubt the natural instinct of government 
Departments is to entrust new problems to new tribunals"1 • 
It was in response to this instinct that the Industrial 
Tribunals were set up. The consequence however of 
unthinking pursuit of this instinct is an unnecessary 
proliferation of tribunals when it would be preferable 
to have "fewer units and a clearer pattern" 2 • 
The real need is for a balance between requirements 
for specialisation, which suggests numbers of purpose-
built tribunals and the requirements of a system which 
suggests rationalisation of jurisdiction. The Industrial 
Tribunals are an example of this balance ~chieved, in 
that they conveniently combine a number of related 
jurisdiction but it is more by luck than by judgement. 
The Industrial Training· .Act 1964 implemented the 
White Paper on Industrial Training published in December 
1962. The White Paper accepted the Robens Report which 
criticised standards of industrial training in Britain. 
The intention behind the .Act was, obviously, to raise 
these standards. To this end, an administrative structure 
was created to apply the .l'!.ct and ensure equality, among 
firms, of contribution and of gains - that is to prevent 
firms who did not provide industrial training from 
profiting from those who did3 o 
1. Wade, Towards .~dministrative Justice, p. 15. 
2. Sch'\-rartz and Wade\ The Legal Control of Government, 
p. 151. 
3. G. Terry Page, The Industrial Training .~ct and .After • 
.. 
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The Industrial Training Boards instituted by the 
.Act operated a levy/grant system. These Training 
Boards were set up in respect of forms of industrial 
activity so that all firms engaging in a particular type 
of· activity were subject to the same board. Each Board 
exacted a levy directly related to the payroll of the 
organisation and the proceeds of the .levy were then 
used by the Board to provide training or were returned 
in the form of loans and grants to those firms whose 
training measured up to the Boards' standards. 
The Industrial Tribunals were brought into operation 
by ministerial regulation in May 1965 to settle disputes 
concerning the industrial training levy. The tribunals 
sat in private to hear appeals by firms against 
the imposition of levy on two possible grounds: 
1. that the firm in question had been 
assigned to the wrong training board 
or 2. that the amount of the levy had been 
miscalculated. 
Writing in 1965, Ka W. Wedderburn reported that 
"some observers have inferred that the Industrial 
Tribunals are to be made into Labour Courts with wide-
. 1 
rang1ng powers" • 
Under the Redundancy Payments .Act 1965, the 
Industrial Tribunals were given jurisdiction over 
disputed claims for entitlement to compensation by an 
employee when dismissed for redundancyo .As such payment 
was paid in part from a redundancy fund financed by 
contributions from employers, this jurisdiction had some 
slight similarity to the tribunals' existing jurisdiction, 
but in terms of case-load it represented a major extensiona 
lo K. Wo Wedderburn, "Labour Courts" article in 
New Society, 
.. 
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It also brought before the tribunals difficult points 
of general· law conneci:ed lvith the contract of employment. 
The parties to these disputes were employer and employee, 
concerned as they sa'\'l it to protect their rights and 
interests against each other, rather than as under the 
Industrial Training .Act to maintai:1. a claim against a 
Board • 
. After this first major extensions, there followed 
some hesitation, and a change of political colour of 
the government altered the prospects for the Industrial 
Tribunals. Conservative policy dictated the setting 
up of a court for industrial law disputes, but when the 
National Industrial Rela.f:.ions Court was set up by the 
.. Industrial Relations .Act 1971, the Industrial Tribunals 
were incorporated into the same structure as the new 
Court.· 
The 1971 .r,ct introduced a new right for employees 
"not to be unfairly dismissed" and claims in relation 
to this right were in the jurisdiction of the tribunals 
and, on appeal, that of the new Court. 
The N.I.R.C. had a s~ort and stormy period of 
existence until it was abolished in 1974. Schedule I 
of the Trade Union and Labour Relations .!-\ct 1974 
re-enacted the rights of employees in relation to 
unfair dismissal, leaving such claims to be determined 
by the Industrial Tribunals with appeal to the High 
Courto Later the Empl.oyment .1\ppeal Tribunal was set 
up by the Employment Protection .net 1975 to take over 
the appeal function. 
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribm1als now 
arises under the follo"io~ing leadingsa 
1. Claims for cow;,.Jensation for Unfair 
Dismissal. (Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978); 
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2. r:la i!<1S for redunoancy payments (Employ-ment 
Protection (Consolidation) .~ct 1978); 
3. Cl~ims for Equ~l Pay (Equal Pay Act 1970); 
.'J. COl!1plaints of discrirnination in employment 
on grounds of sox or ruce (Sex Discrimination 
.~ct 1975, Race Relations Act 1976); 
5. Certain c1isputP.s relat:i.n;;J to contracts of 
employment (Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) .Act 1978); 
6. .!1J.:JPCCJ1s against Improvement or Prohibition 
!"-~otices served by Health and Safety 
Inspectors; (Health and Safety at Work 
.!:ct 197LJ); 
7. Certain claims for loss of office or loss 
of pension rights (Dodcs and Harbours .net 
19 GG) o 
Durin.0 the short existence o.f the Selective 
Emplo}~ent Tax, disputes concerning its application were 
decided ~)J' the Industrial Tribunals. .~s this tax has 
no,·.r been abolished, no ne,., cases can be brought. In 
1976 and 1977, the overwhelming majority bf cases came 
"\·d.thin tho .First t"\·TO jurisdictions outlined above. (The 
new claims may in some circumstances be combined). In 
the firE··t six months of 1976, out of a total of 20,713 
cuscs brought before the Industrial Tribunals, 18,411 
were clajms for compensation for unfair dismissal and/ 
or recl.unr:'l<Jnc:;n in the fi rs·t five months of 1977, out 
or 70,~00 CQSes, 1R,7B3 were claims in that category. 
'rhese fic_~ures cr:i.ve an average of 89~~ of all cases brought 
beforo t:ho Industrial Tribunals as claims by employee 
ag<.linrst employer. Over the same b1o-year period the 
orj.ginal jurisdiction of the tribunals under the 
Industri.al Training -~~t gave rise to an ~verage 6f 5~ 
r·ases Zl year ( 0 .13~~ of the total). This jurisdiction 
lS nOl.' c1:i ~:ch:J r0ecl. by referees. 
.. 
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The Industrial Tribunals are organised on a presi-
dential system. England and Wales is divided into regions 
each with its own regional office. There are sixteen of 
these including three for London. The regions are under 
the central direction of the President of Industrial 
Tribunals (there is a similar system for Scotland). The 
presidential system is in the spirit of the Franks Report 
which expressed general approval for some form of local 
organisation, and gave the Industrial Tribunals sufficient 
flexibility to absorb the very large extensions of their 
jurisdiction between 1965-1971. In order to cope with 
this jurisdiction, a number of full-time chairmen have 
been appointed. This practice was not approved in the 
Franks Report which indeed clearly stated that "we do not 
think that full-time service on tribunals is in general a 
desirable objective"1• The council on Tribunals, which 
was concerned to ensure the quality of decisions and had 
regularly expressed doubts as to whether sufficient persons 
of the right calibre could be found to take up appointments 
on the many new tribunals, welcomed the move to full-time 
. 2 
appo1.ntments • 
Under the Employment Protection .Act 1975, the 
Secretary of State was given power to bring certain matters 
relating to contracts of employment (such as claims for 
arrears of wages) within the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Tribunals by Ministerial Order. Legislation and amend-
ments to procedural rules have all combined to make 
Industrial Tribunals very court-like both in their own 
procedure (see post Chapter VII) and in their structure 
of appeal integrated as it is with the courts. Some of the 
claims heard before the Industrial Tribunals contain 
1. 1957 Cmnd 218, para. 138. 
2. .Annual Report of Council on Tribunals 1969/70, 
para. 46; 1972/73. para. 76 (on the appointment of 
women). 
.. 
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elements which are sufficiently sensational to be news-
worthy. The press regularly attend Industrial Tribunal 
hearings which are, in nearly all cases open to the 
public. Individual members of the public rarely attend 
but if, as it has been argued1 , the press represent the 
public on such occasions, then these tribunals have a 
large share of public attention. 
There is no strict rule that these tribunals are 
bound by precedent, but some of their decisions are re-
ported and published and there is a strong tendency 
for previous decisions to be consulted and followed. 
The complexities of the legislation have presented these 
tribunals with difficult points of law to determine, 
and this and other factors (discussed later in Chapter 
VII) have led to an unusually high level of representa-
tion at proceedings. This in turn has produced demands 
for the legal aid scheme to be extended to cover represen-
. . 'b 1 2 tat1on before Industr1al Tr1 una s • 
Certain employers (and newspapers) see the 
Industrial Tribunals as favouring trade unions and 
workers at the expense of employees (although different in 
detail, this is substantially the same criticism that fol-
lowed the Traffic Commissioners) •. ~n article in the. Guardian3 
newspaper summarises the main points of criticism. It is said 
that trouble-makers (encouraged by the lack of cost and the 
informali~y of these proceedings) use the proceedings to harass 
their employers (or ex-employers). It is also said that 
an employer's chance of "winning his case" is smaller 
1. Jones M. Justice and Journalism. 
2. Eq. Evidence of Lord Chancellor's .~dvisory Committee 
on Legal .~id to the Royal Commission on Legal Sercives, 
para. 24.3. 
3. 21.8.78, 22.8.78. 
.. 
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than that of his employee. The article refutes both 
these suggestions The annual number of cases, at least 
in the more contentious areas, is now decreasing after 
the hectic years of uncertainty always generated by 
legislative innovation. It will, presumably, level off 
at some "natural" level. Of the cases settled before 
hearing, about 5~~ are settled in the appellants• favour; 
of those determined at a hearing about 3~~ are settled in 
the appellants's favour. 
The criticism most stressed by the article is 
that many cases brought to the Industrial Tribunals 
are trivial and unnecessary; that the tribunals are 
being used to settle "disputes which civilised grown-
ups ought to be able to decide without a state-appointed 
referee" 1 • If this were valid, it would seem to me to 
justify the abolition of many of our courts of law, es-
pecially those exercising matrimonial jurisdiction which 
regularly settle disputes that one might expect civilised 
adults to resolve for themselves. 
Perhaps the author of the article confuses 
triviality of evidence with .triviality of legal princi-
ple. There are within the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Tribunals many matters involving new rights, new duties 
and new procedures. Whether these should exist is a 
matter for political decision but given that they exist, 
the law relating to them must be administered. This 
administration could be entrusted to the courts of law 
(as in part it is). Various factors, included failure 
in the past on the part of the courts to administer such 
matters satisfactorily, have led to the setting up of 
the Industrial Tribunals. Now established for over a 
1 •. f\rticle in the "Guardian", 22.8.78 • 
.. 
-51 -
decade, the Industrial Tribunals are unlikely to have 
a short history. 
In one sense, both the tribunals examined 1n this 
sertion ~an be seen to have the same function, to deal 
r·heaply and speedily with questions that arise 
ronrerninq the appliration of a s~ecialised area of 
lav.r. In another sense, their functions are distinct: 
The Tr~ffir rommissioners hear ex-parte applications 
,.,hich ·they mc.y reject or e1llou. .?\ decision against an 
application confers no benefit on anyone. Even when 
a permitted hod.y, such as a local authority is heard 
as a party to the proceedings, its role is more that 
of an expert witness than of an interested party. 
The Industrial Tribunctls are subsidised "People's 
r·ourts" 1-1ho mainly listen to disputes between indivi-
duals and determine then in favour of one party or 
another. 
Yet to the casual visitor there are striking 
similarities het"JrO)en the two tribunals. ·In Newcastle, 
both tho Industrial •rrihunals and the Traffic 
r·ommissioners occupy extensive premises in central 
positions (although the locution of the Industrial 
Tribun2ls is noticeably more salubrious than that of 
the Traffic commissioners). Both premises rontain a 
"Court Poom ' 1r:i.th raised dc=lis for the tribunal, seats 
for parties and their witnesses and seating for the 
publir. Each has a rlerk and follows a procedure 
Hhirh is recognisably "Court-like". Each party 
has the right to be heard, to call evidence and witnes-
ses on his mvn behalf nnd to refute that called by 
another party. Before each tribunal a derision 1s 
.. 
- 52 -
~lhi?rc the st~1:;jpr·t rni'ltter is sui table for decision 
by ;, hody opeJ:<:otin~I i.n this ,,rr1y, then trihunals -..-rorl~ 
well. On the ~~ole m~ttPrs within the jurisdiction of 
the t\·JO tribnnols outJ.inr-•d ahove ;,re amenable to this 
type:> of mvrhinc~ry. But one should not r.onrlude from 
this that t ri J::-.unill::: cnn Si.lccess Fully exerc isC:' any 
jurisc1:ir·tion, :Jf3 iJ so1·t of administrative mnid of 
.:111 1·.ror1~. ~:-o r:'cc:-~nt cxpcriennJ \·Ji th planning inquiries 
hns sho1·!ll ·U'!co limits of usefulness of that procedure. 
Tril1Un21::; hOi·!c'ver useful in one context may be inap-
propr:i.:xt:,' :i.n 0nother. 
.. 
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CH.APTER IV 
Dependence or Independence - Tripunals and the Executiveo 
The function of a statutory tribunal is to make 
decisions; the extent to which tribunals should be freed 
from direction before the decision and from oversight 
after the decision is an unanswered and perhaps unanswer-
able questiono In the earlier part of this century 
tribunals were seen as part of the machinery of executive 
decision-making, a view that was decisively rejected 
by the Franks Report which saw them as part of the 
machinery of adjudication. In practice, tribunals reside 
in limbo between the Executive and the Judiciary, and 
their relations with each are less than satisfactory. 
This chapter and the one that follows examine this two-
fold relationship • 
. A tribunal is usually accorded decis·ion-making 
powers at the instigation of a government department 
in order to remove these decisions from the influence 
of politics and to protect the minister from questions 
and accusations of bias1 that would be likely to follow 
if he took such a decisiona The Executive parts with 
its decision-making power with rel·uctance, even when 
the quid pro quo is a corresponding protection from 
responsibility. In consequence some early tribunals 
were restricted to an advisory role. 
Most tribunals operating at the present have power 
to make decisions and increasingly the tendency has been 
to make their decisions enforceable in the same way as 
1. .As in Hewart, The New Despotism , p. 154 1 "The 
Department becomes judge in its own cause". 
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decisions in a court of law. Even so there are areas 
of uncertainty1 In all cases· when Parlianent legis-
lates for a new tribunal,the E~ecutive will wish to 
part only with a minimum of its/own powers and may 
also wish to retain the possibility of influencing 
their exercise or even of withdrawing these powers in 
the light of subsequent developments. 
There are a number of ways in which the Executive 
can keep strings on statutory tribunals,all of which 
ways are exemplified in current legislation. 
Ministers' Questions 
Certain elements in the matters assigned to tribunals 
may be reserved for the minister to decide. Thus a 
question as to whether or not the contribution record 
of an applicant for contributory social security.benefits 
satisfies the statutory requirements is determined by 
the Secretary of State (Social Security .Act 1975 ss. 
93 and 95. This is now the principal act replacing ear-
lier legislation). The Secretary of State is empowered 
to delegate this function or to refer it to the High 
Court. 
There are two main objections to this separation 
of ministers' questions. One is that it fragments the 
tribunal'Sjurisdiction and while they are relieved of 
the responsibility for technical questions, they are 
burdened with the extra task of separating these questions 
which often appear as a single element in a disputed 
claim. The other objection is that it engenders a sense 
of frustration in claimants, unless there is a clear 
justification for the separation, to be required 
1. .A BBC "Checkpoint" reported on a local authority 
which continued to demand rates at their own 
valuation after this had been reduced by a local 
valuation court. · 
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to apply separately for the resolution of different parts 
of the same question. In the case of the contribution 
record, this justification is~hard to find. Now that 
"it' 
contributions are recorded on computer, presumably a 
tribunal with access to this facility, would invaria-
bly reach the same result in an inquiry as would the 
Secretary of State. 
On matters of immigration law, certain decisions 
cannot be reviewed by the Immigration .Appeal Tribunal but 
are reserved for the Minister alone. Thus a decision not 
to allow a person to remain in United Kingdom is subject 
to full right of appeal to the tribunal but on a decision 
to refuse a work permit, the word of the Secretary of 
State is final. .Again the logic of this position is not 
very apparent and the claimant is likely to be confused. 
Ministerial Guidance. There are situations where a minis-
ter, while not reserving the power of decision, can guide 
the tribunal to their decision. The Civil .Aviation .Authority 
is required to act on such guidance1 • .At one time it was 
thought that in giving such guidance a minister had merely 
to satisfy himself that it was ·necessary, a view that 
made the validity of such guidance (and indeed of other 
ministerial actions) virtually beyond revi~w2 • Recently, 
however, the views ·expressed by Lord :Atkin in his dissenting 
. . . 3 h . Judgement 1n L1versedge v •. Anderson , t at 1t was not 
sufficient for a minister to be personally satisfied as to 
the correctness of his view, but that he must have 
1. Civil Aviation Act 1971. 
2. Liversedge v •. Anderson [;1.942) .AC 206. 
3. Ibid at pp. 225-247. 
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objective grounds for this view, have received judicial 
. d 1 approval. In Laker .Alrways Ltd. v. Department of Tra e , 
the Court of .Appeal held that. the guidance given by the 
Secretary of State to the Ch;il .Aviation .Authority (in 
this case that they should revoke the licence for the 
uskytrain" service) had to be reasonable and consistent 
with the policy of the legislation. .As it was not, 
the guidance was ultra vires. 
The willingness of the courts to quest!on the 
grounds for ministerial guidance is also seen in the 
decision of the House of Lords in Secretary of State 
for Education and 
h . 2 Boroug counc1l • 
empowered (under 
Science v. Tameside Metropolitan 
Here the Secretary of State was 
the Education .Act 1944)to give direc-
tions to a Local Education authority if satisfied that 
the authority was acting or proposing to act unreasonably. 
The House of Lords held the Secretary of State had acted 
ultra vires in giving directions to the Tameside L .E •. A. 
as she had no objective grounds for considering their 
action unreasonable. Indeed,on the evidence, their 
Lordships found that the actions of the authority were 
reasonable. 
Policy Considerations (published) 
Legislation may require a tribunal to take into 
account considerations of policy. Such policy will 
emanate from government departments, and may in fact 
be changed from time to time. The Department may publish 
these policy considerations in the form of rules or a code. 
This is done by the Home Office for the Immigration 
.Appeal Tribuna1 3 • Such rules may be extremely helpful 
1. [j977] QB 643. 
2. Q. 977) .AC 1014. 
3. The rules deal with ~uch matters as the weight to 
be given to family ties and the expectation that 
students will normally leave when their studies 
are complete. 
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to both applicant and tribunal and make for consistency 
in decision maing • 
. l\ Government White Paper 9n. Transport Policy in 
1977 proposed that the Traffic Commissioners should 
"have regard to Counties·· and regions' policies and 
plans for public transport"1 in the exercise of their 
licensing function for passenger transport service. 
This proposal has not been implemented by legislation •. 
If it were introduced, the problem would arise that the 
Traffic Commissioners are already subject to statutory 
guidelines, including one to take account of the in-
terests of the publico If policy 1s one to come from more 
than one source, how is the tribunal to resolve possible 
conflicts between results so dictated? By further rules, 
perhaps. .As will be considered later, too much guidance 
is as bad as too little. 
Policy Considerations (secret). While policy considera-
tions may be unobjectionable if they are publicly stated, 
there must be misgivings about policy considerations 
regarded as confidential to the Department. The Supplemen-
tary Benefits .Appeal Tribunals have been widely criticised 
for their subservience to the policy of the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission. Directly descended from the National 
.l\ssistance .l\ppeal Tribunals (1948-1966) and the earlier 
Unemployment .Appeal Tribunals (1934-1948), these tribunals 
hear appeals against refusal of supplementary benefits, a 
mixed group of non-contributory benefits in cash and kind 
designed for persons in "need". 
The Unemployment .l\ssistance Board was the machinery 
for a new system set up in the 1930's to replace the 
lo HC Debo 935(2) 1577o 
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"temporary" expedient under the National Insurance .Acts 
of allowing "uncovenanted payments•; that is benefits 
paid to unemployed men whose contribution record did 
not.satisfy the legal requirements. The Board which 
was subject to ministerial direction, operated tribunals 
to hear appeals against decisions by officers of the 
Board. 
The scheme has twice been restructured, as the 
National .Assistance Board in 1948 and as the Supplemen-
tary Benefits Commission in 1966 but the terms of the 
legislation authorising all three are remarkably similar. 
Despite protestations of independence1 , these various bodies 
have been closely linked with a Government Department 
(currently the Department of Health and Social Services) 2 • 
Initially, claims for Supplementary Benefits are 
decided by Officers of the S.B.C. The scale level of 
benefits is established as a legal right· but enti-
tlement to them depends on 'need' as judged by the 
officero Guidelines on the Commissions' policy3 are 
issued to officers but are not available to the public. 
Studies of the officers at work indicate that they 
usually apply the guidelines as.strict ruleso 
If the decision of the officer. is appealed, it 
is important to ask if the tribunal approaches the 
question of entitlement de novo, bringing a fresh mind 
to the factors determining 'need' or if the tribunal 
feels itself subject to the policy considerations of the 
Commissiono .A number of studies have indicated that 
1. The tribunals are closely examined in .Adler and Bradley, 
Justice, Discretion and Poverty. The independence 
of the u •. r..B. is seen as unrealistic 
in .Alan Booth, .An .Administrative Experiment in 
Unemployment Policy in the thirties. Pub •. Admin. 
Summer 1978, 139o 
2. Tony Lynes& Unemployment .Assistance Tribunals in 
the 1930's, in Justice, Discretion and Poverty, 
ed. .Adler et al. 
3o The so-called 'A' code. 
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these tribunals do feel so-obliged1 • 
. As the contents of the '.A' code do not have the 
force of law, in treating them,• as such a tribunal is 
"'iJ' 
erring in law. However, there is no appeal to the 
courts so that the errors of the S.B •. A.T. •s can be 
corrected only by review, in which case the error will 
remain undetected unless it appears on "the face of the 
record". The tribunals must give reasons for their 
decision on request and this will form part of the record. 
However,these reasons are often regrettably brief and 
may not disclose that a tribunal imposed limits on the 
discretion it was required to exercise. Where such limits 
are shown to have been imposed the Divisional court can 
quash the tribunal decision. This was done in R.v. 
Birmingham .Appeal Tribunal ex parte Simper2 where the 
long-term addition to the weekly payment had been given 
in substitution for an exceptional needs allowance al-
ready reviewed by the claimant, because this was general 
practice (i.e. no separate consideration had· been given 
to that claimant's needs). 
Regrettably the practice h~ld to be improper in 
the Simper case was then give·n legal force by subsequent 
regulations. The use of policy considerations to guide 
the exercise of powers given to tribunals is part of 
the ambivalence of the Executive when it comes to granting 
away powers which it believes belong to the executive 
function; "The administration regards its discretionary 
powers as essential not only for efficient administration 
but also for the good of the community ••••• the 
consequence is for the administration to view further 
limitation or subordination to the legal process as 
detrimental to the community as well as rendering 
administration less effective and efficient"3 • 
1. Lewis No, S.B •. A.To •s 1973 Public Law 257-84. 
Herman M. , .Administrative Justice of Supplementary 
Benefits. Occasional Papers on Social Administration 
47. London, Bell 1972. 
2. (1973) 177 SJ, 304. 
3. Craig, The Reluctant Executive 1961, .Pub. Law 45. 
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The use of policy consideration (both public and 
secret) to guide tribunals to their decisions may be 
inspired by the highest of motives but it should be 
used with restraint • 
.~ ~)_:' 
. ~ppeal to the Minister. From '.certain matters decided by 
tribunal, appeal~sometimes the only appeal)lies to a minister. 
This practice was criticised in the Franks Report1 but it 
has not been discontinued • .~n example is the appeal 
to a minister from decisions of the Traffic Commissioners 
1n respect of Road Service Licences. There seems little 
logic in providing such an appeal when from a decision 
in respect of an operator's licence appeal lies to 
the Transport Tribunal. Presumably this Tribunal could 
deal equally well with both • 
. ~ Minister and his Department may also indirectly 
influence the decisions of a tribunal through· the power 
to appoint personnel. The Franks Report recommended 
appointment by the Council on Tribunals but this was 
never put into effect. Some appointments are made by 
the Lord Chancellor, sometimes from a panel nominated 
by a Department. There is some.evidence that the 
Unemployment .~ppeal Tribunals in the '30's were 
directly influenced by the appointment of persons amenable 
to the Board's policies and that non-conformist members 
were "dropped". The appointment of members to the new 
National .~ssistance .~ppeal Tribunals was therefore placed 
in a curious half-way position: the Chairman and one 
member was appointed by the Minister of Pensions and 
National Insurance and the other member by the National 
.~ssistance Board from a panel proposed by the Minister. 
The appointment of members is further considered in 
lo 1957 cmnd 218, parao 105. 
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Chapter VII .It can be seen that Ministers like to 
have some control over the appointment of members. 
The Exercise of Discretion. The problem of adjusting the 
relationship of tribunals and t_pe executive is part of 
the general problem of finding a balance between discre-
tion and rules. Discretion is often demanded in the interests 
of efficiency as necessary if public administration is to 
be carried out in unforeseen or changed circumstances. In 
the interests of certainty and predictability the popular 
demand is often for rules (sometimes paradoxically combined 
with protest against legislation) • 
. A recent study based on the .American experience suggests 
that "the problem is not merely to choose between rule 
and discretion but to find the optimum point on the rule 
to discretion scale"1 • Davis favours what he calls 
"structured discretion"; that is discretion based on pre-
established principles and "open" precedents. If justice 
is to be achieved, it is vital that these precedents should 
pre-date the hearing and that both the principles and the 
precedents should be "open" in the sense that they are 
available to parties to the proceedings. 
Some tribunals operate in this way but in relation 
to others the Executive has retained .some power to influence 
tribunal proceedings without exposing the terms of the 
exercise of ho 2 t 1s power • In any case~ if the process of 
"legislation" is carried too far, the advantages of 
0 0 3 d1scret1on are lost • 
1. K .c. Davis, Discretionary Justice: .A Preliminary 
Inquiry. 
2o The process of transforming policy into rules is 
examined in Jowell J., Legal Control of .Administrative 
Discretion, 1973 Pub. Law, 178-220. 
3. Hill M. Some Implications of a Legal .Approach to 
Welfare Rights.Br. Journal of Soc. Work 1974 v .4 
no.2 187. 
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.A recent example of how delicate this balance ls,was 
the consequence of a decision of the National Insurance 
Commissioners. The Social Security .Act 1975, S.36 intro-
duced a non-contributory invalid"ity pension for a married 
woman, living with her husband, having a "substantial" 
disability. .After a number of claims by physically disa-
bled housewives had been rejected, an appeal came before 
the National Insurance Commissioners who interpreted 
"substantial" in such a way as to extend eligibility 
for the pension to women whose level of disablement had 
previously been rejected by Insurance Officers • 
. An order was immediately laid before Parliament, 
annulling the effect of the Commissioners' decision. 
The Minister justified this order by saying that the 
effect of the decision would have been to grant more 
pensions than his Department's budget allowed for. "It 
would", he said nbe wrong to allow the setting of prio-
riti"es to be pre-empted by a decision of the Commissioners 
to change the effect of the law"1 • 
This statement is a curious non sequitur. The al-
location of funds is a matter for the Executive, but 
it is no part of the Judicial fUnction to take account 
of Departmental Budgets (and their shortcomings) in 
arriving at a decision. The Commissioners could hardly 
have been said to "pre-empt" a function entrusted to 
them by law, by an .Act which had presumably originated 
in the Ministers' own Department. While the setting of 
priorities is an Executive function it should surely 
take place in time before the legislation is framed not 
after it is applied. 
1. Statement by .Alfred Morris, Minister for the 
Disabled, Sunday Times, October 8th 1978. 
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The incident is illustrative of an ambivalent 
attitude on the part of the Executive towards tribunals 
which simultaneously supports the entrusting of decisions 
to bodies independent of government departments but 
desires to retain a power to intervene when such decisions 
do not accord with departmental views {much as parents 
may grant independence to their children only to recall 
it when it is exercised contrary to parental standards). 
This ambivalence can be explained but not excused. It 
is also in my view responsible for a tendency in recent 
time to create decision-making bodies which have some 
of the characteristics of tribunals but which cannot 
be positively identified as such. These neo-tribunals 
are declared to be independent of the executive, their 
actions cannot be questioned in Parliament and they are 
likely to be outside the terms of reference of the 
Ombudsman; as they are not tribunals, however, they are 
not subject to the Tribunals and Inquiries .Act 1972 
not are they under the Supervision of the council on 
Tribunals. The Police Complaints Board set up under 
the Police Act 1975 is one such body1 • So also is the 
criminal Injuries Compensation ~oard set up by Order 
in Council to make decisions affecting the exercise of 
prerogative powers. More recently there is the decision 
to set up Comparability Boards to investigate the basis 
of claims for increases in pay. The nature of these 
2 bodies is far from clear • 
. As times and situations change so must methods ~f 
government but where as with tribunals, a system has a 
proved usefulness and is familiar and acceptable to the 
public, then long and serious thought should be given 
before new bodies outside the system are set up; bodies 
1. Cf o Comments in the .Annual Report of the Council 
on Tribunals, 1975-76. 
2. Since the change of government following the General 
Election, the continued existence of these bodies is 
in doubt, but no doubt other ad hoc deciding authori-
ties will be devised. 
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that are "neither flesh, nor fowl, nor red herring"} 
set up, it may reasonably be suspected with some 
intention to evade the machinery of appeal and review 
that operate within the systerrt~· 
It was doubted whether a decision (which is in fact 
a recommendation) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board could be challenged in the courts at all until 
the decision in R.v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
ex parte Lain1 . In this case it was held that certiorari 
would lie to review the proceedings of the Board not-
withstanding that whatever the determination of the Board, 
the actual payment of compensation remains a matter for 
executive discretion • 
. ~s will be seen in Chapter V, the Courts are 
currently taking a robust attitude towards decisions 
that are apparently beyond challenge. What the courts 
cannot challenge is Parliament's manifest intention in 
legislation to put decision-making out of the range of 
attack of these affected by ita Too often·legislation 
is designed to place decisions beyond challenge. This 
tendency should always be viewed with concern. If a 
decision 1s justified it can meet a challenge; if it 
is not then it deserves to fall. 
1 • ~ 9 6 7] 2 .~11 ER 7 7 0, 
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Chapter V 
.l\ Second Opinj,on - Tribunals and the courts. 
/ 
. 
The second part of the general question posed in 
Chapter IV is "to what extent should decisions of tribunals 
be subject to judicial review?'' Where a matter is ascribed 
by the legislature for decision by a tribunal, this matter 
is almost invariably within the exclusive juris~iction of 
that tribunal. Thus a party to the proceedings before 
the tribunal who is dissatisfied with the tribunal's 
decision is concerned to know if this decision can be 
challenged and if so how. Since the 1940's when tribunals 
became so pervasive a feature of public administration, 
three alternative general situations have obtained 1 there 
might be provision for an appeal to a higher tribunal, there 
might be a right of appeal to the courts of law; there 
might be no provision for appeal. Further .complications 
exist in that any right of appeal might be limited as to 
the grounds on which it might be brought or the time within 
which it ,.,as required to be lodged or both. 
There is often a desire to bring an unsatisfactory · 
tribunal decision before a court. .~ "person aggrieved" 
is likely in the first place to derive his sense of 
grievance from the variation and inconsistencies in the 
provisions for appeal which result from policy, history 
or chance or a mixture of all these factors. His chances 
of obtaining his desired hearing before the courts will 
depend on two main factors; namely the grounds of his 
complaint and the procedural route chosen for making it. 
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These b.J"o factors are interrelated in complexways and 
are also connected with the features mentioned above, 
that is the terms of the statutory provision (if any) for 
appeal to the court~-· 
In this situation, the courts have been faced with ques-
tions concerning their relationship with tribunals and 
the answers to these questions have varied. The variation 
in time has been apparent in that the attitude of the courts 
has shmm greater or less concern at different periods; also 
the operation of the case-lal-T system ensures that any answer 
is in respect of a particular case and may not readily be 
generalised. 
The consequence has not been fortunate. Faced with 
hard cases the judges have made bad law, bad in the sense 
that it is based on no principles clear and sound enough 
to allow a confident opinion to be expressed 1n new cases, 
and bad in the sense that it abounds in illogicality and 
circular argument. This chapter examines a number of deci-
ded cases, an examination that leads to the conclusion that 
it is high time that the legislature intervened to clarify 
the terms on uhich the courts could and should re-examine 
a tribunal decision. 
The courts ·w·ere excluded from the dispute-settling 
machinery set up under the National Insurance .!\ct 1911 
and clearly there \vas little occasion or desire for invol-
vement by the courts in the operation of tribunals. This 
arose first from a feeling that the courts \veJ$e not suitable 
for the resolution of matters ascribed to tribunals. The 
courts had protested against their being entrusted with 
the regulation of railw·ay rates and when given jurisdic-
tion over claims under the Norkmen 's Compensation .~cts 
had spun a \·leb of technicality which ensnared every one 
I 
\.J"ho approached. In respect of the munitions tribunals 
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set up w1der the l'Iunitions of \'/ar .1\ct 1915, it is suggested 
that "the reasonable degree of satisfaction with the 
"tvorkings of the unemployment insurance panels set up under 
the National Insurance .Act 1911 helped to provide a favou-
• j • • • 1 
rable cllma·te for more tr1bunal exper1mentat1on" • The 
courts as they then "tvere (and they showed no propensity for 
change) 'i'lere felt to be unsuited for the determination of 
matters ·Hhich nmv appeared to require determination. "Lalv 
1s concerned ·with rights and duties of persons and the body 
of le9islation upon Hhich the l·lelfare State rests imposes 
duties on and grants rights to virtually every member of 
the conununity •••• From the very beginning of the national 
insurance idea it was recognised that the regular courts 
of lalv "tvere a cumbersome tool for the settlement of questions 
. "2 
arising in connection with these rights and duties o 
Secondly there \vas a feeling that new legislation \vas 
creating new problems that "t·Tere not amenable to decision 
by the courts. "Social legislation is not a "matter of 
state" in the traditional sense. It is out.side the 
customary function of government ••••• ln social legislation. 
The government is underta1{ing to do for the citizen what 
the citizen is unable or um.,rilling to do for himself"3 , 
'l'ribunals ,,!ere thus preferable to courts when the lalv 
to be upplied \vas specialised, detailed and novel. "The 
substantive law of National Insurance is entirely statutory 
and inevitr:tbly extremely complicated ••• the addition of 
this "\vork to any existing jurisdiction such as that of the 
County courts "\vould have constituted a heavy -· and I. euspect 
unwelcome burden for them. I think. that this "\vork "\vOuld 
have suamped the courts"4 • 
These twin reasons for the growth of tribunals that 
1. G. Robson. The Origins of the Industrial Tribunals. 
Indust. L. J. Sept. 1977, 149. 
2. .1\. Harding Houltorn. The Law and Practice of Social 
Security. Introduction p. XXii. 
3. B. B. Gilbert. The Evolution of National Insurance 1n 
Great Britain. P 289. 
4. R. J.'lic1zel th"lvaite. .Another Experiment 1n Legal 
Procedure - National Insurance pp.S-6. 
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the courts could not cope and that the new le9islation 
·was unsuitable for application by them \vere noted by Sir 
Alfred Denning1 (as he then 'tvas) \vho, hO\vever, seems to 
regard them as one rrason. In fact the courts were not used 
as a matter of policy; they could, given the will and the 
funds, have been expanded to meet the enlarged case-load. 
The use of specialised "courts" is not new but had been 
discouraged after a period of ill-repute under the Tudors 
and early Stuarts. It has been said that ··-~dministrative 
Tribunals have found their way back into the judicial 
system from ivhich they v1ere excluded by the aftermath of 
the 1688 Eevolution" 2 • ·rhe courts, however, did no·t always 
recognise tribunals as their long-lost relations and it 
was left to the I:'ranJ<:s committee to recognise that tri-
btmals 1-1ere an extension of the courts under an assumed 
name. 
It 'tv()S also common to stress advantages of tribw1als 
that dis-tinguished them from courts: "Possibly expert 
tribunals, HorJcing under central direction,· may ,even 
though not assisted by professional advocate, on the whole 
achieve equally just results, far more cheaply, with far 
greater expedition and with greater certaintyM3 • 
In Parliament there was a genuinely held view among 
ministers and members that tribunals did a better job than 
the courts would have done in the same circumstances and 
·that questions assigned to tribunals required the applica-
. h . . 4 tlon of cow1non sense rather t an of legal tra1111ng • 
Once created, the uncertainty arose as to \vhether 
5 tribunals ,,rere of the Executive or the Judiciary The 
1. Sir .!\. Denning. Freedom under the Law. P. 77. 
7.. I•Jrait.h and Hu·tcheson. .?".dministrative Tribw1als. P. :ZtJ. 
3. Sir Hartly Sha"\vcross. The State and the La\v. 11 MLR 1. 
4. e.~J· He. Deb Oct. lOth 19'18. Cols. 345-6. 
5. 'l'his controversy is examined in the Franl<:s Heport. 
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term ;•ministerial", 1vhich 1vas often applied to them suggests 
th~t they were somehow the property of a minister, a useful 
device to he l~ept in his cuprX>ard and brought out \·Then needed. 
The Donoucrhmore Committee avoided the issue hv coining 
_. j J. 
the phrase "quasi-judicial" to describe the nature of a 
tribunul but the statement in that Committee's report 
that "all leqislation \vhich excluded purely judicial decisions 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of law and entrusts them 
exclusively to tribunals ••••• should be definitely regarded 
as exceptional"! Has already unrealistic when it was written. 
G. ~'1. J{eeton suggests that the complacency 1vith which 
the Donou~{hmore Commi tt.ee vie,ved tribunals delayed (for 
almost 30 years) any serious consideration of the problems 
associated with them. "The manifest determination to remove 
disputes between the individual and authority from the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts contained within them 
dangerous potentialities which could be and were exploited 
to the detriment of private rights in a period of rapid 
. 2 
soc1al change" • 
'l'his change was at its most rapid from 1945-1950 and 
the "manifest determination" \vas evidenced r.JOth by the 
widespread use of tribtmals to determine issues arising 
under the legislation introduced during that time and by 
provisions in statutes that decisions of tribunals should 
be "finul ''. 'l'here \·.ras an assumption that the tz-wo questions 
were so closely related that if a matter was denied to be 
sui table for determination by tribunal it \vus taJcen to 
follow that reference to the courts should be precluded. 
There is no basis for this ass1.11nption as \vas clearly 
shO\vn in that Hhereas th~~ use of tribunals as a forwn of 
1. 193~ C~d 4060 para. 21. 
2. G. l'l. hee·ton. .1\dministrative Procedure and the Franks 
Ueport, 1958 C.L.P. P. 88. 
- 70 -
first instance came to be seen as necessary and indeed 
desirable, increasingly people sought access to the courts 
as a means of challenging a tribunal. 
The introductioh (in 194 8) of the Legal .~id Scheme 
and the extension of matrimonial causes contributed to a 
familiarity with the machinery of justice. The existence 
of a few appeal tribunals (the National Insurance 
Commissioners and the Transport Tribunal are examples) 
showed the advantages, in terms of consistency, respect 
and a public affirmation of justice, of the possibility of 
challenge. The popularity of recourse to the courts in-
creased in a way unthinkable earlier in the century when 
the average working man's experience of them was likely to 
be limited to an unwelcome acquaintanceship with the Justices 
of the Peace. Because the legislation did not envisage 
appeal to the courts, the means available for doing so were 
complex, even devious, and the current situation, outlined 
below is highly complex. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. Recourse to the courts cannot be Used as 
a substitute for the procedures laid down by 
Parliament (Barraclough v. Brownl). Usually, 
the courts cannot intervene in any matter until 
all other possible procedures have been 
exhausted. 
2. The principle of ultra vires prevents a 
tribunal from making a determination which is 
outside its powers. The courts can always 
set aside such a determination (Barnard and 
Others v. National Dock Labour Boardl). Failure 
to provide for appeal or even exclusion of appeal 
cannot prevent a review by the courts on th~s 
ground (Taylor v. National .~ssistance Board ) • 
3. Where appeal to the courts is provided for,this 
is usually limited _to appeal on a point of law. 
In difficult cases the courts may have to decide 
fi897] .~c 615. 
095~ 1.~11 ER 113. 
CJ.95?J 2WLR 189. 
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whether the alleged grounds of appeal 
constitute a point of law (Esso Petroleum 
Ltd. v. Minister of Labour). 
4. On a matter which concerns his legal rights, 
any person is entitled to ask the courts to 
make a dec~~ration as to the law (Thame R.D.c. 
v, Bunting ) • .An action for a declaration 
exists collaterally to other procedures 
(Pyx Granite v. Min. of Housing3) and is 
notexcluded by reason only of the existence 
of alternative remedies4 (Francis v. Yiewsley and West Drayton V.D.c. ). 
5. The Courts have inherent power to review 
the proceedings of inferior tribunals, a 
power which is rested in the Divisional 
Court of Queen's Bench. This court may 
quash a tribunal's proceedings where there 
has been an error of law, evidenced by the 
court record (R v. Northumberl~nd Compensation 
.Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw ) , or where these 
have been imp5operly conducted(R v. Electricity 
Commissioners ). The power to review (by 
prerogative order) can be expressly excluded 
by statute, but where the tribunal has acted 
outside its jurisdiction th~s exclusion does not 
operate (ex parte Bradlaugh ). 
In all cases the jurisdiction 
outsted only by the clearest words 
of the courts can be. 
(London Borough of 
But an applicant must . . 8) Eal1ng v. Race Relat1ons Board • 
himself choose the route by which he approaches the_court 
and all the possibilities raise different problems of time 
limits, locus standi and result achieved. The confusion 
has been ameliorated but not removed by the new order 53 
(R.s.c.) which is considered later. 
The Prerogative Orders 
The usual method by which to challenge a tribunal 
1. li969] lQB 98. 
2. (1972] Ch 470. 
3. [1960] .AC 488. 
4. ~958] lQB 478. 5. 952] lKB 338. 6. 924 lKB 171. 
7. (1878) 3QBD 509. 
a. 1).971] l.All ER 424. 
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on the grow1ds of jurisdiction is the prerogative orders 
(formerly the prerogative writs). In the past these orders 
have shown periods of disuse and periods of popularity1 • 
The writ of certiorari (which originated as a royal request 
j 
for information) has been shown to be the most adaptable 
and thus the one most frequently used. It has been used 
to review proceedings of the Justices of the Peace 
especially after the case of Groenvelt v. Burwe11 2 • Later 
when some fw1ctions of the Justices were transferred to 
Local Government .Authorities certiorari was also used to 
supervise activities of these bodies3 • Independent adminis-
trative bodies have been supervised in this way at least 
since the seventeen·th century 4 • Since 1950 certiorari has 
been increasingly used to rev1ew decisions of tribunals. 
The grounds for such review ~a~ generally thought to 
be confined to questions of juris~tion although there 
were times ·uhen almost u.ny defect lvas regarded as one of 
r:: jurisdiction·): thus a tribunal (or other body) might lack 
jurisdiction to enter upon a hearing in the first place6 , 
or might go beyond the limits of its juris~iction7 ; irregu-
larities in the constitution of the tril;>unal or dev:iation 
8 
of correct procedure \vere also grounds for c·ertiorari; 
so also 1-~u.s the use of fraud or deception in obtaining a 
decision or a denial of the principles of natural justice9 • 
. 1\11 o£ these \·lere regarded as jurisdictional defects and 
clearly resulted from taking a very wide vielY' of juris-
diction. These groW1ds were further extended \vhen it \vas 
decided that. on an order of c:.ertiorari the court could 
quash a determination for "a patent error of la\Y' on the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
For an account of their history see J. H. Baker. 
.1\n Introduction to English Legal History. Chapter 9. 
(1709) lLd Raym 454o 
Rv. Local Government Board (1882) lOQBD 309. 
Commins v. Massam 82 ER 475. · 
De Smith. Judicial Review of .Administrative .Action, 
P• 66. 
Rv. Bolton (1841) lQB 66. 
Rv. Blackpool Rent Tribunal ex parte .Ashton G94B] 
2I<C 277. 
General Nedi~al. council. v. Spaclanan 1i.943] .. AC 627. 
Rv. Barnsley M. B. c. ex parte Hook n970} lWLR 652o 
Rv. Northumberland Compensation .~ppeal Tribunal. Ex 
parte Shaw· ~95~ li<B 338 
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face of the record"1 • Certiorari had always involved an 
examination of the record but to do so for an error of law 
was new and the consequences of the case have been regretted 
by a number of writefs including the late Professor de Smith2 
and Professor Geoffrey Sawer3 • 
Some of the authorities on c:ertiorari were reviewed 
4 in R~~ Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte .~rmah • Refer-
ring to c<:~ses '11here magistrates • decisions to commit for 
trial had been quashed on the grounds that there was not 
sufficient evidence to justify a committal, Lord Reid 
argued that these cases could not all have been based solely 
on w·ant of jurisdiction. "If a magistrate or any other 
tribunal has jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry and there 
is no irregularity in the procedure, he does not destroy 
his jurisdiction by reaching a wrong decision"5 • Never-
theless, decisions w·i thin jurisdiction had been set aside 
1n the past. 
The decision in Shaw's case undoubtedly led to in-
creased use of the prerogative orders, especially that of 
certiorari, as a means of challenging tribunals' decisions. 
'l'his tendency was assisted by two factors: the Tribunals 
and Inquiries .~ct S .12 required that tribunals (unless 
exemptQd from the provisions, and such exemptions as ,..,-ere 
asked for uere resisted by the Council on Tribunals) 
should g1ve reasons for their decisions and these reasons 
became part of the "record"; the decision in R.V. Medical 
.1\ppeal Trib1..m<:~l ex parte Gilmore 6 established that ,..,-here 
a record is so brief as to give insufficient information 
as to '"hether or not any error has been made, the court 
1. R. v. l\orthumberland compensation .1\ppeal Tribunal. 
Ex parte Shaw [.i95~ 11\B 338. 
2. ltJ l'-1LR 207; 15 l'lLR 217. 
3. Error of La\v on the Face of the .1\dministrati ve Record. 
University of Hest .1\ustralia, L.R. 24. 
4. [j_968] .1\C 192. 
5. Ibid at p. 234. 
6. [igs~ lQD 574. 
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can order the tribunal to "complete the record". In 
Re Poyser and Mills .~rbit.ration1 , the requirement of 
s. 12 was interpreted "as meaning" 2 that proper and adequate 
reasons must be give~. 
If an error of law appears on the record Of a deter-
mination, then the determination can be quashed; "neither 
certiorari nor ~andamus usurp the function of a tribunal 
but require it, having quashed its decision, to hear the 
case and determine it correctly"3• .The disadvantages of 
certiorari are procedural. The form of the Order is 
archaic (despite attempts at modernisation) pleadings 
are technical and time limits short, (applications must be 
brought within six months and may be refused even if brought 
within a shorter period. 
The extended use of the Order has contributed to 
the blurring of the distinction between an error as to 
jurisdiction and an error within the jurisdiction, a 
distinction already noted as a fine one4 • The Master of 
the Rolls, Lord Denning, has expressed the opinion that 
this distinction is "so fine indeed that it is rapidly 
being eroded"5 , but this opinion is far from universa1 6 
nor is it to be welcomed. 
Certiorari has been used in cases where appeal on a 
point of law would have been appropriate but where such 
appeal was not available. Similarly an action for a declara-
tion has been used where certiorari was the more obvious 
choice as in .~nisminic and Foreign Compensation Commission 7• 
In this case, a majority of the House of Lords restored the 
judgement of Brown J. at first instance that the determi-
nation of the Commission was a nullity. The Court was 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
[i ?63J 1.~11 ER 612. 
Ib1d. Per Megaw J. 
Puntan v. ~lin. of Pensions and National Insurance, 
G:964] 1.~11 ER 448. . 
R v. Licensing .~uthority for Goods Vehicles for the 
M~.trq.politan Traffic .~reu E-x parte B. E. Barrett Ltd. 
Q. 94 ~ 2KB 17. 
Pearlman v. Harrow School (i97ij) 3WLR 736. 
Gordon, "What did the Anisminic Case Decide? 1971 MLR 1. 
1969 2.~C 147. 
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prepared to hear the claim despite a clear "ouster• clause 
which extended to certiorari, although a minority of Lords 
Norris and Pearson \vould have upheld the Commission • s 
determination as be~ng -plainly within their jurisdiction. 
J 
Of the majority, Lords Pearce and Wilberforce found that 
a .declaration \·las a most suitable remedy despite the 
doubts as to the standing of the applicant company expres-
sed in the Court of Appeal 1 • 
In the course of his judgement, Lord Pearce admitted 
that ''the courts have at times taken a more robust line 
to see that the law is carried out and justice administered 
by inferior tribunals and at times taken a more cautious 
and reluctant line in their anxiety not to seem to encroach 
or to ass'ume an appellate function which they have not 
got " 2 • Hhile the decision in the .~nisminic case may be 
"\velcomed as an example of the "more robust line", it 1s to 
be regretted as having rendered meaningless a clause that 
excludes recourse to the courts and as having brought 
confusion to the concept of jurisdiction. 
Relying on the principle that an ouster clause does 
not protect a decision where there 1s no jurisdiction3 , the 
majority of the House of Lords held that the Commission 
had entered on an enquiry (into the nationality of "succes-
sors in title") \vhich they had no jurisdiction to pursue. 
'rhe problem that had faced the commission was the interpre-
tation of Sol. 1959 625o Lord Wilberforce referred to 
the "un·fortunate telescopic drafting" of the Instrument and 
the court appeared unanimous in finding that the phrase 
"successor in title" had no meaning in that no-one had any 
lo per DiplocJ( L J o .1\nisminic Vo Foreign. c:ompensation 
commission (! 968] 2QB 862. 
2 o ~969] 2.~c at Po ?34 o 
3o exp. Bradlaugh (1878) 3QBD 509. 
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title to compensation (which was discretionary) that any 
other person could succeed to. If "title" meant a "hope 
or expectation"·of compensation then plainly the purchasers 
of the assets of .Ani.sminic had not succeeded to it and j 
their nationality hrhich was the decisive factor in the 
Commission • s decision) ,.,as plainly not a factor to be 
considen-~d. 
Had the Commission destroyed its jurisdiction by 
considering an irrelevant factor? The minority held that 
they had not "the decision ,.,hether right or '"rong was 
plainly ,.,i thin their jurisdiction ·• 1 • Lord Wilberforce • s 
argument is the most convincing in the majority judgements. 
He brol<:e dmvn the order as imposing a number of separate 
conditions so that a positive reply to an early condition 
(is the applicant a British national?) precluded looking 
further. Such fine analysis may be made by a Lord of 
J\ppeal in Ordinary but can hardly be expected of a tribunal, 
however expert. Further, if such an error destroys juris-
diction,and if a court may always intervene if there is 
no jurisdiction, it is impossible to think of an error 
of law that \vould not potentially destroy jurisdiction, and 
it follm·rs thilt the courts must always look into such errors 
1n order to ascertain whether or not the error took the 
tribunal outside its jurisdiction. If this is so, an ouster 
clause can have no effect. 
The real issue in the .!\nisminic Case was not before 
the court at all, that is the justification for excluding 
recourse to the Courts and precluding appeal from a tribunal 
decision. .!\s far as the Foreign Compensation Commission 
is concerned, the situation has now been corrected by statute, 
the ¥oreign Compensation .~ct 1969 providing for appeal from 
a determination of the Commission by way of case stated. 
1. per Lord Pearson. 
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Such an appeal ivOuld have disposed of the .~nisminic Case, 
as clearly the Commission had erred in law and a statement 
of the case ivould have revealed such an error. The problems 
raised by the case .t;emain. The distinction between an 
error of jurisdiction and other errors is blurred to no-
one's advantage. If in the interests of cost and efficiency, 
rights of appeal from a tribunal decision are limited, these 
limitations can be rendered nugatory by alleging that 
the tribunal has erred so as to destroy its jurisdiction. 
In the meantime attention 1s deflected from the real issue 
of when (if at all) appeal should be limited and if so, on 
ivhat terms • 
. A.ppeal. The Tribunals and Inquiries .~ct 195 8 implemented 
the reconunendation in the ·Franks Report by providing for 
a gener<:~l right of appeal to the High court on ag of 
law or by ivay of case stated from all tribunals specified 
or scheduled in the .~ct, a provision that is now re-
enacted us S.l3, Tribunals and Inquiries .~ct 1971. Procedure 
for such appeals is provided in Rules of the Supreme Court 
and is not the same for all tribunals. Noreover not all 
tribunals are subject to S.l3. 
Where such appeal is available, it must usually be 
made vTithin six i·Teeks and is limited to ["point of law". 
Thus the court cannot reconsider the evidence for the 
decision (l·fooller v. Hin •. ~griculture1 ). The line betiveen 
la\v and facts is difficult to draw. In the case of Esso 
. . . 2 . . Petroleum Ltd. v. M1n of Labour , the 1nterpretat1on of 
classificatory language was held to be a question of fact 
and thus not subject to appeal, a restrictive approach that 
was influenced by policy considerations: 
1. 
2. 
fi9s51 [).969] lQB 103. lQB 98. 
"the task of 
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classification is not entrusted to the courts of law. It 
1s entrusted by Parliament to the Industrial Tribunals which 
is a body better fitted for it than the courts. In the 
first place, it is mpre knowledgeable, being composed in 
h . . I . t e rna1n of 1ndustr1al1sts. In the second place the 
Standard Industrial Classification is not drawn up by 
lawyers for interpretation by lawyer. It is drawn up by 
economists and statisticians for use by government depart-
ments. In the third place the headings are illustrative not 
exhaustive. •rhey are not to be construed in a legalis-
tic fashion according to the letter but broadly according 
to the intent. In the fourth place the task of classifi-
cation is not a matter of law. It is a matter of fact and 
degree. The courts of law will not interfere with the de-
cision of a tribunal unless it is a decision to which it 
could not reasonably come" 1 • The policy element was 
emphasised in this case; "the courts ••• should be very 
slow indeed to disturb the conclusion of the tribunal -
even when not expressed in the language lawyers would have 
used". 2 • 
In matters of interpretation, the situation appears 
to be that 'vhile interpretation of statements of the law 
(such as a statutory provision) is a matter of law, the 
meaning of a word in ordinary usage is a matter of fact. 
The difficulties in this distinction are shown in the 
case of R.v. National Insurance Commissioners (ex parte 
Secretary of State for Social Security) 3 • In this case the 
meaning to be ascribed to the word "night" 1n the legis-
lation providing for the c9nstant attendance allowance was 
questioned as an error of law on the face of the record. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Esso Petroleum Ltd. V. Min.of Labour ~969] lQH 98 
per Denning L J at p.108. 
Ipid. per Sachs L J at p.116 
Q97~ H.JLR 1290. 
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The Divisional Court, while not approving the meaning as-
cribed by the l\:ational Insurance commissioners, refused 
to find on error of law. Ho\vever, the Commissioners had 
allmved an appeal o?- this basis from the finding by a 
National Insurance Local .Appeal Tribunal that preparations 
for bed came ,.Ji thin "day" and not "night" activities. Such 
decisions lead to the conclusion that the distinction 
between law and fact is one of degree rather than type; 
more serious errors being regarded as errors of law. 
Furthermore.,vider interpretations of what constitutes 
a point of law have been used. ".?\n appellant who claims 
that there is an error of law must establish that the 
tribunal misdirected itself in law, or misunderstood the 
law; or secondly that the tribunal misunderstood the facts 
or misapplied the facts; or thirdly that the decision was 
•·perverse '' "1 • On this v ie\v only a finding of primary 
fact cannot be an error of law, but an inference from the 
') 
pr1mary facts is a matter of law-. The wide definition of 
a point of law in Watling v. William Bird and Sons was 
clurif.ied as "there is an error of la\-r in a case where, 
looldng at all the primary facts, the decision upon what 
is a point of fact appears to the appellate court to be 
Hrong" 3 • 
~part from interpretation and application of the law, 
an error of laH also occurs when the decision is against 
the '"ei~;)1·t of the evidence. This can be further compli-
cuted if the tribunal misunderstands on whom the burden 
of proof f<llls. Hhere there is a presumption of redun-
dancy, sufficiency of evidence to rebut this presumption 
. Lj • • h h . 1s a quest1on of law Where 1t 1s clear t at t ere 1s 
slight or no evidence to support a conclusion then there 
has clearly been an error of la,.,5 • But at some stage 
1. 
') 
L.• 
Jo 
L] o 
5. 
1Jatling v. William Bird and Sons (1970) 11 lTR 70 
per Philii:) S J .• 
J.larriot v. Oxford Cooperative Society Ltd. (1969) 
i) 1 'l'H 377. 
Cooper v. British Steel Corporation (1975) 
Etherington v. Henry Greenham (1929) Ltd. 
Ll 1 'I'I{ 2 ·~ 6 • 
Colleen ProRcrties Ltd. v. Min. of Housing 
Government {i97~ 1 .1\11 ER 10494. 
10 lTR 137. 
(1969) 
and Local 
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where there is clearly some evidence for the conclusion, 
to allow an appeal may be to substitute the opinion of 
the court for that of the tribunal and this the courts have 
. . 1 
regularly s~ld they y111 not do • Thus~ on appeal by 
case stated, the court refused to reverse a finding that 
the contracts in question were contracts of employment, 
although the evidence might have supported a contrary 
rl 
conclusion·~. The problem always is to maintain a balance: 
"The court 1s not a second opinion "\vhere there is reasonable 
. 3 groillld for the flrst" • 
The Decl~r~tory Judgement. }\ppeal to the courts from a 
tribw1ul may exist in a limited form so that other pro-
cedures m~y be used to bring a case before the courts. 
Thus a person may ~sk the courts for a declaration of some 
aspect of the la,·r ~s it affects him or seek an injilllction 
to prohibi·t activity Hhich infrin9es his legal rights or 
to compel some action to \vhich he is entitled. .An action 
for a declaration or un application for an injunction w·ill 
be availat•le in circumstances "\vhere appeal is not but they 
may not always be appropriate as their effect is not to 
make a new decision in place of one that is questioned, but, 
if successful, to prevent any effect of the challenged 
decision. .!Uso both procedures involve problems of locUs 
standi. 
In the case of a tribl.U"lal decision, parties to the 
proceedincrs before the tribunal will usually have sufficient 
standinq to challenge the decision by any available means 
• • • L] 
and lnc1E•ed other persons may be g1ven stand1ng by statute • 
Receni:ly the courts have adopted a fairly generous attitude 
I': 
to locus cti:'\ndi in relation to injunctions:.J, especially 
1. Retarded Children • s .Aid Society Ltd. v. Day [,i97u1 
lHLF~ 763. 
2. Global Plant Ltd. v. Sec. df State for .Socinl Security [j.97J lQB 139. 
3. Per Lord Radcliffe. EdHards v. Barstow· ~956] .AC 14. 
LJ. For exc::mple: The Secretary of State in relation to 
,.,el.f<lre trilxmals. 
5. Gouriet v. Union of Post Off ice Harkers ~ 9771 311/LR 300. 
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where these are interim. but imposed stricter standards in 
relation to a declaration1 • 
The Declaration wa~ hailed by some writers and judges 
as an imaginative reLdiscovery of an all purpose remedy2 
b t th . 3 . h . u o ers are more caut1ous and 1ts s ortcom1ngs can be 
seen in Woollett v. Min. of .l\griculture4 •. .1\s well. as 
imposing strict requirements as to standing, the action for 
the declaration may be different in scope from the needs 
of the claimant and ·interim relief, if the matter is urgent, 
is not available; the declaration is final. In many cases 
it will be wholly inappropriate and the Law Commission 
found that, even where an applicant could convince the 
Court as to his locus standi, the court would not grant 
a declaration to challenge the decision of a tribunal 
"where a declaration would be of no avail to the applicant"5 • 
This situation is likely to obtain in relation to a tribunal 
decision which cannot be altered by a declaratory judgement. 
. . . . 6 In Pyx Gran1te v. M1n1stery of Hous1ng and Local Government , 
however, it was held that in certain circumstances the 
action for a Declaration was available even if another re-
medy could have been sought. .!\ Declaration may be coupled 
with an injunction, and this may obviate the lack of enfor-
cement procedure in Declaratory judgements. 
Both the Declaration and the Injunction may be the sub-
ject of a "relater action" in which either or both of these 
remedies is sought by the .1\ttorney-General, on behalf of 
the public, but in this case there must be an issue of 
public interest (as judged by the .1\ttorney-General) a 
factor which is rare in tribunal decisions. Both remedies 
are available unless excluded by the legislature and only 
clear words will suffice to do this. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Gregory v. Camden London. B.c. li966j lWLR 899. 
G. J. Borrie. The .1\dvantages of 'the Declaratory 
Judgement in .Administrative Law (1955) 18MLR 138. 
I. Zamir. The Declaratory Judgement Revisited 1977 
:MCLJ;, 4 3. 95~ lQB 103. ork1ng Paper no. 40. Remedies in .Administrative Law, 
PJlra ,_, 71. Q-960J .nc 260. 
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The r.ew Order 53, There is certainly a strong case for an 
"all purpose remedy" perhaps based on the principle of 
Ultra Vires 1 • A case for amending the law in this way was 
made in the La1·r commission's \rforking Paper on Remedies in 
i 
.?\dmini::-:;t.rative Lr:m \•rhich proposed a draft Bill. Instead 
' 
a new procedure was introduced by way of amendment to the 
Rules of the Supreme Court. Under Order 53 an application 
m<1y be EliJcle for "Judicial Hevie\v" but the form of the 
revle\-r 1s SC:!lected by the Court to suit the caseo .1\n 
applicc::mt io required to have a "sufficient interest" but 
it is no·t clear Hhether this llill be interpreted in the 
Si1me Hay irrespective of \vhat remedy is appropriate .or 
1-Jhethcr '' suff iciency•·.- \vill have to he greater in some 
cases ·thc::m in others. Surprisingly ,in view of the Law· 
Commission's opinion that six months 1vas too short a period 
for certiorari, time limit within uhich an .~pplication for 
Judicial Pcvieu should be brought is three months; longer 
than that amounts.to "undue delay" and there is discretion 
to refuse • 
. ~s the Order 53 procedure is additional to and does 
not rcple1ce existing remedies, although it is envisaged 
th<1t it will be used to obtain them, the proliferation of 
time limits is confusing. Short time limits are l,lSUally 
justified by the need for certainty but can amount to a 
denial of justice2 • In evidence to the Dobry Commission 
on Development control, the point was made that "rather 
than st.reL!mlining plc:ll1nin<_;~ procedures we should be 
slm,rin~! theu dmm so that slmv-thinldng members of the 
. . 3 publ1c shoulci not J.-,e left be lund" • The same could be 
said of recourse to the Courts. 
Order 53 should be \vel corned as a small simplification 
1. GoulC:. .!\nisminic and Jurisdictional Revie\v 1970 
Public L.:nr 35 8. 
2. Wade. Constitutional and .~dministrative .~spects of the 
.?\.nismic Ce1se 1969 LQR 198. 
J. .Z\ppcndix to J .• E. Lucas. "Democracy and Participation. 
Penguj.n Books 1976. 
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in a complex area but a change effected by delegated 
legislation cannot be a major one. The underlying 
system (or non-system) remains the same with all the 
failings and inconsi&tencies noted by Davis1 • Indeed 
j 
so small a change .as to make the remedies of public law 
··interchangeable under a single procedure" .i. can be seen 
as an evasion of the real J.ssue, and "the general umvilling-
ness of Government to allow a proper review by the Law 
Commission of our administrative law system has escaped 
1 . . . . 3 par 1amentary crJ.tJ.cJ.srn" • 
The last twenty-five years have seen a movement by 
the courts from "judicial subservience" to government 
(seen to have reached a peak in Liversedge v •. ?\nderson4 ) 
to a concern "to safeguard the citizen against executive 
action" 5 • 1:\efore 1950 the courts ivere "disinclined to 
review the correctness of an administrative determination 
6 
where the power to determine is lawfully present•· • This 
approach \vas based on a feeling that the courts should not 
intervene without positive reason but that their function 
was to preserve a balance, to correct a tribunal that strayed 
outside its jurisdiction or ignored principles of natural 
justice but not to intervene so as to destroy the advantages 
of tribunal decision. "h'e cannot do without judicial review. 
The courts are the only protectors of our rights; it is 
their function to protect us. Yet if every administrative 
tribunal's decisions are to be reviewed we might as well 
abolish the tribunals; if we did \·Te should swamp the courts 
with worJ( for ivhich they have neither the time nor the 
. 7. 
aptJ.tude"' 
1. 
?. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
H01·1ever ,as judges came to accept more extensive 
1\. c. Duvis. English .1\dministrative La\v - .?\n .Z\merican 
VieH. 
Wade (1978) 94LQR 179. 
c. Harlow- 1978 P.L.l. 
f!.?/liJ .l\C :.?.06. ~ee comments in Blom-Cooper and Drury• FJ.n~ .nppeal. L1versedge v. Anderson was similarly 
described as the "high-water mark of judicial quietism. 
Geoffrey Marshall. Political Science and the judicial 
Process. 
Blorn-cooper and Drury. Final .~ppeal. 
Carr. Concerning English .!\dministrative Law. 
Carr. Op. cit, p. 125. 
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government intervention as an inevitable product of changes 
in society and "concerned very largely with the social 
casualties associated with industrialisation••, and as people 
applied to the cour~s '\·Then they w·ere dissatisfied, the 
courts started to develop principles on which they would 
intervene •. This change in attitude has been traced in 
respect of the House of Lords1 • "The House of Lords entered 
the 1950's uith a record of extreme caution in matters of 
public law. The period 1950-1970 saw the emergence of a 
more spirited attempt to accommodate administrative rules 
'\vi thin u precise legalistic frameworl<:" 2 • 
Perhaps that attempt has been too spirited. The 
caution expressed by Lord Denning in R.v. Preston S.B.A.T. 
ex parte Noore3 that "the courts should hesitate long 
before interferring by certiorari with the decisions of the 
appeal tribw1als •••• they should leave the tribunals to 
interpret the .!\ct in a broad reasonable way • • • • the court 
should only interfere,vhen the decision of the tribunal is 
w1reasonable in the sense thut no tribW1al· acquainted with 
the ordinury use o:E language could reasonably reach that 
decisio11 a... and if the tribrmals have exceeded their 
jurisdiction or acted contrary to natural justice" is not 
very apparent in the Anisminic Case and the Court of .~ppeal 
decision in Pearlman v. Harrow School4 further confuses 
the position. In this case certiorari was granted, after 
refusal by the Divisional Court, in respect of a county 
court eecision although the use of certiorari was excluded 
by the county Courts Act 1959. Their Lordships ,.;ere unani-
mous in one thing only that this exclusion did not apply 
if the Court had exceeded its jurisdiction; Geoffrey 
Lane L.J.(dissenting) found that there was no such error~ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
LJ • 
Dlom-Cooper and Drury. final .!\ppeal. 
Ibid 
~975] 2.7'111 ER 87. ;:l 
per Denning N. R.)Pearlman v. Harrow School ~97~ 3\-JLR. 
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Eveleigh L. J. that the Court had exceeded its jurisdiction 
by answering the wrong question and its determination was 
thus a nullity, and Denning M. R. having stated that the 
distinction can no;longer be made between errors as to 
jurisdiction and errors of law within the jurisdiction, 
concluded that "when things go wrong in law, the High 
Court should have power to put them right" • 
. As a statement of philosophy this may be justified but 
as a statement of the law it is misleading. Parliament does 
have power to exclude recourse to the courts and is not 
prevented constitutionally from providing that a determina-
tion shall be "final and conclusive". Even if we accept 
. . . 
1 h h that "'f1nal' 1s a word of many mean1ngs" t e prase must 
have some meaning and the decision in the Harrow School 
case would appear to deny it any. 
The conclusion must be that what is needed is an 
acceptance by Parliament of some principle relating to 
appeal in Administrative Law. Perhaps a standard system 
should be enacted on the understanding that deviation from 
the system would require positive justification. Such 
a system should recognise that too liberal provision for 
appeal defeats the main objectives of the use of tribunals, 
a speedy decision, but to exclude all appeals must be unde-
sirable. The system should recognise that the courts 
cannot take on the work of tribunals but on well-defined 
grounds at least one level of appeal should be available • 
. As long as laymen are asked to reach decisions involving 
points of law, there should be some way of reopening that 
decision in a court of law. 
1. per Lord Reid. Jones and Hudson v. Sec. of State 696~ 
l.All ER 210. 
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CH.~PTER VI 
A watchdog calied Cassandra 
The Council on._ Tribunals 
Tribunals, whether qualified by the adjective 
statutory, administrative, ministerial or special 
have regularly been subjected to criticism, much of 
it entangled with criticism of that wider, loosely 
defined area now known as administrative law. - For 
many years the existence of this branch of law had 
hardly been aclcnowleged by English lawyers. The 
constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century 
had enhanced the prestige of the Common Law courts • 
. At the conclusion of these struggles, the Judge 
emerged (not always deservedly) as a champion of li-
berty under the law and the independence of his 
position was confirmed by the Act of Settlement 1701. 
Other competitors in the field of administration of 
justice, such as the court of Star Chamber and the 
Court of Requests were labelled instruments of 
tyranny and were abolished. 
Once established in their favoured position, 
the courts proved, on the whole, resistant to change. 
During the next hundred years society was to be 
affected by the Industrial Revolution. Judges declined 
to interest themselves in the incidents of this 
upheaval and were slow indeed to recognize the signifi-
cance in law of the urbanisation and technical advance 
that took place in the nineteenth century. Control over 
railways was given to administrative bodies1 ; that 
1. Parriss, op. cit. 
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over public health 'vas entrusted to independent boards 
and later to the ne'v local Government Boards1 • In 
matters such as these the courts remained aloof. When 
they 'vere required to adjudicat'~· on Workmen • s Compensation 
claims, their decisions did little good for the image 
of the law or indeed of justice, and they provoked 
a reaction against judicial insensitivity and excessive 
legalism which has lasted to the present day. 
It seems that the courts at the end of the 
nineteenth century were jealous of the erosion of 
their jurisdiction rather than concerned to develop 
the law to be consistent with social change. Claims 
in respect of injuries at lvOrk were transferred from 
the Courts under the National Insurance (Industrial 
Injuries) Act 1946. During debate in The House of 
Commons, Lto Col. Rees Nilliams M.P. recollected that 
"when the first Act dealing "\vi th workmen • s compensa-
tion came before this House, it was intended by the 
then President of the Board of Trade that the cases 
should come before some informal tribunal as is nolv 
contemplated and it was only under pressure 
he was persuaded to alter that proposal and 
cases to go before the courts of la~· 2 • 
. 
• • • that 
to allOlv 
. As tribunals came to take over functions that 
might have been thought suitable for the courts, the 
feeling lTas engendered that these new bodies were some-
how inferior upstarts. The period of criticism from 
1911-1930 "\·Tas concerned with tribunals who usurped 
the functions of the courts. Between the publication 
of the Report of the Donoughmore Committee and that 
of the Franks Corrunittee, a period of enormous expansion 
1. Sir Joru1 Simon, English Sanitary Institutions. 
2. H. c. Deb. 414, cols. 345-346. 
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in the number of tribunals in operation, criticism 
was directed against bodies accepted as necessary but 
who were seen to discharge the~r functions in an 
amateur and unjudicial manner.··,.a.'During a third period 
which extends from the Tribunals and Inquiries .!\ct 
1958 to the present day, criticism is directed at 
bodies wh~important function is recognized but who 
through official oversight and economy have been 
denied the opportunity to function to their best 
advantage. 
The National Insurance Act 1911 may be seen as 
instituting the prototype of the modern tribunal, the 
court of referees. Others were soon to follow dealing 
with disputes over pensions, transport and, in 
specialised areas and for the duration of the war, 
certain aspects of employment. In 1912 Hilaire 
Belloc attacked the' whole National Insurance .!\ct 
and its administrative machinery, claiming that it 
instituted a "Servile State" in which a worker submits 
to legal regulation in exchange for social and material 
benefits1 • In 1928, a legal text book significantly 
entitled the chapter on tribunals "Trial by Whitehall" 2 • 
In 1929, came Lord Hewart•s blast of the trumpet 
against the monstrous regiment of administrators which 
was directed at least in part against tribunals 3 • 
The publication of this last work led to the setting 
up of the Donoughmore committee. 
The philosophy underlying "The Servile State" 
is easy to ridicule. The freedom that Belloc prized 
so highly was in practice freedom to starve. But 
there is this much truth in his arguments - benefits 
for the people did not mean power for the people. 
1. H. Belloc, The Servile State. 
2. w. A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law. 
3. Hewart, The New Despotism. 
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Nor was there any power in this area of law, in the 
courts. So, where was it? It -was, it appeared 
secreted in the offices of civil- servants. Administrative 
law was made and applied by Miidisters and their under-
lings. Both Lord Hewart and Professor Robson saw the 
current problem as the emergence of administrative 
law by way of a change of location. Laws (in the form 
of delegated legislation) were no longer enacted in 
Westminster but were made in Whitehall; Justice (in 
the form of determination of claims and questions) was 
no longer dispensed in the Strand but·was administered 
in \'lhi tehall. 
And to whom were these new law makers and 
dispensers accountable? To no-one it seemed but 
themselves; they were the new tyrants, the new 
despots. 
The main onslaught of "The New Despotism" was 
directed at delegated legislation and executive 
decision making in general whether carried out by 
a minister alone or acting on a report (following an 
enquiry or a tribunal hearing). Lord Hewart saw, 
and did not like~what he saw and felt to be an abuse 
of the Constitution, the following practicess 
1. Nuch executive action followed an 
inquiry or tribunal hearing which 
might be held in secret and in 
many cases was not required to be 
bel. d. 
2o The judiciary were seen by many 
ministers as laCkeys of government. 
There was some substance in Lord Hewart's 
outburst and reform eventually followed in the 
Statutory Instruments Act 1946 and the Crown 
Proceedings .l\ct 1948. The immediate consequence 
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was the setting up of the Donoughmore Commission 
which reported, in soothing terms, in 1932 but may 
have served as a curb on executive arrogance. The 
I ~~ 
attack on tr~bunals as such was no more than a 
passing shot in the barrage against administrative 
law which he described as "not really a system at all 
but simply an exercise of arbitrary power in rela-
tion to certain matters which are specified or 
indicated by Statute, not on any definite principle 
but haphazard, on the theory, presumably, that such 
matters are better kept outside the control of the 
Courts, and left to the uncontrolled discretion of 
h . . 1 t e Execut~ve and ~ts servants" • 
Professor Robson was more moderate in his criti-
cism and yet he too was far from welcoming the 
increased power of the executive of which the increased 
use of tribunals (often termed ministerial tribunals) 
was a part. He recognized, as perhaps Lord Hewart 
did not, the factors that made the emergence of 
administrative law inevitable. Firstly, technologi-
cal invention leading to social change in patterns 
of work had provided new problems for government. 
Secondly, a policy of social improvement such as 
governments of all political colours now pursued would 
inevitably conflict with these individual rights 
that the courts of law traditionally upheld. Thirdly, 
it was not possible, perhaps not even desirable for 
the courts suddenly to change direction in response 
to new expectations within society; "For the task 
of hammering out new standards in fields such as 
1. Hewart, The New Despotism, p. 46. 
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these the courts of lc:n1 would doubtless have been 
among the first to aclmmvledge· their own manifest 
' J ' ' II 1 unsu1ta)111·ty • 
The advantages of tribunals set out by Professor 
Robson are cheapness (especially for the parties to 
a dispute}, rapidity, flexibility, the eA~ertise of 
their personnel and their utility in promoting a 
defined line of policy. The list has a ring of fami-
liarity about it as it re-appears with modification 
,.,henever tribw1als are the subject of discussion. 
The disadvantages of tribunals w·ere also considered 
in "Justice and ~~dministrative Lalv"; they lvere lack 
of publicity, the unsatisfactory and sldmpy nature 
of many sets of procedural rules and rules of 
evidence applied by tribunals, and the opportunity 
they presented for political interference and direc-
tion by a Hinister. 
Hm'lever, Professor Robson's attitude to tribw1als 
was constructive. He salv that a decision of a tribunal 
is in general to be preferred to a decision by a Ninister 
alone. I-Ie also salv tribunals as an opportunity to 
create standards (of fairness for example} in areas 
of neH lal'l and to promote consistency in decision 
making in these areas. There is a positive advantage 
in the expertise that may be held by tribw1al members. 
·Hmvever, he mal<es the point that cheapness and speed 
are not sufficient alone for creating a tribunal in 
preference to allocating matters to a court. If this 
w·ere the only reason then the courts could be made 
cheaper and speedier in their operation. 
The follo,ving are the main principles set out 
in "LTustice and .~dninistrati ve Lalv" for the setting 
up of ".!idministrati ve Tribunals" 1 -
1. Robson, op. cit. 
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1. Matters to be referred to administrative 
tribunals should be legally novel - that 
is they should not be part of the law 
already administered in the courts; 
~~; 
2. Administrative tribunals should normally 
be of first instance; 
3. .~dministrative tribunals should proceed by 
oral hearings and have power to compel the 
appearance of witnesses and the production 
of evidence. They should give reasons for 
their decisions; 
4. The personnel of tribunals should be of 
high calibre, chosen where necessary for 
their specialist knowledge and expertise. 
They should always be independent of 
government; 
5. Where an administrative tribunal is 
charged with implementing a line of 
policy, the principles of that policy should 
be clearly stated by the executive. Any 
discretion should be exercised by the 
tribunal alone; 
6. .~11 administrative tribunals should be 
subject to control by the courts. There 
should be a general right of appeal from 
all tribunal decisions. 
The principles set out in paragraphs 1-3 are 
generally accepted and applied to-day. Lip service 
is paid to the requirements of paragraph 4 but 
there are undoubtedly practical problems, notably 
a lack of suitably qualified persons with the neces-
sary spare time, in seeing them implemented. It is 
difficult to evaluate how the principles set out in 
paragraph 5 are applied in practice; the supplementary 
Benefit .~ppeal Tribunals, which are frequently criticised, 
seem to operate in an area where policy is unclear and 
even contradictory, and where discretion is not exer-
cised as freely as some critics think is desirable. 
The question of appeals from tribunal decisions is 
unsatisfactory and the principles expressed in 
paragraph 6 do not operate generally. Professor 
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Robson himself gave evidence both to the Donoughmore 
Committee and the Franks Committee of the need he 
saw for an .l\dministrative Divis:ion of the High Court 
which would both supervise and ·H~ar appeals from tri-
bunals. Others have urged the use of high level appeal 
tribunals to hear such appeals. The Franks committee 
recommended an appeal as of right on a point of law 
to the High court from any tribunal decision1 • The 
.Administrative Division of the High Court has never 
been created. .Appeal Tribunals exist but only to 
hear appeals from selected tribunals. A general 
right of appeal to the courts from tribunals has never 
been established. The whole position of appeals 
remains piecemeal and unsatisfactory. 
The Franks Committee took over the unfinished 
business of the Donoughmore Committee and subjected 
tribunals, now considerably more numerous and diverse than 
they had been in 1932, to searching scrutiny. Among 
the proposals contained in the report of the-Franks 
Committee '\-ras one of which the committee was clearly 
proudo This was that there should be set up a new 
body called the Council on Tribunals "to keep the 
constitution and working of tribunals under continuous 
review" 2 • The suggestion arose from the evidence of 
Professor Robson and that of Professor Wade. The 
Franks Committee recognized difficulties concerning 
tribunals in the present and foresaw further difficul-
ties for the future. The Committee felt that it was 
unsatisfactory to wait for governments to appoint ad hoc 
committees (like themselves) when the criticisms 
rose to a crescendo. 
1. The Fraru{s Report, op. cit., para. 107. 
2. The Franks Repprt, op. cit., para. 43. 
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Th8 Cow1cil on Tribunals has nm.,r carried out 
tuenty years of continuous revie'tvo Described as 
a "\-Tatchdog, it 't·Tas designed to barlc rather than 
to bite and more Often than net its barking goes 
unheeded. Perhups, the Council's bark is neither 
loud nor long; perhaps, like Cassandra, it was 
doomed from the first to be ignored. 
Some fifty tribtmals are subject to the 
supervision of the Council on Tribunals. The 
establishroent of this supervisory body '"as a 
proposal of the Franlcs Report ,.,rhich was promptly 
implemented hy the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 
1950 (nm.,r replaced by the Tribunals and Inquiries 
.1\ct 1971) o The justification for such a body was 
the need recognized by the Committee for some continuing 
form of supervision. The Council which has been in 
existence since December 3rd 1958 relies on part-time 
members, 10-15 in number, who apart from the Chairman 
are unpaid and receive only their expenses.. The 
Council contrives to meet rather less frequently than 
once a month, has an office in London with a modest 
secretariat. There is a separate committee of the 
Council for Scotland. 
The principal functions of the Council on 
Tribunals, as laid dm.,rn by the Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act 1971 are: -
1. To l;:eep under revie,.,r the constitution 
and lTOrldng of the tribunals specified 
in Schedule I to the .1\ct and to report 
on their constitution and working. 
2. To consider and report on such 
particular matters as may be re-
ferred to the Council under the 
Act with respect to tribunals 
other than the ordinary courts of 
luu ("\-1hether or not specified in 
Schedule I) o 
- 95 -
3. To consider and report on such matters 
as may be referred a$ aforesaid or as 
the Council rnay consider to be of special 
importance 'vith respect to administrative 
procedures involving '.-pr which may involve 
the holders by or on behalf of a minister 
of a statutory inquiry or any such procedure. 
The council is required to report annually to 
the Lord Chancellor and the Lord .Advocate and this 
report must be laid before Parliament. Additionally 
the council may make a special report on its own 
initiative or any matter within its jurisdiction 
but in practice the Council does not make much 
use of this pO\ver. 
It can be seen that the Council's supervision 
extends even beyond the very diverse tribunals listed 
in Schedule I to the Tribunals and Inquiries .Act 1971. 
It extends to Inquiries and indeed to Administrative 
procedures in general. When the Parliamentary Com-
missioner for Administration (the Ombudsman) was 
first appoint-ed under the Parliamentary Con\missioner 
.Act 1967 it was clear that the functions of the 
Ombudsman and the Council might overlap in smme 
areas. In 19621 the.council.had complained of lack 
of consultation with the council concerning the 
Whyatt Report2 • The potential duplication of function 
between the Council and the Commissioner was remarked 
on by the Council 3 • Provision was made in the 
legislation for the Commissioner to be ex-officio a 
member of the Council,,-rhich he continues to be, but 
apart from this there was no formal delineation of 
functions and in certain cases a citizen aggrieved 
by malaruninistration might be perplexed as to where 
1. 
2. 
3. 
.Annual Report of Council on Tribunals 
The citizen and the .Administration• . 
redress of grievances,Justice,l961 • 
. Annual Report of Council on Tribunals 
1962. 
The 
1968. 
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his complaint should be made. 
The Council on Tribunals has two positive duties& -
1. The council must be cd2sulted by the 
appropriate rule-making authority 
before any procedural rules are made 
in respect of tribunals specified in 
Schedule I. 
2. The Council must be consulted before 
any scheduled tribunal or any minister 
making a decision subsequent to a 
statutory inquiry is relieved of the obli-
gation to give reasons for their decision 
(s. 12 of the Tribunals and Inquiries .Act 
1971 requires that reasons for such decisions 
must be given on request). 
In practice a lot of the Council's time and 
energy is spent on reviewing draft rules of proce-
dure, and judging from the matters raised in this 
regard in the Annual Reports, the council appears 
to perform a valuable service. Government departments 
are normally responsible for drawing up these rules 
and they seem in general to adopt a cavalier· attitude 
towards them. Early tribunals had rules of procedure 
of a brevity which amounted to total inadequacy. 
1 . 
In its first lmnual Report the Council referred 
to procedural rules as "defective and incomplete", 
giving as an example the. rules of the Milk and Dairies 
Tribunal 1·Thich required the tribunal to communicate 
its decision to the Minister but not to the appellant. 
Hhen pressed for time, departments tended to serve 
up left-over rules from past tribunals as a new 
dish, irrespective of their suitability. Conversely, 
different departments devised their rules in such 
isolation that quite illogical differences could and 
did exist (as to time limits for example). Moreover 
some rules '\vere drawn up in such general terms that 
lo 1959o 
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individual tribunals could appear, in their interpre-
tation of them, to be operat{ng under different sets. 
Thus in 1963 the council received complaints from the 
~:.-· 
National Council for civil Liberties concerning the 
lack of similarity in procedure followed by different 
Nental Health P.eview Tribunals which made it difficult 
to brief patients and their representatives in advance1 • 
The Council itself found reason to criticis·e the Mental 
Health Revievr Tribunals for "the absence of any clearly 
defined procedure" (for example for handling of medical 
reports) and of any formal guidance for patients or 
their representatives prior to the hearing either in 
the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules or in the form 
of a leaflet2 • 
Noreover the Council found that draft rules 
occasionally contain ultra vires provisions3 , a 
fact which indicates at the very least a lack of care 
at the drafting stage and one wonders if these provi-
sions might not have been promulgated in their ultra 
vires form were if not for the vigilance of the council. 
In 1967 the council was forced to comment on the absence 
of any rules of procedure for the Rent .~ssessment 
Committees4 o Incredible as it seems these tribunals 
had been operating for two years on an internal code 
of procedure. Prior consultation with the council 
on rules of procedure is required by law bUt there is 
no obligation on the rule-making authority to accept 
the Council's advice. In all fairness one cannot 
point to many examples of unreasonable rejection of 
this advice; on the contrary the council's recommendations 
are more often followed than not. Departmental short-
1. Jmnual Report of council on Tribunals 1963, para. 34. 
2. Annual Report of Council on Tribunals 1974-1975, 
parao 71. 
3. .Annual Report of Council on Tribunals 1964, para. 29. 
4. .Annual Report of Council on Tribunals 1967, 
appendix B. 
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comings as framers of rules seem to be caused by 
oversight rather than deliberate disregard of the 
Council. 
Nevertheless the Council does see a problem 
in relation to those cases where their objections 
to draft rules are ignored. Thus in its first report, 
the Council on Tribunals urged that there should be 
some machinery to acknowledge Council objections to 
draft rules where these objections did not lead to altera-
tions in the rules. Despite consultation on this point 
no machinery has been devised. One suggestion was that 
objections should be laid before Parliament tog~ther 
with the final Statutory Instrument containing the contro-
versial rules. The Council can of course and does refer 
to such controversies in its .~nnual Reports but these 
Reports have never attracted much public attention. 
Inrespectof principal legislation there is no 
requirement for the Council to be consulted, although 
there seems to be general agreement that where a new 
tribunal is proposed, the Council should be given the 
opportunity to comment at an early stage. .~gain, over-
sight rather than any deep laid scheme to avoid scrutiny 
seems to be responsible for theCouncil'sbeing taken by 
surprise by new tribunals. In particular the Rent .~ssessment 
Committees were set up as new tribunals separate from the 
existing Rent Tribunal although matters within the jurisdic-
tion of both tribunals were essentially the same. This 
was contrary to firm and consistent objections by the 
council. The Council was notified by a proposal to include 
in the legislation·the means of merging the two tribunals 
at a later stage but had to .complain that this had not been 
done1 • 
1. .~nnual Report of council on Tribunals 1968. 
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The Council's face has always been set against 
unnecessary proliferation of tribunals. In 1960, 
in its Second .rmnual Report the Council announced 
''.t<-1(_/. 
that it was seeking "an opportunJ.ty to remedy the 
lack of system that has been a point of frequent 
criticism in the past". In the .rmnual Report for 
1969/70 the Council stated that "we consider that 
in the framing of legislation too little attention 
is paid to the system of tribunals as a whole"1 • 
Two years later the council reported that "we feel 
that it is once more necessary to re-emphasise our 
view that if the tribunal system is not to proliferate 
in a haphazard and illogical manner, proposals for 
new tribunals should be closely examined in the context 
of the overall structure of the tribunal system" 2 • 
The same point had been set out at length in a letter from 
the Chairman of the Council on Tribunals to the Lord 
Chancellor. It is possible to detect a note of weariness 
in the .Mn.ual Reports. .A pattern which is depressingly 
apparent throughout them is that of common sense advice 
repeatedly disregard with the consequence ~hat it is 
repeated to the point of tedium. 
.Another problem which affects the 
that the limited resources available to 
functions may be wastefully utilised. 
Council is 
carry out its 
.As a body depen-
dent on voluntary part-time service, time must be one 
of its most valuable resources. It inevitably happens 
from time to time that the council is asked to consider 
proposals for legislation which are not implemented. 
The .Annual Report for 1973/74 referred to that twelve-
month period as "the year of the lapsed bills". If 
. . 
1. Ibid., para. 48. 
2. .!Ulnual Report of Council on Tribunals 1972/73, 
para. 18. 
' 
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waste of time is to be an incident of the councils' 
functions then it follows that it should be so struc-
tured as to make more time available • 
. ~~ .. 
It also seems unfortunate that the Councils' 
time should be spent on raising the same complaint 
on a number of occasions. This has happened in re-
lation to a number of mattersa accommodation, 
'vhich the Council believes should be selected to 
h . h . h . 1 emp as1se t e 1ndependence of t e tr1bunal ; 
nevertheless tribunals continue to sit in premises 
occupied by Government Departments, often the very 
Department responsible for the decision that the 
tribunal sits to review; the clerk, whose behaviour 
at proceedings sometimes suggests partiality and 
influence over tribunal decisions2 ; clerks are 
often seconded from the Government Department which 
may be a party to the dispute before the tribunal; 
Chairmen, who the council believes should be legally 
qualified and should meet regularly to exchange views 
. . . . 3 
and promote cons1stency 1n dec1s1ons • 
One particular problem that arose and was re-
ported on more than one occasion is connected also 
with the Councils continuing struggle for recogni-
tion on the importance of its function. It must seem 
sometimes to the council's dedicated members that the 
Council ,.ras created only to be ignored. In order to 
supervise tribunals in practice, members of the 
Council try as far as time will permit to attend 
hearings of individual tribunals. Their experience 
has been that although they regarded these visits 
as part of their official function, their position 
was not recognised by the tribunal as any different 
1. .nnnual Report of Council on Tribunals 1972/73, 
para. 18. 
2. Annual Report Of Council on Tribunals 1962, 
1973/74. 
3. J'mnual Report of the Council· on Tribunals 
1969/70, 1970/71, 1971/72. 
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from that of any member of the public. Thus, they 
\vere not permitted to retire with the tribunal and 
were thus denied an insight in;to hO\v the decision 
was arrived at. This problem ~s presented in the 
Council's First .Annual Report, repeated in the .~nnual 
Report for 1960 and by 1961 it had become the plaintive 
cry that the term in relevant legislation "members 
of the public" should not be taken to include members 
h . 'b 1 of t e counc11 on Tr1 unals • 
The basic weakness of the Council is that it 
has functions but no powers. Therefore a picture 
emerges of it as a body which is extraordinarily 
busy but does not achieve anything. The Council has 
been criticised for delays in dealing with complaints, 
for inadequate replies to letters of complaint, for 
2 failure on some occasions to reply at all The 
author of these criticisms concludes that the Council 
"has neither the power nor the resources to fulfill 
3 its functions properly" • 
•. Professor Harry Street expressed a similar v1ew 
. 98 4 .. ( h 1n the 1 6 Hamlyn Lectures • Superv1s1on by t e 
Council on Tribunals} he said "is so slight as to be 
ineffective" 5 • He was reluctant to blame the council 
as he sa1v the reason for its shortcomings in the same 
b.,ro factors, lack of pO\.,rer and lack of money. "Hithin 
the limits of its budget and powers it has done as 
much as could be expected in supervising administra-
tive tribunals" 6 • The conclusion is clear; all that 
the cow1cil can do, as at present constituted, is not 
enough. 
1. .Annual Peport of Council on Tribunals 1961. 
2. R. Lister, Council Inaction, r.P.A.G. pamphlet. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Harry Street, Justice in the Welfare State. 
5. Ibid. P• 63. 
6. Ibid. P• 62. 
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Over the past few years the Council has been 
re-assessing its position. -~ special Conunittee has 
been set up within the council-.to consider its present 
and future role_, to enquire in& "the kind of super-
visory body for tribunals and inquiries needed to 
meet the present situation" 1 • It is clear that the 
Council is seeking a sense of direction and purpose • 
. A.t the same time it needs to seek the more tangible 
features of pm-1er and money. 
1. .~nnual Peport 1976-77. 
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CH.!\PTER VI I 
Who • s who and what·· s what 
Personnel and Procedure 
It has always been a feature of the administration 
of English law to use amateurs among its personnel. The 
use of the jury as a jury of presentment and later 
also as a trial jury is an example of this. .1\ more 
noteable example is the Office of Justice of the Peace, 
the forerunner of today•s lay magistrate whose courts 
are the most numerous and the busiest in the country. 
Lay magistrates are appointed by the Lord Chancellor 
on the advice of local committees. There are no required 
qualifications for appointment save that of local resi-
dence. Those appointed to administer the law in the 
Magistrates• Courts need have no knowledge of the law; 
they are required to follow some preparatory courses 
and to attend refresher courses, although lack of success 
on these courses or indeed failure to attend is not a 
disqualification. 
In one way, the staffing of statutory tribunals 
in the present century is following this tradition. 
In another way, however, there has been a modification 
of this tradition in that those appointed are often 
required by the legislation to have a special expertise 
based on past training or experience or both. Thus the 
tribunal member is an amateur but an expert amateur. 
The number of persons constituting a tribunal 
varies but is usually between one and three. Where a 
tribunal consists of one person only he is usually 
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rather different from the average lay-man (the Director 
General of Fair Trading for instance or a Traffic 
commissioner). However, what we may call the traditional 
tribunal consists of three pers~ps, usually a lawyer 
chairman and t\vo "members' • Sometimes the field of choice 
for the m~nbers is narrow, sometimes it is wide. 
It does seem th~t Parliament when it sets up a new 
tribunal takes it very much as a matter of faith that 
suitable people will be available and willing to act 
as members. This faith is surprising where tribunal 
members are required to have an experience or expertise 
of a particular kind, especially as chairmen are, as 
a rule, poorly paid and other members are not paid at 
all, although they are reimbursed for their expenses. 
It has certainly been a matter of concern and 
regular comment from the Council on Tribunals that 
sufficient persons of appropriate quality might not 
be available to staff the very large number of tribunals 
in operation today. One of the recommendations of the 
Franks H.eport \vhich was not implemented by legislation 
was that the council on 'I'ribunals should be responsible 
for the appointment of members of tribunals1 • 
In practice the most usual arrangement is for 
chairmen to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor and 
for other members to be appointed by the Hinister whose 
Department is most closely concerned with that particular 
tribunal. '!'here is no indication that either the Lord 
Chancellor or Ninisters are disposed to consult the 
< ·ouncil on •rribunals concerning the discharge of their 
function to appoint tribw1al personnel, although from 
1. 1957 C:mnd, 218. para. 49. 
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time to time the c·nuncil 1s co·~ulted on isolated problems 
connected Hith staffing. r:or example, the Industrial 
Tribunals were intended to be composed of a legally-
-·.j-· qualified Chairman and t1..ro members, one selected from a 
panel proposed by local Trade Unions and the other from a 
panel proposed by local Employers' .~Ssociations. During 
the period of operation of the Industrial Relations .~ct 
1971, the Trade Unions pursued a policy of non-cooperation 
with l~th the Industrial Tribunals and the National 
Industrial Eelations c:ourt, and thus no names were put for-
ward for the Trade Union panel; indeed, Trade Union members 
were instructed not to act as members. 
The c:ouncil on ·rribunals was consulted on this problem 
as to the suggestion that for the time being the Department 
of Trade and Industry should operate a single panel and that 
both members should be drc:nm from this panel. The Council 
accepted this proposal although it did so with some misgivings 1 • 
There is a certain amount of mystique attached to ho1~ 
the field of selection for members of tribunals is arrived at, 
and a certain lack of comprehensive information. A few se-
lected tribunals were studied as to their composition and 
the results of the study were published in 1962 2 • Later two 
examples of t'·IO types of tribunal "\·/ere subjected to closer 
scrutiny and these results 1vere published bebveen 1970 and 
1974 3 • 
These studies throw up some interesting figures but 
suffer from some serious defects. The Tribunals studied 
are sel.e cted most probably for ease of access and availabi-
lity of information. Other unstudied t.ribunals might be 
found to have a "\vholly different membership. Even for those 
tribunals selected there remains a doubt as to whether the 
1. .?\.nnual P.eport of council on 'l'ribunals, 1971-7 2, para. 75. 
-:>. J•!cCorquodale 9 The Composition of .?\.dministrat i ve Tribunals. 
Public LaH 196?. 
3. Cavanagh 21nd l':e,,rton, 'fhe membership of T1vo .~dministratiiVe 
Tribunals. Public .~dmin. 1970, 1971, 197"l. 
- 106 -
examples chosen exhibit the chi'.lracteristics for that type 
of tribunal. For the information revealed in the study 
there remain uncertainties and difficulties of definition. 
• <r • 
The classifica·tion by occupat1oh used '"as one designed for 
other purpo~es and it might be argued that in connection 
1vith membership of tribunals a classification by ,.,ay of 
voluntary occupation or interest might be more meaningful 
than one by gainful occupation. 
Hm-rever, certain ch<1racteristics of tribtmal members 
are clear from the Birmingham Survey:. Tribtmal members are 
predominantly, male, a~Jed 45 or over and dra,.,rn from social 
class II (intermediate occupations) and from socio-economic 
classes 1 and 2 (Employers and Managers). Thus the same 
description might apply to them as was applied to the typical 
juryman, before alterations in the law in 1972, that he was 
. . . . 1 ·•mr:~le, m1ddle-aged, m1ddle-m1nded and mlddle-class" 
When this description was applied to jurors it was 
taken as a demerit of jury service as it then operated 
.... 
and·it led to reform of the system of selectionL. It was 
ac.ceptccl that a juror, or r1t least a group of bvel ve of them, 
should t;{pify the population at l<lrge and not a section of 
it. It CC1ll be argued th<1t the function of the juror in a 
trial is to represent the vie1vs and interests of the man 1r1 
the street. 'l'he function of tri l::lUl<ll mer.1bers 1s surely a 
different one, although the members of an Industrial Tribunal. 
have been described as an industrial jury. However, there 
may be some tribunals ,.,here the function of one or more 
members should be to stand for the ordinary citizen. What 
is disturbing is that the function of tribunal members 1s 
rarely sufficiently clearly expressed to allm..r a clear 
1. sir Patrid;: Devlin, Trial by Jury, p. -w. 
2. criminal Justice .1\.ct 197:?. 
Juries .?'!.ct 1974. 
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conception of the type of member sought. If members are 
found to be drawn from a narrow section of the community 
at large then this should be by design and not by accident. 
In particular of the Rent .~ssessment Panel investigated, 
86% of its members were men and of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal 84% were men and this unbalance has been noted 
with concern by the council on Tribunals1 • 
. ~ similar proportion of members (84%) were aged 
45 or over (in the case of the Rent .~ssessment Panel 
66% were 55 and over). On the Rent .~ssessment Panel 
63% were of Social Class II; on the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal this figure was 75%. 
There may well be some justification for requiring 
tribunal members to have an experience of life that can 
only be coupled with maturity of age. .~t the same time, 
the danger that such experience belongs to a time past 
that differs from the present is a very real one. 
The infirmities of age, deafness,slowness of mind and 
speech are more the rule than the exception and the 
sufferer is all too often the last to be aware of them. 
The very real difficulties in increasing the numbers 
of the younger, more junior and less affluent members 
of our society to serve on tribunals should not prevent 
a serious effort being made in this direction. But for 
any effort to be of value, it is necessary for policy-
makers to determine the sense of their direction. 
One finding of the survey by Cavanagh and Newton 
was that more than half the members of the tribunals 
studied by them had some other judicial or quasi-
1. .~nnual Report of Council on Tribunals, 1974-75, 
para.83. 
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judicial experience; this figure rose to three-quarters 
when only chairmen were considered. The most common 
other experience was service as a Justice of the Peace 
or as a member of another tribunal. Thus it seems that 
the field from which tribunal members are drawn is 
further narrowed by the holding by one person of member-
ship of more than one tribunal. 
The problems of choice and appointment of the 
members of tribunals are similar to those connected 
with the choice and appointment of Lay Magistrates 
(Justices of the Peace). The use of unpaid and public-
spirited laymen in the administration of justice is a 
practice in England with some six centuries of history 
behind it. The facts of life in society ensure that 
those rich enough not to require payment and with the 
disposition and leisure to spend their time in public 
service will inevitably be drawn from a small, restricted 
class within that society. The diminution and the uneven 
distribution of this class was a factor in.the rise of 
the stipendiary magistrate who is, nevertheless, ap-
pointed in only a small minority of Magistrates' Courts. 
The selection of Magistrates and their suitability 
(or otherwise) for the job has caused some disquiet, 
especially in recent years1 • While the juror may be 
distinct as to function from both the Magistrate and 
the Tribunal Member, there are sufficient parallels 
between the latter two to suggest that similar considera-
tions should apply to both. The misgivings that have 
been expressed are ~irstly that although appointments 
are made by a Minister of the Crown, the way in which 
the names for selection are brought to the attention 
1. Cf. for example Pat. Carlen, Magistrates'Justice 
.~bel-Smith and Stevens, Lawyers and the cou:J;"ts. 
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of that Minister (in the case of Magistrates, the Lord 
Chancellor) is variable,. unpredictable and secreted in 
the proceedings of committees~ Secondly, persons ap-
pointed are drawn from a sectf~n of society whose 
prejudices may operate adversely in the task these persons 
are called on to perform. Thirdly, those appointed 
are amateurs, however public-spirited and they require 
preparation and training for their task. Magistrates 
are indeed required to attend courses and for some tri-
bunals, chairmen's conferences have been arranged with 
the encouragement of the Council on Tribunals. However, 
suitable training is not always available or it may 
be inadequate or under-utilised. 
There is some substance to these misgivings and I 
believe that some preparation for these forms of public 
service should be a requirement for appointment and should 
be provided. The response to the criticisms of the 
present system for magistrates should be to improve 
that system. Meanwhile the case for some similar pro-
vision for tribunal members should be considered on its 
own merits. 
Where a chairman of a tribunal is required to be 
a lawyer, his legal training will usually be sufficient 
preparation but although lawyers are frequently appointed 
to the Chairmanship of statutory tribunals, and for 
some this is a requirement, it is a variable practice. 
Indeed
1
the Council on Tribunals has been concerned that 
the number of tribunals creates a demand on the.legal 
profession to supply chairmen, which it cannot meet, 
and that the poor level of remuneration may discourage 
the busier, practising lawyer from seeking appointment, 
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leaving the mediocre man to be selected, faute de mieux. 
How far a legal qualification is desirable in a 
chairman has been the subject of much inconclusive 
debate. Under the National Insurance .~ct 1911, 
advisory committees were set up on an area basis and 
each had a barrister as a chairman. The Committees 
also acted as the Court of Referees, sitting therefore 
with a lawyer Chairman, and this to some extent set up 
a pattern for other tribunals. However~in times of 
low popularity of lawyers, the view was often expressed 
in Parliament that lawyers were of no ~pecial value on 
tribunals and might indeed be a hindrance to the smooth 
operation of the tribunals. .1\ number of tribunals, 
notably the Unemployment .~ssistance .Appeal Tribunals 
and the Rent Tribunals were not required to have legally 
qualified chairmen and rarely did so. It is perhaps 
significant that the operation of both these tribunals 
has been the subject of strong criticism, although this 
may also be because of the sensitive nature of the 
disputes brought before these tribunals. 
One effect of the presence of a legally qualified 
chairman is that he may dominate proceedings and turn 
the two members into redundant "yes" men. 
"The wingmen whilst possibly specialists in their 
own fields, "t.;rere restricted in their knowledge of the 
law and therefore were placed in a position where a 
chairman could easily dominate proceedings, because 
as a lawyer appointed by the Lord Chancellor's Office 
to be a Chairman of a Tribunal, he is a permanent 
sitting member of a tribunal whereas the wingmen 
are called to sit on tribunals as and when their other 
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commitments permit and are often therefore on a rota 
system. .Mother factor is that the Chairman through 
his training as a lawyer has developed through experience 
• • ""-t-: 
a retent1ve memory and the ab1l1ty to look at and 
assess given facts and their pro's and con's more easily 
than his fellow tribunal members. The Chairman also 
has the advantage of knowing the law or statute under 
which and upon which the tribunal sits. The Chairman 
also can dominate the proceedings by the emphasis he 
h . . . h 1 places on 1s 1nterpretat1on of t e statute" • 
To some extent,of course,the role ascribed to the 
Chairman ensures that he will show himself to be in 
charge and it is interesting that similar comments 
have been made by students after attendance at a 
Magistrate's Court that the Chairman of the Bench did 
all the talking and the others said little or nothing. 
I have myself observed that tribunal members can be 
very self-effacing and detached to the point of not 
seeming to follow the proceedings at all. 
In the Parliament elected in 1945, opinion of 
lawyers in almost any capacity was low. Therefore, 
many of the new tribunals established during the next 
few years were not required to have lawyer chairmen; 
indee~ usually the only requirement as to a chairman 
was that he be appointed in the prescribed way. 
By 1957 there had been a change in the general 
opinion of lawyers and among witnesses to the Franks 
Committee, t·here was general agreement that chairmen 
of tribunals should usually have legal qualifications. 
The Report of the Franks committee took an equivocal 
1. Extract from a student project1 Sunderland 
Polytechnic. 
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stand on this point. 
"Ne therefore recommend that Chairmen of tribunals 
should ordinarily have legal q·~lifications but that 
the appointment of persons without legal qualifications 
should not be ruled out when they are particularly 
suitable"1 • However,the report was definite that "all 
chairmen of appellate tribunals should have legal 
qualification" 2 • 
This change of attitude between 1945 and 1957 is 
part of a wider change. In this period the courts 
moved from a cowed subservience to Parliament, an 
insensitivity to social change and a studied dis-
involvement from the issues of the day to an awareness 
of change and a new inventiveness that showed that the 
common law was still alive and well. This change was 
accompanied by an esteem for lawyers and the law such 
as had not existed previously during this century. 
In a speech to the House of Lords, Lor~ Denning 
speaking in a d~bate on the Franks Report said ".!\ 
good .layman on a tribunal is better than a bad lawyer 
and there are not enough good lawyers to go round" 3 • 
This also represents the view of the council on Tribunals 
who,however,favours the use of legally-qualified chair-
men as long as there are good lawyers to be found to 
act as such. The following comment was made in rela-
tion to members of S.B •. !\.T. 's1 "Members of tribunals 
appear as plain honest men •••• but they do not 
operate within a recognisable framework of law, they 
are not trained to 
appropriate weight 
quirements of fair 
contain their passions, to give 
to evidence or to understand the re-
4 ' . . procedure" • Today 1t 1s taken as 
1. 1957 cmnd 218, para. 55. 
2. Ibid para. 58. 
3. H.L. Deb. 206, Col. 529. 
4. Norman Lews, S.B •. n.T.'s. 
[!97~ Pub• Law 257. 
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meritorious if a tribunal has a legally-qualified 
chairman. With the encouragement of the Council of 
Tribunals there have been conf~rences of Chairmen of 
S.B •. ~.T. 's and where possible vacancies on these and other 
tribunals have been filled by lawyers. Despite certain 
reservations about overall balance, the earlier study on 
tribunal membership was impressed by the quality of 
chairmen, their experience and their interest in the 
work1 • The report concluded that "If one accepts the 
proposition that the main burden of adjudication rests 
with the Chairman, the conclusion seems to follow that 
the system works well and that the citizen appealing 
an administrative decision is getting a fair hearing 
. . . d 2 before an 1.mpart1.al JU ge" • 
The members of the tribunal are assisted by a clerk, 
whose position is an extremely equivocal one. His function 
is to handle matters of procedure and to advise the 
tribunal members on points of law. Thus he is intended 
as an impartial participant although,as is the case 
with clerks in Magistrates' Courts,the extent to which 
the clerk should assist the parties other than by reminding 
them of procedural niceties is largely a matter of indivi-
dual interpretation. His impartiality is probably real but 
it is rarely apparent to claimants, especially to those 
who apply to welfare tribunals where the clerk is all too 
often an employee of the department against whose decision 
the applicant is appealing. 
The council of Tribunals have expressed concern 
about the practice of secondment of clerks and have 
1. McCorquodale, The composition of .~dministrative 
Tribunals {!96?] Pub. Law. 
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suggested without avail that clerks should be recruited 
to a separate career structure within the civil service1 • 
-~ similar suggestion was reject~d by the Franks Committee • 
.. "~· .. · 
-~ recent research study found that the role of the clerk 
varied on a continuum between advice and domination2• 
These authors favoured the idea of a corps of clerks 
but felt that to be effective in providing the clear 
impartiality of the clerk, the·change should be accom-
panied by a scheme of training for tribunal members 
which would diminish their dependence on the clerk3 • 
The overall conclusion must be that the staffing of 
tribunals is a complex problem which cannot be solved 
by studying one aspect in isolation. It is linked with 
the problem of accommodation. Tribunal hearings are 
often heard in buildings which house Government 
Departments and their officers; indeed some purpose-
built office blocks may contain a "tribunal room" • 
. A person whose claim has been refused by an officer of 
a Department may well doubt the independence _of a 
tribunal that sits to hear his appeal in the same building 
where his claim was refusedo In the administration of jus-
tice, appearance is a majorfactor so also is consistency • 
. An agreed practice concerning accommodation and a standard 
system of appointment of personnel would be a small but 
important step in the right direction. 
Procedure and Evidence 
In matters of procedure, each type of tribunal 
has its min set of rules, now invariably contained 
1. .~nnual Report of council on Tribunals 1962. 
2. Frost and Heward, Representative and .Administrative 
Tribunals, p.45. 
3. Ibid. 
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in a statutory instrument (although some earlier 
tribunals operated according to a set of rules set out 
in a statutory schedule and some were simply issued with 
guidance notes). .7\part from aii ·obligation to observe 
its own rules, tribunals are self-governing in matters 
of procedure, subject only to an obligation to observe 
the principles of natural justice. There is considerable 
diversity among sets of rules both as to length and 
as to content. Particularly those tribunals set up 
between 1945-1950 had brief and simple, if not simplistic, 
rules of procedure. More recently the tendency has 
been to fuller and more specific rules, so that for 
newer tribunals and for those whose rules have been 
replaced or amended, there are comprehensive and detailed 
requirements. 
To survey more than fifty sets of rules would be 
beyond the scope of this work, so that for purposes 
of illustration I shall refer principally to four sets; 
those for the Industrial Tribunals, the Mental Health 
Review Tribunals, the Immigration .~ppeal Tribunals and 
the Supplementary Benefits .~ppeal Tribunals. Procedural 
rules operate at six different stages in a case coming 
to hearing before tribunal• These are, 
1. The pre-hearing stage, 
2. the hearing, 
3. representation and the 
taking of evidence. 
4. the decision, 
5. the provision for appeal, 
6. enforcement and costs. 
1. Pre~hearing. Many tribunals have little or no 
regulation of the pre-hearing stage other than the 
specification of the time limits within which 
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application must be made. These limits are notable for 
their shortness. Three months is a popular period with 
six months representing the upper limit. Compared with 
limitation periods for legal qlaims before courts these 
. - . 
are brief, but perhaps the most confusing aspect is their 
variety. The Immigration .1\ppeal Tribunal rules contain 
periods of 14 days, 28 days, 42 days and 3 months depen-
ding on the nature of the claims. Sometimes it is 
difficult to see the justification for the difference; 
a claim to an industrial tribunal for compensation must 
be made with 3 months if based on an allegation that 
the dismissal was unfair, but 6 months if it claimed 
that the dismissal was for redundancy. 
The Industrial Tribunals are unusual in that their 
rules prescribe a pre-hearing procedure not unlike the 
pleadings in a civil action. The lack of such an ex-
change of information in Rent .1\ssessment committee 
Hearings was regretted by Lowter L.J. in Hanson v. Church 
commissioners for England1 where he felt that a require-
ment that copies of documents be exchanged would have 
prevented an expensive appeal in that case. 
Proceedings before the In~ustrial Tribunals in 
respect of employment claims are commenced by an origin-
ating application in writing which.is sent to the clerk 
to the tribunal and which contain the following 
information a 
(a) The name and address of the 
applicant; 
and (b) the name (s) and address (es) of 
the person (s) against whom relief 
is sought or of the parties to 
proceedings before the court (as 
the case may be); 
and (c) the grounds on which the relief is 
sought. 
1. fi977} 2WLR 848. 
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This application must be in wri~ing but may be in the form 
of a letter. -~ copy is sent to each respondent who within 
14 days of receipt of the copy-must notify the tribunal 
of his !intention to defend the 'claim. .1\ny party can ask 
for further and better particulars, discovery of docu-
ments and the attendance of witnesses, all of which can 
be ordered by the tribunal. Recent amendments to the 
rules designed to prevent frivolous or vexations claims 
increase the requirement for information. .1\t every 
stage, copies of the documents involved are supplied to 
all partiesJ so that each party is fully informed of the 
case to be met. 
Most Tribunals accept relatively informal documents 
in the course of pre-hearing procedure and it is clear-
ly right that they should do so if persons are to present 
their own claims without professional assistance. There 
is also a need for the parties, in order that they may 
be prepared to answer points that arise at hearing, to 
have the fullest possible information in adyance. The 
most satisfactory rules are those that prescribe what 
information should be revealed while not fixing too 
rigidly the form in which it is to be expressed. The 
Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules1 have scheduled 
some specimen documents; other tribunals rely on standard 
forms devised by Government departments. The neces-
sity for satisfactory documentation was stressed in the 
Franks Report 2 • 
2. Hearing. Most tribunals are required to hold a 
hearing and according to Lord Reading, first Chairman 
of the Council or Tribunals,"It is highly desirable 
1. 
2. 
S.l 
Cmnd 
1960/1139. 
218, paras. 71-72. 
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that the proceedings should rema1n as informal as 
possible without sacrificing the element of dignity that 
ought to attach to any Court"~. There is some vagueness 
.~(~ . . . 
in rules as to the form this hear1ng should take, wh1ch 
is noticeable in respect of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunals who, unless a "formal hearing" is requested, 
may "determine an application in such manner as they 
think appropriate" 2 • This tribunal then has two alter-
native proceduresa an informal hearing or a formal 
hearing, application for which may be refused if the 
tribunal is of the opinion that a formal hearing would 
be detrimental to the health of the patient. If the 
hearing is informal the patient can be excluded as long 
as he has the opportunity to submit evidence. 
Representatives of the National Council for Civil 
Liberties complained to the Council on Tribunals of 
the variation in the way different Mental Health 
Review Tribunals interpreted their r~les of procedure3 • 
It seems that whatever the wording of-their rules, 
all tribunals must hold some sort of inquiry into the 
matter for decision. One tribunal was authorized by 
its rules to determine appeals "without a hearing". 
The courts held that this phrase meant "without an oral 
hearing", since to authorize a tribunal to infringe 
the principle of natural justice {audi alteram partem) 
. 4 
would be ultra v1res • 
Some Tribunals {the Traffic commissioners and the 
Industrial Tribunals are notable examples) hold public 
hearings athough in all the rules that I have examined 
1. Lord Reading - .7\ Public Watchdog - The Listener 
Nov. 12th, 1959. 
2. S.l 1960 1139 R. 17. 
3. Annual Report of council on Tribunals 1963 p. 34. 
4. ReV. Tribunal of .7\ppeal under Housing .7\ct 1919 
Q92QJ 3KB 334. 
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there is power to exclude the public; thus a hearing 
before the Industrial Tribunals "shall take place in 
public unless in the opinion<e>.f the tribunal a private 
r.::.; 
hearing is appropriate for the purpose of hearing 
evidence which relates to matters Of SUCh a nature 
that it would be against the interests of national se-
curity to allow the evidence to be given in public or 
hearing evidence from any person which in the opinion 
of the tribunal is likely to consist of -
(a) information which he could not 
disclose without contravening a 
prohibition imposed by or under 
any enactment; or 
(b) any information which has been 
communicated to him in confidence 
or which he has otherwise obtained 
in consequence of the confidence 
reposed in him by another person or 
(c) information the disclosure of which 
would be seriously prejudicial to 
the interests of any undertaking 
of his or any Ufdertakings in which 
he works ••••• (This rule is 
given virtually in full as an ex-
ample of the sort of provision which 
affects most tribunals which hold 
public hearings although the same 
level of detail in relation to the 
circumstances in which a private 
hearing would be appropriate is 
not always given) 
correspondingly most tribunals which hold private 
hearings such as the s.B •. A.T. 's do have power to admit 
the public usually with the consent of the applicant. 
It was in relation to these tribunals that the council 
on Tribunals experienced the rebuff of having its 
members turned away from attendance at tribunals on 
1. 1974 Sl/1386 Rule 6(1). 
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the grounds that the "public" were not admitted. After 
complaints from the Council, new sets of rules usually 
contain a provision giving a member of the council the 
right to attend in his capaci~y.as a member1 • 
Representation and the Taking of Evidence 
.~11 public statutory tribunals allow the parties 
appearing before them to be represented although the 
rules of some limit the type of representation. In 
Enderby Town F.c.v. Football .~ssociation2 it was sug-
gested that it was contrary to the rules of natural 
justice to curtail the right to representation but the 
court did not accept this, holding that in the absence 
of a rule, the right to representation is within the 
discretion of the tribunal. The decision in McKenzie 
v. McKenzie 3 gives the right to all parties to be 
accompanied by a "McKenzie Man", who may remind and 
advise. 
Hmvever, (with few exceptions) legal aid is not 
available for representation before tribunals although 
the "green form scheme" may be used to obtain advice 
before the hearing and to pay a solicitor to act as 
a "McKenzie Man". 
The policy of keeping tribunals outside the legal 
aid scheme is based on the notion that tribunals are 
not courts and that cheapness and informality are in-
compatible with professional legal involvement in 
tribunals. However,this policy has already been 
modified to allow legal advice under the scheme and 
the use of representation has increased before all 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Eq. S.l 1972/1684 Rule 
Rule 24; S.l. 1974/1386 
[} 97U 1 Ch 591. 
Q-970] 3WLR 472. 
32(4); S.l 1960/1139 
Rule 6( 2). 
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tribunals but especially before the more court-like 
such as the Industrial Tribuna is. -~ factor here was 
the legislation which placed a:substantial portion of 
,(·/ 
burden of proof on the respondent employer. The 
concept of the burden of proof is a strange one to the 
average employer. If he has previously been involved 
in litigation it will usually have been in a civil 
action for tort or contract where it is for the plain-
tiff to make good his claim with evidence. In a claim 
by an employee for compensation for unfair dismissal, 
once the employee has proved "dismissal" (as defined by 
the legislation) such dismissal, wh~ch is not usually 
in dispute, is presumed to be unfair unless the employer 
shows it to be fair. Employers soon found that they 
more readily discharged the burden of proof with legal 
assistance. This in turn produced a situation in 
which the applicant employee seemed at a disadvantage 
and he too was likely to seek assistance either from a 
solicitor or (more usually) from his Trade-~nion. The 
Department of Employment suggests that in 1977 one-
fifth of all applicantswere represented and one third 
of all respondents1 • 
Unfortunately the records kept by the Industrial 
Tribunals do not show conclusively the extent of 
representation. It is not always recorded whether 
or not a party to the proceedings was represented and 
it is not possible from the records to distinguish 
legal from lay representation. 
In respect of the Industrial Tribunals the 
Government - financed .!\.c •. A. s. 2 provides advice without 
1. Letter from the Department of Employment. 
2. .Advisory, Conciliation and J\rbi tration Services -
established on a statutory basis by the Employment 
Protection J\ct 1975. 
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charge concerning the majority of claims within their 
jurisdiction. This service is widely publicised and 
used. Indeed in many cases .1\~C •. !\.S. has a duty to 
attempt to conciliate between 'the parties and suggest 
a settlement. ·"·c .. !\.S. has no power to impose its 
assistance or its views on the parties and its services 
do not extend to the provision of representation. 
While free advice may be of great value, represen-
tation for an inarticulate claimant may be crucial. 
The employee who is a member of a large, established 
Trade Union will usually be able to obtain representation 
by a Union Official who will often be very experienced 
and able to perform the service no worse and some would 
say considerably better than a legally-qualified re-
presentative. Even so he may have to submit his claim 
to a "pre-hearing" hearing by the union when the 
decision as to whether or not to give representation 
is made. For the non-trade unionist or the member 
of a small trade union, even this possibility does not 
exist. 
The legal complexity of some issues brought before 
tribunals argues against keeping lawyers out of tribunals, 
whether by direct prohibition (now unusual) or indirectly 
by the non-availability of legal aid. Individual 
opinions for some time have favoured the 
. h . 1 the legal a1d sc erne to cover tr1bunals 
lone voices have .been joined by the Lord 
. . ? 
.1\dvisory comm1ttee on Legal .!\1d~ • 
extension of 
and these 
Chancellor's 
. 1\t the same time the considerations of cost and 
the ability of the legal profession to meet the need, 
1. Frost, Hmo~ard. Representation and .l\dministrative 
Tribunals: .!\.G. Henderson. Employment and Illegal 
Contract, N.L.J. March lOth, 1977. 
2. Report of Lord Chancellor's Committee on Legal .7\id 
(1976-1977), para. 50. Evidence of Lord Chancellor's 
.!\dvisory Committee on Legal .1\id to Royal Commission 
on Legal Services, para 24. 3. 
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both 1n numerical terms and in terms of expertise, ensure 
that any extension will be selective. The principles 
on which such a selection should be made are uncertain. 
Should it favour those tribunals that deal with complex 
legal issues or matters of high financial value? Should 
it favour those tribunals with a large case load or es-
pecially disadvantaged applicants? 
.7\t present only two tribunals are within the legal 
aid scheme, the Land Tribunals and the Employment .!\ppeal 
Tribunal, both high level appeal tribunals with a 
relatively light case load. Other tribunals find that 
legal advice and representation for their claimants 
come from organizations outside the legal profession 
such as the Citizen 1 s .7\dvice Bureaux, pressure groups 
like the Child Poverty .7\ction Group or from Trade. Unions. 
In one sense to extend Legal .!\id to the Industrial 
Tribunals {described as a most pressing candidate1 ) or 
the National Insurance Commissioners would be a question-
able allocation of resources because claimants before 
these bodies do better in terms of advice and represen-· 
tation than do parties before the rent tribunals or the 
Mental Health Review Tribunals·who have no obvious 
source of help within their means other than the 
Green Form Scheme. 
Hy own view is that the question of Legal 
.!\id cannot properly be separated from the question of 
provision of appeal. Denial of professional help is 
less serious at first instance, and the requirements of 
speed and informality correspondingly more influential, 
if appeal 1s possible to a higher tribunal or to a court 
and if legal aid is available for that appeal. 
1. Evidence of Lord Chancellor 1 s .~dvisory committee on 
Legal .!\id to Royal Commission on Legal Services. 
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Evidence before some tribunals is always taken on 
oath (e.g. the Industrial Tribunals); other tribunals 
have power to take evidence on;oath but may choose 
whether to exercise it (e.g. M~·~•·H. R. T. •s) and before 
others, evidence is always taken unsworn (e.g. the 
National Insurance Local .~ppeal Tribunals). There 
seems to be no consistency behind the requirement for 
the oath (or affirmation) • The use of the oath certainly 
increases the formal atmosphere of a tribunal. 
There is general agreement that the strict rules 
of evidence (the rule against hearsay, for instance) 
should be relaxed in tribunals but not so far as to 
threaten the interests of justice. Disputed questions 
of fact must be decided by a tribunal; presumably on the 
balance of probabilities, and certainly on the evidence 
before them1 • However,a tribunal may accept uncorrobo-
. 2 
rated evidence if the. matter is fully argued before them • 
The Decision. 
The making of a decision is a central function of 
a tribunal but for many claimants an equally important 
matter is the reasons for that.-decision. The Tribunals 
and Inquiries .Act 19713 requires that for all tribunals 
under the supervision of the Council on Tribunals, 
reasons for their decision must be given to any party 
requesting reasons in advance. In practice many sets 
of procedural rules require all decisions to oe com-
municated in writing with reasons, whether or not these 
have been previously requested. The justification for 
requiring reasons was set out in cooper v. British 
Steel Corporation4 • "Tribunals should give full reasons 
for each part of their decision for two purposesa first, 
so that the parties can know why the tribunal has decided 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Starr v. Min. o:tr,.Pension [1.94~ KB345; Stafford v. 
Min. of Health 1-!94~ KB 621. 
Douglas v. Prov1dent Clothing and Supply co. Ltd. 
5969_) 41TR 15. . 
s. 12. 
(1975) 10 lTR 137. 
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as it has and secondly because there is an appeal only 
upon a point of law and it is desirable that this court, 
in reviewing, as it is obliged.to do, the decisions of 
tribunals, should be able to determine precisely upon 
what grounds they have arrived at their decision". 
·"Good and sufficient reasons" must be clear and unambi-
guous1 • 
. ~ number of studies have concluded that some 
tribunals regularly evade the requirement to g1ve 
reasons and that these tribunals are not sufficiently 
challenged (by certiorari) for this failure. It has 
been written of the Supplementary Benefits .Appeal 
Tribunals that "evading the requirements to state 
reasons allows a tribunal to conceal its errors and, 
more significantly perhaps, to conceal the fact that 
it is rubber-stamping commission policy or basing 
its judgements upon irrelevant considerations" 2 • 
There seems no reason why the rule that requires 
some tribunals to give their decision, supported by 
reasons, should not be applied as a matter of course. 
There should also be a policy of providing lay chairmen 
with the .guidelines for giving clear, adequate and unam-
biguous reasons. 
The Provision for .~ppeal. Because of the lack of any 
clear principles underlying it.) provision for appeal 
is illogical and unsystematic, there has been a clear 
trend on an ad hoc basis for providing some sort of 
appeal from tribunal decisions; so that following the 
.Misminic case, an appeal by way of case stated 'vas 
provided for from the .oreign Compensation commission 
1. 
2. 
G~vaudan co. v. Min. of Housing and Local Government 
ll96'J1 lWLR 250 
Norman Lewis. S.B •. ~.T. •s, ~97~ Pub. Law 257. 
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and the rules of the Supplementary Benefit .~ppeal 
Tribunals were amended1 , with effect from January 1978 2 
to allm..r appeal on point of la~ to the High Court. 
Nevertheless, there is consider~ble difference between 
the Industrial Tribunals which are well integrated into 
the courts system in terms of appeal and others not 
included in the general provision for appeal by way of 
case stated (Tribunals and Inquiries .~ct 1971 s .13). 
It is hard to see any justification for anything 
less than a general provision for appeal to the courts 
possibly subject to a requirement for leave to appeal • 
. ~ distinction could be made between decisions of appeal 
tribunals, which already have the status of a court and 
from which appeal could reasonably be limited to matters 
of legal importance, and tribunals of first instance or 
which hear appeals from a decision of an "officer". 
From the latter,appeal to the courts should exist as of 
right unless there is an appeal to a higher "special" 
tribunal. 
costs and Enforcement 
English courts have a discretion in the matter of 
costs and in practice, the civil courts usually order 
the loser to pay the winner • s costs·, that 1s, the costs 
follow the event; in tribunal proceedings the usual 
practice is for each party to bear his own co.st, although 
some tribunals meet claims for expenses and loss of 
earnings, the payment being from public funds. The 
underlying assumption is that there are no costs in 
tribunal proceedings. The operating costs of the 
tribunal and its associated offices and staff come from 
government funds. In practice, the increasing complexity 
of matters brought before tribunals has widened the need 
1. S.l 1977, 1735. 
2 • .~ppeal now lies to the National Insurance Commissioners 
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for assistance in the preparation of a case and this 
assistance does not usually o6me free. Before certain 
tribunals, there may be two p~rties with costs to meet. 
The Industrial Tribunals have a limited power to 
order that the costs of both sides be paid by a party 
h . . . . 1 h w ose cla1m 1s "fr1vo1ous or vexat1ons" or w o 
obtains unnecessary adjournments (which aggravate costs). 
Such an order may also require reimbursement, by the party 
against 'tvhom it is made, of the Department of Employment 
. h . 2 for expenses pa1d for attendance at t e tr1bunal • 
'rhe Industrial Tribunals are closer to the courts 
than other tribunals and their powers as to costs are 
an illustration of this. .All tribunals are alike in 
their lack of enforcement procedures. .f\ tribunal ruling 
may be accompanied by an order such as the order for 
reinstatement or re-engagement that can be made by an 
Industrial Tribunal or a direction by a Mental Health 
Review Tribunal that a compulsory patient should be 
discharged. The former orders cannot be enforced 
directly but the Tribunal can order compensation if 
they are not complied ,.,ith; the latter could, if neces-
sary, be enforced by the use of the writ of habeas 
corpus and the qirection would destroy the legality of 
the detention. 
Where a tribunal orders a money payment, the 
help of the courts is needed to enforce it; payments 
ordered by the Industrial Tribunals can be enforced in 
the county Courts. Some tribunals, however, have power 
to specify payments but no legal enforcement machinery 
exists. This is because these tribunals (e.g. the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board) are seen as 
1. 
2. 
For the meaning of this expression see Master Ltd. 
v. Robertson lJ974J lCR 72. 
M.J. Goodman, Industrial Tribunals' Procedure. 
~· 
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independent advisors as to the exercise of a prerogative 
power. 
This situation is anomalops and confusing. Most 
claimants before tribunals would be astonished to find 
that if successful, they have no enforceable right to 
the fruits of that success. .~ standard, simple and 
cheap enforcement procedure should be available for all 
tribunal orders for money payments. Other orders should 
either be directly enforceable or be backed up by an 
alternative;that is if it were recognised in principle 
that an essential function of a tribunal is to make 
binding decisions, confusion could be avoided. .1\dvisory 
bodies, if thought desirable, could be set up with a 
clearly delineated function and name, so as to avoid 
misleading applicants ~n their expectations. 
There is a clear need for standardisation and 
consistency in the planning, staffing and regulation of 
tribunals. The Tribunals and Inquiries .1\ct 1971 is neither 
sufficiently comprehensive nor generally applicable. 
It should be replaced by a new statute in which a pattern 
is laid down for tribunals~ existing and future~ a pattern 
which covers composition, jurisdiction, powers and appeal 
in terms ,.,hich apply to all; a pattern from which new 
tribunals would be allowed to differ only on the showing 
of clear justification for the difference. 
Such a statute would strike directly at the least 
desirable attribute of statutory tribunals~ their 
unnecessary diversity. It would almost certainly be 
resisted by government departments as a restraint on their 
own initiative. The use of delegated legislation to 
reform the procedure for administrative remedies when 
the Law Commission had produced a draft bill was seen 
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as an indication of "the general unwillingness of Government 
to allm.,r a proper review by the Law commission of our 
administrative la,.,r system ••• ·:1 • This unwillingness is 
in part prompted by a view of ··1·~w as an "external constraint" 
on an otherwise free and dynamic administration2 • 
. ~ny view is likely to differ according to the view 
point of the person holding it. What to the administrator 
may seem to be flexibility to the administrated may appear 
as caprice. The actions of tribunals touch closely, even 
intimately, on the lives of the majority of citizens "Fair 
play in administration will enlist the citizen's sympathies 
and will enormously reduce the friction with which the 
machinery of government works. .~11 good administrators should 
take care that the machinery is properly tended and that 
the lubricant of justice is supplied in the right quantity 
at the right points"3 • This fair play and justice is more 
likely to exist ,.,rithin an accepted framework of legal 
restraint such as could be provided by an .~dministrati ve 
Law Statute. 
1. Harlmv, Conunent. G 97 ~ Pub. Law 1. 
2. This vielv is discussed 1n relation to the .American 
experience by P. Nonet) .Z\dministrati ve J·ustice. P. 4. 
3. K. c. Davis) .~dministrative Law Treatise. 
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Chapter VII I 
Conclusion - The Way .~head. 
Public statutory tribunals occupy an important but 
ill-defined place in the English Legal System. The 
initiative to set up tribunals comes from the Executive 
which nevertheless is reluctant to reli~ish control over 
discretionary decisions. Hhen the courts are excluded by 
the legislation from any meaningful contact with tribunals, 
these nevertheless are functioning as courts but in iso-
lation, despite the finding by the Franks Committee that 
tribunals are part of the judiciary. 
Tribunals need to be rescued from their position 
between the Executive and the Judiciary and this can 
only be accomplished by a positive movement towards change. 
The areas in which such change is needed and which must 
be assessed in order to achieve it are summarised below. 
1. The present collection of tribunals in 
operation bears no resemblance to a system. 
It should be possible to amalgamate some or 
form groups of tribunals with similar juris-
diction. .1\ "Beeching for Tribunals"l has been 
called for to do for tribunals what the Courts 
.?\ct 1971 did for the Criminal Courts. The 
Council on Tribunals has called for "fewer and 
stronger units"2. 
2. The diversity of proceedings operated by 
tribunals is contrary to good administrative 
practice and a source of ~rustratiQn to the 
1. Cavanagh and Newton. Lay members on Tribunals. 
1974 Pub. J\dmin. 
2. Letter from the Chairman of the Council on Tribunals 
to the Lord Chancellor. 20th July, 1970 a 
3. 
4. 
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public (and probably to those members of the 
legal profession who. are involved). In a recent 
Upjohn Memorial Lecturel, Master L. H. 
Jacob of the Queen's· Bench Division deplored 
~necessary differen~~s in procedure between 
H1gh court and County Court and went on to 
advocate a standard civil procedure which would 
apply to tribunals as well. 
Those tribunals that are alike should be opera-
ted alike but in ~act tribunals are a far from 
homogeneous'group ·and where differences between 
them are of substance this should be recognised 
in the nomenclature applied to them and in their 
operation. 
Two urgent problems, that of the system of 
appeal3 from tribunals and the provision of 
legal aid for the parties, must be dealt with 
but should not, as seems likely, be treated on 
an ad hoc basis. There should be clear legis-
lative statements of principle concerning the 
structure and functions of tribunals which would 
enable the questions of appeal and legal aid 
to. be established both for all tribunals now 
in operation and for those not yet established. 
5. The supervision of tribunals cannot be adequa-
tely carried out by the council on Tribunals 
alone, 4 in its present form and with its present powers • The Council is in need of legislative 
reforms. For some tribunals, alternative forms 
of supervision should be examined. 
1. The Case for a System. The extreme diversity and ad 
hoc nature of the over 50 different kinds of tribunals 
operating in the United Kingdom regularly attract comment 
and to the continental jurist appear inexcusable5 • Calls 
1. Given at the .~nnual conference of the .Association of 
Law· Teachers 1979. 
2. Farmer. Tribunals and Government. 
3. c.K •. Allen calls it an "un-system". .Administrative 
Jurisdiction. 
4. Harry Street. Justice in the Welfare State, p.62/P.91. 
5. Cf. Michel Fremont. Les ".Administrative Tribunals" 
en Grande Bretagne. 
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for a system have come from The Council on Tribunals, the 
judiciary, academics and research workers, pressure 
groups and., less coherently, from bewildered members of 
the public. The advantages of ·,a· system would be numerous; 
a few are now considered. 
Some of the problems of staffing referred to in the 
previous chapter would recede or even disappear if tribunal 
organisation was more systematic. In particular it is 
a waste of scarce resources to make the large number of 
appointments to individual tribunals which are now 
necessary. If a legal qualification is thought desirable, 
experienced, qualified chairmen may be best provided through 
full-time appointments but these can reasonably be made 
only to tribunals with a steady and substantial case load. 
Similarly, for some tribunal work, training and preparation 
may be either necessary of desirable and this too can be 
more easily provided within the framework of a system. 
Not only the problems of the appointment of Chairmen 
and members but also that of supporting staff, particularly 
the clerk would be less severe within a system. It is 
clearly undesirable that so important a role as that. of 
the clerk should be played by someone temporarily loaned 
or seconded by a government department. Within a system, 
an appointment as a tribunal clerk could be part of a 
career structure, backed up by its own training and without 
links to any individual department • 
. ~ccommodation should be provided, not on the present 
piecemeal basis but to meet the requirement of suitability 
for the purpose (i.e. the holding of tribunal hearings). 
Not only would systematisation reduce overall demand, by 
preventing underuse of some accommodation, but where 
amalgamations had taken place, the jurisdictions of some 
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tribunals would be wider and there would be less reason 
to suggest links with departments. (Thus, the Industrial 
Tribunals are not thought of s~.much as "belonging" to the 
Department of Employment, but ~A~y applicants think of 
the Supplementary Benefit .1\ppeal Tribunals as just another 
Office of the Department of Health and Social Security) • 
. ~ system would also lead to less diversity of proce-
dure and even to more consistency in decisions. The 
capacity of the public to know of and understand tribunals 
is severely strained in the present situation. Fewer in-
dividual units and a rational allocation of jurisdiction, 
would at very least reduce the current confusion and 
ignorance. 
2. The Rationalisation of Procedure. The variation in 
the rules of procedure is in fact a separate issue of great 
importance. Some sets of rules are comprehensive and modera-
tely detailed with supplementary guidance notes and text-
book material; others are so general as to allow for 
differing interpretations among tribunals subject to them. 
The Rules of the Mental Health Review Tribunals (Sl 1960 
1139) which allow for two types of hearing "are so generally 
,. 
drawn that there is in practice little distinction between 
the two procedures"1 • 
Moreover on certain matters .. not only do various 
sets of rules differ but it is hard to see the principle 
behind the difference. .~s an example, take the question 
of evidence. It is possible to recognize that it is 
desirable for some tribunals to receive sworn and other 
to receive unsworn evidence, but if the use of oath or 
affirmation is felt to conflict with informality then 
there seems no reason why any tribunal should receive 
sworn evidence, and if the principle is to avoid 
1. J. D. NcClean. The Legal context of Social Work, p.l50. 
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formality unless the issue is so important or complex 
as to require s"\-rorn evidence, then it is hard to explain 
why evidence relating to loss of work through industrial 
injury is unsworn and evidence relating to loss of work 
through redundancy is given on oath • 
. A first step towards the systematisation of tribunals 
could be a generalising of their rules of procedure. Their 
must be some rules of such general application that they 
should apply to all tribunals,One would then be left with 
a few exceptional cases which would require their own 
justification. The inconsistencies arise mainly because 
rules originate in Goverment Departments. They are re-
quired to consult with the Council on Tribunals but 
often do so at a stage too late to permit variation; 
in any case they are not obliged to follow the Council's 
suggestion. If this situation were reversed, if the 
procedural rules were made by the council on Tribunals 
subject to the requirement for consulta.tion with the 
appropriate department, then more consisteney would surely 
result and the department would be forced to justify any 
divergence from principle that it requiredo Preferably 
this function should be entrusted to a special rule-
making Committee of the Council on Tribunals which could 
call on the services of active members of tribunals, 
close to the realities of applying rules of procedure. 
3. The Classification of Functions. Thus far in this 
conclusion I have referred to tribunals as if they were 
a homogeneous group which clearly is far from the case. 
If we look below the form at the functions of statutory 
tribunals they form clusters& some are designed to settle 
disputed legal claims , others to process applications for 
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licenses or privileges, others to consider claims by an 
individual uguinst the state; around these clusters 
there are others lvhich it is hard to classit:y. · .!\nether 
vie,., is that all statutory tribunals can be placed along 
"a spectrum". vJithin the cluster theory it is possible 
to place tribunals in one of two groups, the "court-
substitute" tribunals and the "policy-oriented tribunals"1 • 
The spectrum theory sees some tribunals as being close to 
decision-making by a minister and others as simple courts, 
and the remaining tribunals on the spectrum in between; 
on this vie,., both the Donoughrnore Committee and the 
Franks Committee "allowed too little for the subtle 
gradations of colour in the spectrum" 2 • 
It is arguable that the differences between tribunals 
in the groups or at the two ends of the spectrum (depending 
on the view taken) are sufficiently large to indicate that 
distinct considerations apply to the two types, suggesting 
differing arrangements for supervision and review. -~ 
starting point could be the introduction of ~ome consistency 
in nomenclature; (tribunals are variously knmm as 
"commission", "committee", "commissioners", "authority" 
and "board" as well as "tribunal"- and "court" and where 
the tribunal is an individual, he carries an official 
title such as ••adjudicator", "director", "registrar", 
"arbitrutor" or "controller"). This may seem a trivial 
point, but a name arouses expectations and carries asso-
ciations, and the multiplicity of names which are different 
for similar bodies and alike for different bodies certainly 
contributes to the confusion in the public mind as to what 
is a tribunal. If the word "tribunal" were always used 
for the court substitutes and the word "commission" for 
the policy decision makers, then some concept of the 
1. Farmer. Tribunals and Government. 
2. Wraith and Hutcheson. .~dministrative Tribunals. 
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distinct functions of these entities might develop. 
4. Legal .~id and .~ppeals. It is all the more important 
to be clear on these distinctions if the recommendations 
·(. 
of the Lord Chancellor 1 s .~dvisory Committee on Legal 
.~id are in any way to be implemented. There is provision 
in the Legal .!\id .!\ct 1974 for extension of the existing 
scheme to tribunals to be made by delegated legislation. 
The .1\dvisory Committee recommended the extension of the 
h 1 . . . 1 sc erne to a low representat1on 1n prescr1bed cases , and 
favours such e:>..'tension using the ''Green form" machinery 
which allO"\vS a solicitor to make on the spot assessment 
of his client's means; legal services are provided, based 
on this assessment, either free or for a contribution 
and most importantly "\vithout delay. Obviously the scrutiny 
of means is not so thorough as under the civil legal aid 
scheme but the administrative costs are markedly lower 
and the La''' Society is impressed by the efficiency of 
the scheme in practice. 
If the extended scheme 1s to apply only to 
designated tribunals, then it is necessary to determine 
which shall be designated and some grouping in terms of 
function "\·Jould facilitate such determination. .1\lso 
"\-Jere certain tribunals to be designated, this would 
result in extending the scheme to one party only in 
that "the other side" 1s a government department whose 
mvn staff are trained to present a case; for other 
tribunals the scheme, if it applied, would be available 
to both sides, thus doubling the number of potential 
applicants. 
Hon~over the legal aid scheme may not be the best 
form of help to parties before tribunals. .~ number of 
1. Report of the Lord chancellor 1 s .1\dvisory committee 
on Legal Aid 1976, para. 50. 
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studies huve shmm that the party without any assistance 
. . 1 1s at a grave d1sadvantage In terms of successfully sus-
taining a claim, unrepresented·parties do worse than those 
that have a representative (no~·(o~ecessarily a lawyer) 2 • 
Tribunal members when interviewed were reluctant to admit 
any disadvuntage for the unrepresented claimant3 but 
conceded that the claimant who did not appear was likely 
. 4 . . to lose h1s case • One not1ceable feature 1s that the 
claimant who is represented (or indeed advised) is likely 
to obtain a more lengthy hearing than the unrepresented 
claimant, ,.,hose case is typically disposed of in less than 
ten minutes. 
One objection to an extension of legal aid is that 
it lvill increase the cost and complexity of tribunal 
hearings, thus defeating these prized objects of cheapness 
and informality, Both of these characteristics can be 
open to abuse, if cheapness is emphasised to the extent 
of depriving a party of a reasonable chance to present his 
case and informality too may be abused lvhen,. as was 
reported to me "members of the tribunal chain-smoked and 
held private and irrelevant conversations during the 
proceedings". c. K. }'l.llen expressed the view in relation 
to formality tha"t:: "Justice need not be in a stiff shirt 
but also need not be in shirt sleeves"5 • The presence 
of a representative may serve as a useful check of the way 
proceedinqs are condu:: ted. 
Even if it is accepted that aid is desirable, it may 
be that such aid should not necessarily come from the 
legal profession. Parties to tribunal proceedings have 
become accustomed to seeking help elsewhere, either because 
1. See e.g. Frost &Howard, Op. Cit. Table 2. 14. 
2. See Bell, Collinson, Turner and Webber. National 
Insurance. Local Tribunals. J. Soc. Pol. Vol 3 .4 
Table 1. 
3. Ross FlocJchard. Some aspects of Tribunal Membership. 
This uuthor thought that this response \vas probably 
a form of self-protection. 
4. Ross Floc1d1ard. Some .~spects of Tribunal Membership 
in .~dler and Bradley Justice, Discretion and Poverty. 
5, c. K. Allen, .~dministrative Jurisdiction • 
.. 
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of lack of funds on their part or because of lack of 
expertise on the part of the legal profession. From 
some organisations, assistance:~s available on a regular 
basis and the government adopte·&· the idea when it set up 
.~.C •. A.S. on a statutory basis • 
. At present the problem is not so much lack of aid as 
that the help that can exist is available on a partial and 
unco-ordinated basis. Chance therefore plays too large a 
role in determining what assistance a party receives. If 
the legal aid scheme were extended, it would apply equally 
throughout the country. It is undesirable that in some 
tribunals and in some areas, non-lawyers such as trade 
union officials and social workers do an excellent job 
as advisors andadvocates and are seen by some as an alter-
native to lawyers1 • This could be combined with general 
assistance and encouragement for parties to present their 
2 
own cases • But without some· coordination, this will 
happen unevenly with resulting injustice. .A reformed 
Council on Tribunals could provide the necessary oversight 
or perhaps there could be a Tribunais .Advisory Service on 
the model of A.C.A.S. 
It is clear that a positive step is needed to provide 
systematically assistance for parties appearing before tri-
bunals. Given that "Claimants stand a much better chance 
of success if they are skilfully and/or legally represented" 3 
then the opportunity to be represented should be equally 
available to all. As c. K. Allen wrote as long ago as 
1956 "to deny persons who are unable to express themselves 
the services of a Competent Spokesman is a very mistaken 
. d 4 k1n ness" • 
The question of legal aid (or some substitute for it) 
cannot be separated from the question of appeal, where 
1. Maughan and Thomas. Lay .Advocacy. New Society, Jan. 
3rd, 1974. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Field F. Poor People•s Courts (1972) 122 N.L.J. 1007. 
4. c. K •. ~llen. .Administrative Jurisdiction. P. 79. 
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the situation contains many inconsistencies. It must be 
remembered that some tribunals are hearing an application 
at first instance, some are re~9sidering a decision made 
(,. 
by an official and others are hearing appeals from tribunal 
decisions. To me it seems obvious that any decision as to 
11hat provision for appeal should be made should rest ini-
tially on the type of tribunal under consideration but 
this does not appear to happen for we find appeal tribunals 
from which it is easy to appeal those from which there 1s 
no appeal or a linked appeal and we find the same for 
both other categories. 
Then it would seem self-evident that only exceptional 
factors can justify the exclusion of any reference to the 
courts but despite numerous statements from eminent sources 
to this effect such exclusion does occur without any special 
pleading. Equally, however, there is no merit in a free-
for-all of appeal to the courts "It does not follow, because 
an administrative tribunal may make mistakes even on a point 
of law that therefore the courts must always have power to 
rectify them. To take this view would be to throw away 
all the advantages of the present system ••• ,l 
The new simplified procedure for Judicial Review should 
work alongside a comprehensive system of appeal so that 
appeals do not appear masquerading as review. From any 
administrative decision there should be one appeal available 
on facts and law; from the appealed decision it should be 
possible to appeal on a point of law; more than one level 
of appeal on point of law should be subject to the leave 
of the court. This leaves open the question as to what 
body should hear appeals. 
There are, I believe strong arguments for extending 
1. La'\vson. Comment 1957 Pub. Law. 
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the operation of the Higher ~ppeal Tribunals1 • The National 
Insurance commissioners, The Employment .~ppeal Tribunals 
and, to a lesser extent, The T~ansport Tribunal, perform 
a valuable function in filteririg cases from the courts. 
These appeal bodies are staffed by la,vyers (in some cases, 
judges) of seniority and experience, and although to some 
extent they are specialists in the field of law they ad-
minister, a group of them clearly contains a wide field of 
expertise • 
. ~s these appeal tribunals are centralised in London, 
it is possible to envisage an amalgamation into a single 
statutory appeal tribunal 2 • How short a step this is 
from the .?'\dministrative Division of the High court so 
persistently urged by Professor Robson, it. is hard to 
measure; indeed, the difference might be purely formal. 
Such a tribLmal, hmvever, could well incorporate those 
features of informality~. cheapness and expedition seen as 
so desirable • 
. ~ decision ,.;rithout appeal has the appearance of injus-
tice w·hatever the reality may be. The whole question of 
appeal should be determined on the basis that any 
party has the right to one appeal and should have the 
chance of b·10. Legal aid (or some equivalent) should ah1ays 
be available for appeals. If it is always possible to 
appeal and if aid is available for such appeals then the 
argl.~ents for extending legal aid to first instance 
tribunals is considerably ,.,eakened. 
1~e existence of a right of appeal may not necessarily 
result in 'videspread use of the right but it can have very 
salutary effects on the conduct of tribunal hearings. 
Hore thought "\·Till be given to a decision and the reasons for 
1. J\ vie'v also advanced by Henry Hodge. Really: Yet 
.l\nother 'l'ribunal? C.P •. ~.G. Bulletin. November 1975. 
2. R.SoH. Pollard in Administrative Tribunals at work, 
susjgested a General .?'\ppeal Tribunal. 
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it if these can he brought before another "court''. .~ 
tribunal usually comes to know if its decisions are 
reversed on appeal and this influences its behaviour and 
the claimC'Int 1·1ho knmvs that he ·~can appeal will be less 
aggrieved by any shortcomings in the hearings before the 
lmver tribw1al • 
. ~ general appeal system is also likely to promote 
consistency in decision-making by tribunals, seen by Mr. 
Justice Phillips as an achievement (within their juris-
diction) of the Employment 1\ppeal Tribunal1 • There is no 
system of binding precedents at the level of tribunal 
decisions and tribunals vary 1n the importance they attach 
to previous decisions. Commentators have seen the lacl<: of 
system of precedent in the case of s.B.A.T. 's as operating 
. . . ? . 
aga1nst the 1nterests of the cla1mants- and certa1nly the 
existence of a system of reportin~t the decisions of the 
Nationul Insurance commissioners (and of their predecessors, 
the Umpires) hus contributed to a coherent and predictable 
. . 3 J~dy of law 1n th1s area • 
. ~ rationalisation of the appeal system and increased 
opportw1ity for reference to th~ Courts cannot by them-
selves promote consistency; some form of supervision is 
neededo 'l'here are the problems of the high proportion 
of lay members on tribunals and their. variety, 1vhich even 
if reduced to a minimum, 1-1ill continue to exist. The 
superv1s1on of the Council on Tribunals is valuable despite 
its shortcomings. 
Reporting as it does to the Lord Chancellor's Office, 
the Council is best suited to the supervision of the Court-
lil<:e tribw1als. 'l.,he policy-guided tribunals come more 
1. The I~n. Mr. Justice Phillips. Some Notes on the 
Employment .!1ppeal Tribw1al, lnd. L. J. Sept. 1978. 
2. Steve Burkeman.~'le go by Law Here. Justice, Discretion 
and Poverty. 
3. Nicldethuaite. The l'<ational Insurance Conmlissioners. 
- 142 -
logically within the terms of reference of the Parliamen-
tary Commission for .~dministration (The Ombudsman) o The 
Ombudsman is an ex-officio memQer of the council but the 
• • • '\t_·· • • • 
relat1onsh1p between them 1s uncerta1n espec1ally as 1t 
arose from an afterthought and not from pre-arrangement. 
Like the council, the Ombudsman lacks power but has 
shown himself influential and the Ombudsman concept has 
now been applied to Local Government and to the Health 
Serviceo Both the council and the Ombudsman should now 
be re-appraised in the light of experience and the legis-
lation amended to clarify their functions and increase 
h . 1 t e1r power o 
The most useful functions of the Council on Tribunals 
are threefold: to supervise and direct the operation of 
existing tribunals; to act as a consultant on impending 
legislation involving tribunals and to act as an avenue 
of complaint when the operation of tribunals goes astray. 
In order to carry·out these functions the council needs 
clear definition of its powers and an extension of them; 
in particular, it should be able to require certain 
principles of fairness to be observed and it should have 
power to obtain redress in situations where complaints are 
found to be justifiedo 
If the list of tribunals subject to the Council's 
jurisdiction were reduced to those best suited to this 
form of supervision, the council could more effectively 
carry it outo Other tribunals could then be within the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction and these could include some out-
side the council's supervision (the Police Complaints Board, 
for instance). 
In respect of the Ombudsman, the requirement for 
complaints to him to be preferred through an MaP. should 
1. Cf. Recommendation in Garnero The Council on 
Tribunalso 1965 Pub. Law 32lo 
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be discontinued and the Ombudsman should have the power to 
require redress for complainants whose complaint is a 
valid one • 
. ~ Place in the System 
The majority of public statutory tribunals in 
England are courts dealing informally with specialised areas 
of law. They represent a break with the traditions of di-
gnity and formality (and expense) that have shaped the higher 
courts of laH (referred to as a "Rolls Royce system of 
.. 1ustice") 1 ; hmvever, the courts themselves now have alter-
native procedures in response to demands for cheaper, simpler 
and speedier justice2 • The difference between tribunals 
and courts is not fundamental; it is a matter of detail and 
of degree. 
There 1s a strong psychological influence in names • 
. ~. tribunal, hov1ever formal, may sometimes be preferred to 
a court, however informal because of the associations of 
their names. This was recognised at the tillJe of the I:•rank.s 
Report: "Only a certain type of lawyer, politician and 
constitutionalist dearly loves our system of established 
courts. The man on the Clapham omnibus and the man in 
the Company Rolls are alike in this, that they would prefer 
to be driven in their respective vehicles to any arbitra-
• • 0 3 
t1on or tr1bunal rather than to the Courts" • 
This prejudice was a factor in the wide UJ't)Opulari·ty 
of the National Industrial Relations Court, although 
the Industrial Tribunals then took a transfer of the 
major part of its jurisdiction and has continued to exer-
cise it since 1974 without suffering similar attacks. 
1. Harry Street. Justice in the Welfare State, P. 3. 
2. e.g. The small claims procedure in the county court; 
the new precedure for indefended divorce; the relaxation 
of probate requirement in the administration of small 
estates. 
3. J •. A. G. Griffith. Tribunals and Inquiries 2'2 1'-lLH 1:?5. 
I' 
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To suppose hO\·Tever that these tribunals are a wholly 
different animal from the court is clearly unfounded. 
Because tribunals have, Qn the whole, given satis-
·t:; 
faction to their customers they have acquired a reputation 
for dealing informally, expeditiously and economically \vi th 
matters assigned to them; at the same time the courts have 
retained a reputation from an earlier time for expensive 
maladroit handling of legal matters. Neither reputation 
is entirely deserved. There is a danger that an impatient 
legislature will always turn to a tribunal (frequently 
invented for the purpose) ,.,hen questions under legislation 
have to be determined. The hopes of thus avoiding 
legalisation are not always fulfilledl. 
In recent years the courts have recognised that most 
tribw1als are truly part of the machinery for the adminis-
tration of the law and have attempted to impose standards 
and to establish legal principles in respect of them. 
The influence of the courts has sometimes come about by 
devious means, and the courts have justified the use of 
a procedure on the grounds that no other means is available. 
In the process the important distinction between a decision 
bad in la\v and a decision arrived at through some irregula-
rity has been blurred and the situation concerning judicial 
review is now so fluid as to be indefinable2 • The admirable 
concern of the judiciary however has not yielded an effec-
. h . . 3 t1ve remedy for t e c1t1zen • 
The idea that administrative law is not a proper study 
for la\·ryers has at last been abandoned and academic lawyers 
too have raised their voices to suggest principles and ask 
plaintively for consistency. Research studies have pointed 
1. K. H. Wedderburn. Labour Courts? New Society 9th Dec. 
1965. 
2. H. ~v. R. Hade. .l'\nisminic ad Inf ini turn 95LQR 163. 
3. H• w. Jones. The Rule of Law and the Welfare State. 
1958 Col. L.R. 
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to some problems and suggested some solutions. 
Tribunals are usually studied in the context of 
administrative law and are co~nly referred to as adminis-
trative tribunals but it is clear, especially to foreign 
observers that the law they are concerned with is not 
administrative law. The distinction between a tribunal 
decision and a true administrative decision is, as pointed 
out by R. M. Jackson, procedural1 • The procedure in most 
tribunals is judicial in that the decision is made according 
h . 2 to law and t e ev1dence • 
What is now needed is for the Executive to recognise 
this reality and to cease to hanker for the "ministerial 
tribunals" of the 1930's. If a minister wishes to control 
a decision he must take the accompanying responsibility for 
it. If he wishes to issue guidelines for the exercise of 
a discretion, these should be public and available, as 
part of the legislation, as codes of practice or as 
published precedents. 
Finally, the legislature too must resist the temptation 
to multiply when it ought to arrange, and must reverse its 
consistent failure to clarify i~tentions. No one would now 
suggest that we can do without tribunals; therefore what 
we do with them should be consistent and constructive, and 
based always on considerations of justice, the machinery 
of which they form an essential part. 
1. R. M. Jackson. The Machinery of Justice in England. 
7th ed. p. 156. 
2. Jackson uses the term "special" to describe tribunals. 
? 
BOOKS 
.'~bel-Smith & Stevens R., Lawyers and the Courts, Heinemann 
1970. 
Abel-Smith & Stevens R., In Search of Justice, Penguin 1968 • 
. Adler & Bradley Justice, Discretion and Poverty, 
(.A Symposium on S.B •. l\.T. 's), Professional Books 1975 • 
. ~ldcroft D. H., Studies in British Transport History 1870-
1970, 1974 David & Charles • 
. 1\llen c. K., .1\dministrative Jurisdiction, Stevens 1956. 
Baker J. H.,· An Introduction to Engli~h Legal History 
(2nd edo), Butterworths. 
Bell Kathleen,Tribunals in the Social Services, R.K.P. 
Belloc H., The Servile State, 1927, London. 
Beveridge W., Unemployments .A Problem of Industry, London 
1910. 
Beveridge Wo, Power and Influence. 
Blom-Cooper W. & Drury G. , Final .~ppeal , Clarendon Press. 
Bonner G •. Ae, British Transport Law, by Road and Rail, 
David & Charles 1974. 
Briggs .A. & Saville J., Essays in Labour History 1886-
1923, Vol. II, 1960 MacMillan. 
Bruce Maurice, The Coming of the Welfare State, Batsford. 
Carlen P., Magistrates' Justice, Marlin Robertson 1976. 
Carr, Sir Cecil T. c., Concerning English .Administrative 
Law, O.U.P. 1941. 
Cook Co, .A Short History of the Liberal Party (1900-
1976), Ma-cMillan 1976. 
Dangerfield Go B., The Strange Death of Liberal England, 
N.Y. 1961 Capricorn Bks. 
Davis Ko c., .Administrative Law Treatise, St. Paul Minn. 
West Pub. co. 1958. 
Denning .Ao, The Changing Law, London 1953. 
De Schweinitz Ko, England's Road to Social Security, 
Philadelphia 1947. 
Denning .A., Freedon Under the Law, Stevens. 
De Smith So .Ao, Judicial Review of .Administrative .Action, 
Stevens. 
Devlin, Sir Patrick, Trial by Jury, 1956 Stevens. 
Dennison D. v., The Government of Housing, Penguin. 
Farmer J •. A., Tribunals and Government, Weider~field & 
Nicolson. 
Foulkes D. F., Introduction to .~dministrati ve Law, 
Butterworth. 
Frost A. & Howard c., Representation and Administrative 
Tribunals, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 
Fulbrook J., .Administrative Justice and the Unemployed, 
Mansell 1978. 
ii 
I 
Gilbert B. B., The Evolution of National Insurance in 
Great Britain (The Origins of the Welfare State}, 
London Joseph 1966. 
Goodman M. J., Industrial Tribunals' Procedure, London-
Oyez 19_76. 
HardingA.-Boulte~The Law and Practice of Social Security, 
Jordans 1972. 
Harris Jos~, Unemployment and Politics, o.u.~ 1972. 
Hay J. R., The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms 
(1906-1914), MacMillan. 
Hewart, Lord, The New Despotism, London. 
Hurwitz s. J., State Intervention in G. Ba -~ Study of 
Economic Control and Social Response 1914-1919. 
Jackson P., Natural Justice (Modern Legal Studies}, 
S. & M. 
Jackson R. M., The Machinery of Justice in England, c. V.P. 
Jones M., Justice and Journalism, Barry Rose. 
Llewllyn K., Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Press, 
1962. 
Lucas J. R., Democracy and Participation, Penguin Books. 
McClean,J. D., The Legal Context of Social Work, 
Masterman Co F. G., The Condition of England, London 1911. 
Marwick .J'\. J·. B., The Deluge, London , Bodley Head ., 1965 •. 
Nowell-Smith S. H. (ed.), Edwardian England, London O.U.P., 
1964. 
Nonet P., .J'\dministrative Justice, N. Y. Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1969. 
Page G. Terry, ':):'he Industrial Training .J'\ct and After, 
London') Deutsch ~ 1967. 
Parriss H., Government and Railways in 19th Century Britain, 
London, Routledge & Paul , 1965o 
Pollard R. s. W. (Ed.), .~dministrative Tribunals at Work, 
Stevens , 1950o 
Potter D. & Stansfield D. H., National Insurance (2nd. Ed.), 
London, 1949o 
Potter D. & Stansfield D. H., National Insurance (Industrial 
Injuries) 2ndo EdA London,1949. 
Riddell Go, More Pages from my Diary 1908-1914, London, 1934o 
Robson W. Ao, Welfare State and Welfare Society. (Illusion 
and Reality), Geo .Allen & Unwin, 1976. 
Robson Wo .J'\e, Justice and ·"dministrative Law, MacMillan. 
Schwartz & Wade, The Legal control of Government, Oxford 
1972o 
Simon, Sir John, English Sanitary Institutions, London 1890. 
Smith (Chris) & Hoath (David), Law and the Under Privileged 
19759 Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Tallents s. Go, Man and Boy, Faber & Faber 1943. 
Thio, Locus Standi and Judicial Review, Singapore u. P. 
Titmus Ro, Problems of Social Policy, H. M. So. 
iii 
Van Dyk, Tribunals and Inquiries, London ~Oyez ., 1965. 
Wade H. w. R., Toward .1-\dministrative Justice, University 
of Michigan Press. 
Wade H. W. R., .1-\dministrati ve Law (4th Ed.), Clarendon Press) 
Oxford 1977. 
Wheare, Maladministration and its Remedies, Stevens. 
Nhitsides K. & Hawkes G., Industrial Tribunals, s. & M. 
Wilcox .A. F., The Decision to Prosecute, Butterworth 1972. 
Wolfe H., Labour Supply and Regulation, Oxford 1923. 
Wraith & Hutcheson, .Administrative Tribunals, Geo .Allen & 
U.Dwin , 1973. 
iv 
.ARTICLES 
.~dler, Representation before Tribunals, 1972 Pub. Law 27 8 • 
. ~kehurst Michael, Statement of Reasons for Judicial and 
.~dministrative Decisions, (1970) 33 MLR p.l54 • 
. Z\rcher et .f\1' Poor People Is Courts, F auian Tract 4 27. 
Beatson J. & Matthews M. H., Supreme Court Rulesa The 
Reform of .1'\dministrative Law Remedies a Order 53, [ 1978 J 
41 MLR 437. 
Bell K., .Administrative Tribunals since Franks, Nov. 4th 1970, 
Social and Economic .Administration, vo1.4. 
Bell, Collinson, Turner & Webber, N.I. Local Tribunals -
.~ research Study, Jnl. of Social Policy vol.4 (4) 1 & 
vo1.4 (1) 1. . 
Bell K., Disequilibrium in Welfare, Inaugural Lecture Nc. 
University. 
Booth .~., .An .Administrative Experiment in Unemployment 
Policy in the Thirties, Pub •. ~dmin. 139, Summer (!978]. 
Barrie G. J., The Advantages of the Declaratory Judgement, 
(1955) 18 MLR 138. 
Caldwell, The Genesis of the Ministry of Labour, 1959 
Pub •. Admin. 37. 
Cavanagh W. E. & Hawker G. N., Laymen on .Administrative 
Tribunals, [1974] 52 Pub. .f\dmin. 209. 
Cavanagh W. E. & Newton D., .~dministrative Tribunals a 
How People Become Members, [1970] 49 Pub •. ~dmin. 197. 
Cavanagh W. E. & Newton D., Membership of Two .~dministrative 
Tribunals, {j976j Pub •. ~dmin. 449. 
Craig, The R~luctant Executive, [96~ P.L. 45. 
Davis K o C., English .f\dministrati ve Law - .Z\n .American 
View. 
Davis K. c., The Liberalised Law of Standing, (1970) 37 
Univ. of Chicago L.R. p.450. 
De Smith s •. A., Judicial Review in .~dministrative Law: 
the ever-open door? (1969) 27 CLJ 161. 
De Smith s . . A., .Administrative Finality and Judicial Review, 
20 MLR 394. 
De Smiths •. ~ •• Certiorari and Speaking Order, 14 MLR 207~ 
15 MLR 217. 
Diplock Lord~ Judicial Control of the .Administrative 
Process, U97~ CLP,l. 
Diplock Lord, .f\dministrative Law a Judicial Review Reviewed, 
(1974) 33 cam. L.J.: 233. 
Dworkin, Is Law q System of Rules.? Ed. R. s. Summers, 
Essays in Legal Philosophy, Pub. Oxford, Blackwell. 
Field F., Poor People's courts, (1972) 122 NLJ 1007. 
Fromont M., Les ".~dministrative Tribunals" en Grande-
Bretagne. 
G~nz G., A Voyage of Discovery into Administrative Action, 
L1963] PL 76. 
Garner J. F., The Council on Tribunals, 1965 Pub. Law p.321. 
Gomm R., The Claimant as Mendicant, Soc. Work Today, 
19th Sept. 1974 
v 
Gordon D. M., .Administrative Tribunals and the Courts, 
49 LQR [1933) 94, 419. 
Gordon D. M., Quashing.on Certiorari for Error in Law, 
67 LQR 452. 
Gordon D. M., What did t~e Anisminic Case Decide?,f197~ 
Mod. L.R. ~. 1. . 
Gould, .1\nisminic and Jurisdictional Review, [_i97qj Pub. Law 
358. 
Griffith J •. A. G., Tribunals and Inquiries, 22 Modern Law 
Review (1959) p.125. . 
Harlow, Comment, (1978)Pub. Law 1. 
Henderson .1\. G., Employment Law and Illegal Contracts, 
[1977] NLJ March lOth 232. 
Herman M., .Administrative Justice and Supplementary 
Benefits, Pamphlet ~ Occasional Papers on Social 
.Administration 4 7. 
Hill M., Some implications of a Legal .~pproach to Welfare 
Rights, Bt. J. of Soc. Wk. (19741 V. 4 187. 
Hodge H., Really a Yet .Another Tribunal? CP.~G Bulletin, 
Nov. 1975. 
Jennings w. I., Judicial Process at its Worst, [1937] 
lMLR 111. 
Jones H. w., The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, (1958] 
58 Col. L.R. 143. 
Jewell J., The Legal Control of .~dministrative Discz:etion 
[1973] Pub. Law 178-220. 
Keeton G. W., .~dministrati ve Procedure and the Franks 
Report, ~958j C.L. P, 88. 
Lawson F. a., Comment, L1957] PUbo Law 89. 
Lewis N. ,Supplementary Benefit .Appeal Tribunals, [1973] 
Pubo Law 257. 
Lister R., Justice for the Claimant, C.P •. ~.G. Res. 
Series 4 1974. 
Lister R., Council Inaction, C.P •. ~.G. Report, Jne 1975. 
Lynes Tony, Social Security - Whose Benefit? 1970 New Soc. 
lOth Sept. 
Marshall G., Tribunals and Inquiries- Development since 
Franks, D:958j 36 Pub •. Admin. 261. 
Marshall G., The Franks Report, [i9s?J 35 Pub •. Admin. 347. 
Marshall G., Political Science & the Judicial Process, [1957] 
Pub. Law 139. 
Maugham & Thomas, Lay .Advocacy, New Soc. Jan. 3rd, 1974. 
Micklewaite R., .Another Experiment in Legal Procedure, 
reading given in Middle Temple Hall, Nov. 1964. 
McCorquodale Susan, Composition of .Administrative Tribunals, 
[1964) Pub. Law 298, 326. 
Phillips, Hon. Mr. J., Some Notes on the Employment .Appeal 
Tribunal, Ind. L.J. Sept. 1978. 
Radcliffe Lord, How a La~er Thinks, Lancet, Jan. 7th, 1956. 
Reading Lord, .A Public Watchdog, The Listener, Novo 12th 
1959. 
Robson w •. r.., .Administrative Justice and Injustice, 1}.958) 
Pub. Lawo 
Rubin G. R., The Origins of the Industrial Tribunals, 
Indust. L.J., Sept. 1977, V.6.3 149. 
Rubin G. Ro, The Munitions .~ppeal Reports, Jurid. Rev. 
Dec. 1977 221. 
vi 
Sawer G., Error of Law on the Face of the Administrative 
Record, (1954) 3. Univ. of w •. ~ustralia L.R. 24. 
Shawcross H., The State and the Law, (1948) 11 MLR 1. 
Smith c., Discretion of Rule of Thumb, N.L.J. 22nd Mar. 
1973, 267. 
Smith c., Discretion or Legislation, N.L.J. 7th Mar. 1974. 
Stevens R. B., The Role of a Final .~ppeal Court ·in a 
Democracys The House of Lords Today, (1965) 28 MLR 509. 
Taylor G. D. s., Judicial Review of Improper Purposes and 
Irrelevant Considerations, [1970) C.~M. L.J., V. 35.2 272. 
Titmus R., Welfare Rights, Law and Discretion,(l9711 Polit. 
Quartedy, (.~pril) 113. 
Treble, The .~ttitude of the Friendly Societies Towards the 
Movement in Great Britain for State Pensions, Inter. Rev. 
of Soc. History (1970) 15. 
Wade H. w. R., Quasi Judicial and its Background, (1949) 
10 cam. L.J. 216. 
Wade H. w. R., .~nisminic ad Infinitum, (1979) 95 LQR 163. 
Wade H.W .R., Constitutional and .~dministrative .~spects of 
the .~nisminic Case, (1969) 85 LQR 198. 
Wedderburn K., Labour Courts? New Society, 9th Dec. 1965. 
Woodward, Reality and Social Reform - The Transition form 
Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, Yale L J. Cl962J286. 
Zamir I., The Declaratory Judgement Revisited, [1977]30 
LP 43. 
vii 
Table of Cases 
.I\ 
.~gricul tural, Horticultural and 
Board v •. ~ylsbury Mushrooms Ltd. 
Forestry Industry Training 
[1972J lWLR 190. 
lrnisminic v .- Foreign compensation Commission ~968J 2QB 862 • 
. ~isminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission (H.L.) 
~ 969_\ 2.1\C 14 7 • 
. ~shbridge Investment Ltd. v. Min. of Housing and Local 
Government @.965) 3.~11 ER 371 • 
. Attorney General v. I.B •. ~. ~973] 1.~11 ER 689. 
B 
Barnard and others v. National Dock Labour Board ~95~ 
1.~11 ER 113. 
Barraclougl) v. Brown ~89TI .AC 615. 
Ex parte Bradlaugh (1878) 3Q.B.D. 509. 
Breen v •. 1\.E.U. ~97~ 2QB 190. 
c 
Coleen Properties Ltd. v. Min. of Housing and Local 
Government ~97!} 1.~11 ER 1049. 
Coleman v. South of England Tyre Services Ltd. (1971) 
6 lTR 41. 
Cooper v. British Steel Corp. (1975) 10 lTR 137. 
D 
Douglas v. Provident Clothing and Supply co Ltd. (1969) 
4 lTR 15. 
viii 
E 
Edwards v. Barstow [195~ .~c 14. 
Enderby Town F .c. v. Football .~ssociation ~97~ Ch 591. 
Errington v. Minister of Health [193~ lKB 249. 
Esso Petroleum Ltd. v. Minister of Labour ~96~ lQB 98. 
Etheri~gton v. Henry Greenhaw (1929) Ltd. (1969) 4 lTR 226. 
F 
Francis v. Yiewsby and w. Drayton V.o.c. ~95~ lQB 478. 
Frankl in v. Min. of Town and Country P 1 anning. ~ 94 ~ .~c 8 7. 
G 
Givaudan v. Min. of Housing and Local Government ~96CU 
3.~11 ER 696. 
Green v. Southampton Corporation (1972) lTR 153. 
Gregory v. Camden London B.c. [1966]1WLR 899. 
Global Plant Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Health and 
Soc. Security [i97~ 3WLR 269. 
Gouriet v. Union of Post Off ice Workers 6 977] 3WLR 209. 
Groenvelt v. Burwell (1700) Ld. Raym. 454. 
H 
Hanson v. Church Commissioners for England {_1977] 2WLR 848. 
Howard v. Bor111eman (No.2) ~975] 2.~11 ER 418. 
Hudson v. Sec. of State ~97~ .~C 944. 
I 
J 
Jones and Hudson v. Sec. of State ~96~ 1.~11 ER 210. 
ix 
K 
L 
Laker .Airways Ltd. v. Dep. of Trade (}.977] 2WLR 
Liebman v. G~n. Medical Council [197~ .AC 217. 
Liversedge v •. Anderson E94 iJ .AC 206. 
London Borough of Ealing v. Race Relations Board 
U'\11 ER 424. 
234. 
Lord .Advocate v. Reliant Tool Co. ~96~ lWLR 205. 
M 
Maurice • Minister of Labour [!. 90~ 2.AC 34 6. 
Masters v. Robertson ~974] lCR 84. 
Maybank (J + J) Ltd. v. Edwards (1970) 5 lTR 189. 
McBride v. B. R. (1972) 7 lTR 84. 
McKenzie v. McKenzie [i97Q_J_ 3WLR 
Moxon v. Min. of Pensions -[i94~ 
N 
0 
p 
472. 
KB 490. 
Pearlman v. Harrow School ~97~ l.All ER 365. 
X 
Puntan v. Min. of Pensions and National Insurance ~964] 
1.~11 ER 448. 
Puntan v. Min. of Pensions (No.2) ~964] LWLR 226. 
Re Poyser and Mills .f\rbitration [1963] 1.~11 ER 612. 
Pyx Granite co. Ltd. v. Min. of Housing and Local Government 
~960J .i\C 260. 
Q 
R 
R v •. i\shford (Kent) J J. ex. parte Richly (195~ lQB 
R v. Barnet and Camden Rent Tribunal ex. parte Frey 
Investment Ltd. ~972] l.i\11 ER 1185. 
R v. Barnsley Metrop. Council ex. parte Hook ~97~ 
3J\ll ER 402. 
R v. Blackp_ool Rent Tribunal ex. parte .~shton 094~ 
2KB 277. 
R v. Bolton (1841) lQB 66. 
162. 
R v. Brighton .!\rea Rent Tribunal ex. parte Marine Parade 
Estates Ltd. {j.952J l.i\11 ER. 
R v. city of London Rent Tribunal ex. parte Honig G95~ 
lKB 641. 
R v. Criminal Injuries compensation Board ex parte Lain E 96~ l.i\11 ER 770. 
'· 
R v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex parte Moore 
1!965) l.i\11 ER 81. 
R v. Electricity commissioners ~92~ lKB 171. 
R v. Gillyar,d ~848] 12 QB 527. 
R v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte .i\rmah r96~ 
.~C 192. 
R v. Birmingham S.B •. ~.T. ex parte Simper G97~ 2.!\11 ER 461. 
R v. Housing .~ppeal Tribunal {j.920J 3KB 334. 
R v. Industrial Tribunal ex parte Geo. Green and Thempson 
r-967) 11 KlR. 
R v. Licensing .Authority for Goods Vehicles for the 
Metropolitan .~rea ex parte B. E. Barrett Ltd. [i94~ 
2KB 17. 
R v. Local Government Board ~91~ 2 lRR 131. 
R v. London c. c. {i91i} 2KB 466. 
R v. Ludlow ex parte Barnsley Corp. 694.;] lKB 634. 
R v. Medical .~ppeal Tribunal ex parte Gilmore [I957] 
lQB 574. 
Rv. Minister of Health ~9391 lKB 232. 
R ·v. Nat Bill Liquors Ltd. '{i..922J 2.~c 128. 
R v. National Insurance Commissioners ex parte Hudson 
~969] 2WLR 639. 
R v. National Insurance Commissioners ex parte Jones 
E969J 2WLR .647. 
R v. National Insurance (I.I.) commissioners ex parte 
Richardson ~·968_] lWLR 851. 
R v. National Insurance Commissioners ex parte 
Cox and James ~955] lQB 139. 
R v. Newcastle Munitions .Appeal ex parte Lloyd George 
(1915) 50LJ 530. 
R v. Paddington and St. Marylebone Rent.Tribunal ex parte 
Bell Properties ~96~ lKB 666. 
R v. Paddington Valuation Officer ex parte Peachey G 96~ 2.~11 ER 836. 
R v. Plowright (1686) 3 Mod 95. 
R v. Preston S.B •. A.T. ex parte Moore 097~ 2.~11 ER 807. 
R v. Sec. of State for the Environment ex parte Ostler 
e97~ 3}\11 ER. 
xii 
R v. Special commissioners of Iacome Tax {i888J 21 QB 313. 
R v. Sto .~lbans J J. (1853) 22 L.J.M.c. 
R v. Somersetshire J J. (1825) B & c 816. 
R v. West London S.B •. ~.T. ex parte Taylor [197~ 2.~11 ER 
790. 
R v. West London S.B •. ~.T. ex parte Clarke The Times 
31st July 1975. 
R v. Westminster (City) London B. c. Rent Officer ex parte 
Rendall ~97~ 3.~11 ER 119. 
R v. Yorkshire (WR) c. c. 1896 2QB 386. 
Retarded Children's .~id Society Ltd. v. Day ~97~ lWLR 
763. 
s 
Scott v. Scott [i92~ P. 107 (C.~). 
Secretary of-State for Education and Science v. Tameside 
Metropolitan B. C, e 977] .~C 104. 
Sharp v. Wakdefield [!89~ .AC 173. 
Shell co. of Australia Ltd. v. Federal commissioner of 
Taxation [i 93~ .~c 275. 
Smith v. East Elloe R. D. c. ·~95~ .~c 736. 
Stafford v. Min. of Health ~94~ KB 621. 
Starr v. Minister of Pensions ~94~ KB 345. 
Stronger Vo David Rosenfield (1972) 7 lTR 375. 
T 
Taylor v. National .~ssistance Board [195~ 2WLR 189. 
xiii 
Thame R. :D.c. v. Bunting [_i97~ Ch 470. 
u 
v 
Vickers v. Hudson Bros. Ltd. (1970) 5 lTR 259. 
Vime v. National Dock Labow:· Board ~95~ 3.All ER 939. 
w 
Wagstaff v. Trade and Industrial Press Ltd. (1968) 2 lTR 1. 
Watling v. William Bird and Son Contractors Ltd. (1976) 11 
lTR 70. 
White v. University of Manchester [1976] lRLR 218. 
Wiseman v. Bo~nmaD ~ f97~ .AC 297. 
Woodhouse v. Brotherhood Ltd. ~97~ 2QB 520. 
Woollet v. Min. of .Agriculture and Fisheries @.95~ 3.All ER 
529. 
